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Abstract 
 
Two interpretive trends have driven the recent revival of Kant’s 
political philosophy. On the one hand, a focus on his cosmopolitanism 
as providing a normative agenda for a global political order. On the 
other hand, a turn to Kant as a theorist of a distinctly state-centred 
political morality, based on his much debated property argument. This 
thesis argues that these interpretive trends have sidetracked us from 
Kant’s most sustained, systematic and original cosmopolitan vision as it 
is laid out in the Doctrine of Right. I develop this framework through the 
notion of a global standpoint as a distinctly first-person perspective from 
which agents reflexively recognise their systematic interdependence in 
a world of limited space. The global standpoint binds what I call ‘earth 
dwellers’ – corporeal agents who concurrently coexist on the earth’s 
spherical surface – to a certain kind of comportment towards distant 
strangers. It is a standpoint from which we must interact with others 
with the aim of finding shared terms of coexistence. What is particularly 
fascinating about this cosmopolitan vision and of continuing relevance 
is the way in which Kant folds it into his account of juridical statehood. 
The global standpoint is not only predicated on the existences of states. 
Despite being concerned with our comportment beyond borders, the 
ensuing obligations are also to be implemented within the state context. 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism as conceived from the global standpoint is not 
directed at a global institutional order, but a world of distinctly outward-
looking states that bind themselves (and their citizens) to rightful 
comportment towards other states and non-state peoples of their own 
accord. We take up the global standpoint from within states by 
transforming them into cosmopolitan agents. 
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Abbreviations of Kant’s Works 
 
All citations refer to volume and page numbers of the Prussian Academy 
Edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and 
predecessors, 1900—), with the standard A/B form for the first/second 
editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. Where available, I have used 
translations from the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works, published by 
Cambridge University Press under the general editorship of Paul Guyer 
and Allen Wood. 
 
Ant Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
CBHH Conjectural Beginnings of Human History  
CF The Conflict of the Faculties 
CJ Critique of Judgment  
CPR Critique of Pure Reason 
CrPrR Critique of Practical Reason 
Discovery On a Discovery whereby any new Critique of Pure 
Reason is made superfluous by an older one 
DoR Doctrine of Right 
En An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?  
Gr Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
ID Inaugural Dissertation 
IUH Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Intent 
Logic Lectures on Logic 
PL Lectures on Pedagogy 
PP Toward Perpetual Peace 
Preparatory DoR Preparatory Works for the Doctrine of Right 
Preparatory PP Preparatory Works for Perpetual Peace 
Proleg Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 
Rel Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason 
T&P On the Common Saying: This May Be Correct 
in Theory, but it is of No Use in Practice 
WOT What is Orientation in Thinking? 
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The contemporary slogan, Think Global-Act Local, requires 
modification. We need first to ask what it means to Think Global, 
because we do not yet know how.  




We shall not cease from exploration. And the end of all our exploring 
will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time. 
— T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding. 
 




While Kant’s status as a key figure in the history of philosophical 
cosmopolitanism has never been in doubt (e.g. Kleingeld & E. Brown 
2014; Kleingeld 2016), for long his ideas were primarily absorbed only 
indirectly through his moral philosophy. First generation cosmopolitans 
in contemporary global justice debates (e.g. Tan 2004; Caney 2005), for 
instance, prominently invoked Kant’s ethical idea of all humans as 
members of a single, all-encompassing moral community (Gr 4:433-
440, see also Kleingeld 2016, pp.19-21). In so doing, they reflected a 
wider, long-standing tendency to politicise Kant’s moral writings. The 
primary “culprit” in this regard was John Rawls (2000, pp.143-328), 
who had effectively turned the Groundwork’s account of ethically good 
willing as self-legislation into a ‘decision-making procedure’ for the 
generation of universally binding principles of justice: this, despite 
Kant’s own insistence on a sharp distinction between right and ethics. 
Consequently, Kant was read as a kind of proto-constructivist about 
justice (Rawls 1980), vindicating the political ideal of a well-ordered 
democratic society constituted by collectively self-legislating citizens of 
equal moral standing.1 
This has changed over the last few decades, as interpreters have 
begun to study Kant’s actual political writings in their own right. In 
particular, two interpretive tendencies have emerged, which are in some 
tension with each other. On the one hand, a set of innovative work on 
his occasional political essays, in particular Perpetual Peace (e.g. Höffe 
2006; Lutz-Bachmann 1997), occasioned a resurgence of interest in 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Presenting Kant as a theorist of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism (G. Brown 2009) or even global democracy (Held 
                                                
1 Versions of this idea can be found also in Reath (1997) and Maus (1994). 
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1995), authors focused on his prescriptive agenda for a global political 
order laid out in the essay’s three ‘Definitive Articles’. The latter call for 
every state to have a republican constitution, demand the creation of a 
league of free states, and envisage a ‘cosmopolitan right’ to interact 
across boundaries. The ensuing debates primarily investigated Kant’s 
rationale for vindicating this specific set of cosmopolitan institutions 
instead of some equally conceivable alternative: for instance, his choice 
of a limited, voluntary league of states instead of the coercive form of 
world government that he had preferred earlier. This led to further 
debates about the essay’s applicability and hence its continued 
relevance under contemporary circumstances (e.g. Habermas 1998).  
The second and even more recent interpretive trend was driven 
by a revival of interest in the Doctrine of Right, the first part of Kant’s late 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and arguably the most systematic 
formulation of his political philosophy. The spoilt state of significant 
portions of the text was among the main reasons why the Doctrine of Right 
received only little attention until the late 1980s.2 Yet, Bernd Ludwig’s 
(1988) crucial rearrangement of what he had identified as editorial 
errors at the printing stage elucidated crucial parts of the argument and 
initiated a systematic and philosophically oriented body of interpretive 
work (Flikschuh 2000; Ripstein 2009; Byrd & Hruschka 2010). 
Interestingly, the elevation of the Doctrine of Right to Kant’s most 
significant work in political philosophy has come with a ‘statist backlash’ 
of sorts.3 Until recently championed as a cosmopolitan figurehead, 
Kant is increasingly associated with a particularly compelling argument 
in favour of a distinctly moral justification of the modern state (e.g. 
                                                
2 The seeming textual disorder even led some interpreters to concur with 
Schopenhauer’s ‘senility thesis’ (e.g. Arendt 1982), according to which Kant’s 
intellectual vigour was already waning at the stage of writing the Doctrine of Right. 
3 This is not to deny that much of the recent innovative work on Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism has very well taken into account the Doctrine of Right (e.g. Flikschuh 
2000; Kleingeld 2004; Kleingeld 2011; Muthu 2009, pp.122-210). The category of 
cosmopolitan right in particular has of late received increased and more systematic 
attention in the literature (Benhabib 2004; Byrd & Hruschka 2010, pp.205-210; 
Niesen 2007; Kleingeld 2011, pp.72-92). 
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Ripstein 2009; Hodgson 2010; Stilz 2011a). This is not without textual 
warrant: while earlier essays such as Perpetual Peace are emphatic and 
unconditional in their cosmopolitan commitments, large parts of the 
Doctrine of Right seem to focus on a cluster of ideas – around (the relation 
between) property rights, political obligation and state entrance – 
familiar from the classical social contract tradition.  
Kant’s own acknowledgement that he had “towards the end of 
the book worked less thoroughly over certain sections than might be 
expected in comparison with earlier ones” (DoR 6:209), may easily be 
taken to confirm this impression. Precisely at the point at which Kant 
has developed and delineated the domain of right most systematically, 
he appears also to have become more sceptical of anything like justice 
beyond the state and appears to have pulled back from the earlier 
uncompromising cosmopolitanism. So, for example, whereas Perpetual 
Peace had included sharp criticisms of state power and of warfare, the 
Doctrine of Right arrives at a much more favourable view of the state as a 
distinct kind of juridical agent in virtue of being a necessary enforcer of 
individual rights claims. To some interpreters, Kant’s considerations on 
international and cosmopolitan right seemed to be little more than 
appendices to a view of justice, prominent in early liberal thought, as 
effectively terminating in state establishment. 
On an interpretive level, Kant’s much-discussed property 
argument, around which Bernd Ludwig (1988) himself had constructed 
his philosophical case for a reconceived approach to reading the Doctrine 
of Right, played a crucial role in this context. For long regarded as 
obscure, inaccessible and largely a failure, the idea that the connection 
between state authority and the possibility of individual property rights 
is at the heart of the Doctrine of Right and its most original innovation has 
rapidly become a commonplace among interpreters.4 
                                                
4 Another seminal piece to this effect was Brandt (1982). 
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In a wider context, the ‘statist backlash’ was further fuelled by 
the fact that it proved conducive to the incipient absorption of Kant’s 
political thought into contemporary normative theory. His distinctly 
moral justification of state authority could not only be nicely juxtaposed 
to Hobbesian, Lockean and Communitarian alternatives;5 it also 
coincided with a more general return of statism even in contemporary 
global justice debates, where a growing camp of internationalists 
revisited earlier cosmopolitans’ farewell to the idea of sovereign 
statehood and argued for a system of nationally independent though 
internationally interdependent states (e.g. Buchanan 2004; Valentini 
2011; Sangiovanni 2008). 
The argument that I will develop in this thesis defies both these 
interpretive tendencies. I believe that it is precisely in the Doctrine of Right 
that Kant develops his most sustained, systematic and original 
cosmopolitan vision. This is not to deny the absolute centrality of his 
property-based justification of the state. Instead, Kant folds his long-
standing cosmopolitan commitments into a novel account of juridical 
statehood. I shall develop this claim through the notion of a global 
standpoint as a reflexive, first-person standpoint through which 
individuals must acknowledge their interdependence with others in a 
world of limited space. Yet despite being concerned with our 
comportment beyond borders, the global standpoint is itself conceived 
from within the state. That is to say, the pertinent obligation – to 
interact with distant strangers on a reciprocal basis – is predicated on 
the existence of states and institutionally implemented within them. 
Hence, Kant’s global standpoint is ultimately also a global 
standpoint on the state. It is directed not at the ideal of a global 
institutional order, but at a cosmopolitically transformed notion of 
statehood. I hope to show that this is not only among the most original 
                                                
5 This holds analogously with regard to recently burgeoning debates on state 
territorial rights, where Kantian accounts are usually construed in opposition to their 
Lockean and liberal nationalist opponents (Stilz 2011b; Ypi 2014). 
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(though rarely appreciated) insights of Kant’s political philosophy, but 
also one of continuing relevance. In the remainder of this Introduction, 
I will (1.) lay out the main ideas underlying my interpretive framework 
and then (2.) sketch the structure of the argument of this thesis, before 
(3.) concluding with some remarks on method. 
1. The Global Standpoint  
The cosmopolitan framework which I develop in this thesis will first lead 
us away from the state context and Kant’s property argument with 
which it is usually associated. Yet, it is not the kind of cosmopolitanism 
familiar to interpreters: a substantive normative account usually 
associated with essays such as Perpetual Peace, which is said to deliver 
blueprints of a global institutional order, substantive principles of 
distributive justice or even concrete lists of human rights. Instead, I will 
urge us to take a step back and turn to a deeper and more systematic 
cosmopolitan vision: how we should conceive of the way individuals 
relate to one another in virtue of the fact that they share the earth in 
common. That is to say, what I take to be most fascinating about Kant’s 
global thinking in the Doctrine of Right and wish therefore to spell out 
more systematically is a particular way of framing the problem of global 
coexistence. 
At the heart of the framework I propose is a thought to which 
interpreters of Kant’s cosmopolitanism have thus far paid scant 
attention: the mere fact that they can affect and constrain each other 
with their choices by virtue of sharing the limited space of the earth’s 
spherical surface unites humans in a particular kind of community. I 
call this community one of ‘earth dwellers’, that is, corporeal agents in 
direct physical confrontation with each other. It is neither one of shared 
humanity (in Kant’s noumenal sense) nor of (property-mediated) global 
citizenship, but one of “possible physical interaction” (DoR 6:352). I 
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hope to show that much of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in the Doctrine of 
Right is concerned with coming to grips with the nature and normativity 
of this distinctive type of community among earth dwellers. 
Kant’s focus on this community of physical beings who act on 
and thereby affect one another merely in virtue of inhabiting and 
sharing one space can only be understood in the wider context of the 
moral domain of right. To be more precise, the “place-related” kind of 
cosmopolitanism I shall reconstruct over subsequent chapters is 
intricately tied to his attempt to develop an account of the “formal 
external relation between the power of choice of one person to that of 
another” (DoR 6:230). Kant believes its global scope to be constitutive 
of the very concept of right itself: the earth’s spherical surface is that 
stage on which possible rights relations between agents unfold as 
relations of choice that manifest themselves externally in ‘earthly’ time 
and space.  
Its global scope is reflected in Kant’s claim that the very concept 
of right gives rise to three functionally differentiated though 
constitutively intertwined forms of rights relations at state, international 
and cosmopolitan levels. Together, these constitute a complex, self-
sustaining system of right. “If the principle of outer freedom limited by 
law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful 
condition”, Kant insists, “the framework of all the others is unavoidably 
undermined and must finally collapse” (DoR 6:311). None of the three 
levels fully instantiates the idea of rightful relations; none of them could 
persist on its own. 
A vital element of the framework I propose is constituted by the 
perspective from which it is conceived: the insight into the normativity 
of embodiment under conditions of spatial constraints endows earth 
dwellers with a distinctly first-person standpoint through which they 
reflexively recognise their systematic interdependence with other agents 
in a world of limited space. What I shall call the ‘global standpoint’ 
encapsulates a radical shift in perspective away from an Archimedean 
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observer’s ‘view from nowhere’, to a first-person standpoint from which 
agents must interact with one another with the aim of finding shared 
solutions to shared problems.  
This reflexivity is vital to Kant’s global standpoint. It elucidates 
how, in virtue of sharing the earth in common, we each affect one 
another, but it also indicates the sense in which we are each able 
reflexively to relate to all those human beings with whom we stand in 
thoroughgoing interaction. It is a standpoint, that is to say, through 
which we acknowledge our ability to locate ourselves vis-à-vis everyone 
else, and from which we interact with others. This kind of reflexivity is 
a feature of Kant’s philosophical thinking in general. It is central to his 
Copernican turn that the very loss of a transcendent, cosmological 
perspective means that reason needs to determine its limits reflexively. 
Indeed, this insight has long been central to accounts of Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy and has of late been taken more seriously among 
proponents of Kantian ethics.6  
When it comes to Kant’s political philosophy, however, the idea 
that our external interactions with others are similarly perspectival is 
less well established. This has, on the one hand, certainly to do with the 
fact that it has for long simply not been considered an essential part (and 
hence in the context) of his critical philosophy. Recent attempts to 
appropriate the Doctrine of Right for primarily normative purposes, 
                                                
6 Most prominent in this context is Stephen Darwall’s (2006) reformulation of Kantian 
ethics from a “second-person standpoint”. Darwall’s aim is to present morality as 
concerned with our relations to ‘concrete others’ and obligations as grounded in the 
reciprocal authority agents have to make demands on one another (see also Thompson 
2004). It is the second-person standpoint – “the perspective you and I take up when 
we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s conduct and will” (Darwall 2006, 
p.3) – from which he derives his particular understanding of morality as equal 
accountability. Darwall’s reconstruction is geared both against first-personal 
internalist readings such as Korsgaard’s (2007) constitutivism, and Nagel’s (1989) 
third-personal “view from nowhere” that regards others from an impersonal agent-
neutral perspective. Given that Darwall’s second-person standpoint is only a 
particular kind of first-person standpoint – namely one that includes a second-personal 
aspect (see also Pauer-Studer 2010) –  it ends up being strikingly close to the (inherently 
relational) way I will reconstruct Kant’s political philosophy. Ariel Zylberman (2016) 
has recognised this. 
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however, have exacerbated this tendency by likening its justificatory 
method to the foundationalist forms of natural rights reasoning that are 
prevalent in contemporary political philosophy. In this thesis, I shall 
argue that Kant takes not only our perception of the world to be 
perspectival, but also our interactions with other agents in it. 
Rather than being subjectivist, however, the global standpoint 
constitutes a constrained first-personal perspective. Kant remains 
committed to the enlightenment dictum that we must think for ourselves 
which, in turn, requires that we think from the point of view of every 
other rational agent. He is interested in a specifically “human 
standpoint” (Longuenesse 2005), that is the standpoint of reason shared 
by all finite rational beings. Again, the human standpoint is not a 
detached, objective standpoint but a first-person standpoint that has a 
certain kind of impartiality criterion built into it. The global standpoint 
binds us to interact with distant strangers in a particular kind of way, 
namely by acknowledging our shared earth dwellership. An accurate 
understanding of what this amounts to thus requires that we come to 
grips with Kant’s vision of the (global) community of ‘original common 
possession’ as that idea which simultaneously functions as the reference 
point for the global standpoint and a constraint on it. 
Notice, though, that the global standpoint does not come with 
substantive principles on the basis of which a genuine plurality of agents 
could coordinate their interactions. It is not a single standpoint on the 
whole but is constituted instead by a plurality of first-personally reflexive 
standpoints in disjunctive relation, coming together under the concept 
of original common possession. What we share with other earth dwellers 
is the capacity to come to terms with the fact of our concurrent 
coexistence on the earth as juridical equals. The global standpoint thus 
issues a formal requirement to comport ourselves in a certain way. We 
must interact with each other in a manner that allows a plurality of 
agents with diverse and potentially incompatible sets of principles and 
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political arrangements nevertheless normatively to structure the 
common space they share by negotiating shared terms of coexistence.  
This open-endedness it particularly vital for Kant in the colonial 
context, that is when states and their citizens interact with distant 
strangers who do not share their statist political arrangements. These 
‘cosmopolitan encounters’ reveal that the reflexive awareness of shared 
earth dwellership is itself predicated on the state context. That is to say, 
it is their rightful condition ‘back home’ – their membership of already 
established polities from which they have ‘sailed forth’ – that binds the 
conduct of Western emissaries, settlers or traders on whichever soil they 
set foot. On a textual level, I will show how this is reflected in a recursive 
argumentative sequence that leads to the global standpoint through 
Kant’s property-based justification of statehood. Citizens of Western 
states arrive at the global standpoint by means of reflecting on (the 
moral conditions of possibility of) their own, statist form of political 
organization. Substantively, this implies not only that Western states 
and those who claim to represent them abroad must refrain from simply 
extending the modern state to the world at large. Given that they lack 
the grounds on which to predicate anything of their stateless 
counterparts, it also means that they must limit themselves to making 
unilateral offers of peaceful interaction to the other side in the hope that 
they gradually get to know and understand each other.  
Yet, the global standpoint is not only predicated on and taken 
up from within states. It is also incumbent on states to institutionalise 
the pertinent requirements of their own accord. Their very existence 
forecloses the possibility of a truly public global institutional order with 
the power to make universally binding laws. The reason for this 
predicament is that Kant conceives of states as moral agents with an 
artificial (sovereign) will that would be destroyed if they had a supremely 
coercive agent above them. This explains why he construes both 
domains of rights relations beyond the state as characteristically non-
coercive: states lack the authority to force other states into a coercive 
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federation and their citizens lack the authority to force distant strangers 
into a cosmopolitan rights regime. 
I thus read both domains of public right beyond the state not as 
blueprints for a global constitutional order, but as laying out norms of 
international and cosmopolitan conduct that states and their citizens 
respectively are duty-bound to impose on themselves in their 
interactions with other states and non-state groups. In the cosmopolitan 
context, this implies that the obligation to interact with other earth 
dwellers from the global standpoint is not only predicated on the 
existence of states but must also be legally implemented by them. It is 
states themselves who must legislate provisions that (coercively) 
constrain their citizens’ comportment abroad. Only where traders, 
settlers or missionaries attempt to establish interactions with distant 
strangers on fair or equitable terms can we hope for the gradual 
emergence of something like a meta-language that allows us to agree 
shared principles. In the absence of global coercive institutions, juridical 
self-constraint is the only means by which we can hope to find peaceable 
terms of coexistence with other states and non-state actors.  
Contrary to first impression, it thus turns out that Kant’s global 
standpoint does not actually issue a daunting (and frankly implausible) 
requirement to take a practical stance towards all of mankind. Such a 
stance would be bereft of all context and blind to the pertinence of 
actually existing social relations; it could hardly be action-guiding. 
Instead, the global standpoint provides us with a reflexive and critical 
stance on our very own statist political arrangements, asking us to 
recognise the relations of property, territory or sovereignty we find 
ourselves in as the contingent products of history that they are. But 
rather than doing away with them, Kant’s cosmopolitanism is geared 
towards a world of radically reformed states that bind themselves (and their 
citizens) to rightful comportment towards other states and non-state 
peoples of their own accord. We take up the global standpoint from 
within states by transforming them into cosmopolitan agents. 
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2. The Argument of this Thesis 
In laying out some of the core ideas of this thesis, I showed how my 
argument first leads us beyond and away from the state context (as well 
as the textual focus on Kant’s property argument), in order to return to 
it eventually. This is not to say, however, that in the end we are back to 
where we started. For, we come away with a cosmopolitically transformed 
notion of the state, that is one which acknowledges obligations of 
international and cosmopolitan right and thus binds itself and hence its 
citizens to interact with other states and distant strangers on peaceful 
terms. The shape of this argument is also reflected in the structure of 
the thesis. 
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for my novel perspective on 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism by carving out the conceptual space of Kant’s 
concern with the concurrent existence of a plurality of corporeal agents 
on the spherical surface of the earth. I start by inviting us to read beyond 
the much-discussed property argument, focusing on the subsequent 
discussion of ‘original acquisition of land’ and the ensuing right to be 
somewhere. I show that Kant there introduces a moral relation that is 
basic to the Doctrine of Right yet insufficiently appreciated: the domain of 
embodied agency under spatial constraints. The relation between what 
I call earth dwellers is ‘external’ but not property-mediated, thus eluding 
a distinction generally deemed both definitive of Kant’s political 
philosophy, and exhaustive: that between innate and acquired right. 
Consequently, it can neither be reduced to a relation of shared 
humanity (in the noumenal sense), nor of shared citizenship in a man-
made political institution like the state. 
Chapter 2 goes on to develop the moral domain pertinent to 
embodied agency under spatial constraints as a template for Kant’s 
global thinking. I do so by reconstructing his notion of original common 
possession of the earth, emphasising its formal character as opposed to 
the material conception prevalent in the natural law tradition. The core 
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of the chapter is constituted by a detour into Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy; this is motivated by his characterisation of original common 
possession as ‘disjunctive’. I argue that the idea of original common 
possession describes a system of mutual exclusion in which a plurality 
of persons think of themselves as standing in a relation of ‘possible 
physical interaction’ in virtue of sharing a limited space. Kant’s ‘global 
standpoint’ constitutes a reflexive, first-personal perspective from which 
we think of ourselves as participants in a cosmopolitan community of 
individuals whose fates are inevitably bound up with one another in the 
most basic normatively relevant way. 
Chapter 3 gathers more systematic evidence against an 
interpretation of the Doctrine of Right that stops short at the property-
based argument for state entrance. I here investigate the puzzle of non-
state peoples, showing why, rather than being licensed to coerce non-state 
peoples into the state, Western emissaries must interact with them on 
the basis of cosmopolitan right. I make two claims in particular: first, 
Kant’s recursive justification of state entrance is predicated on the 
existence of reciprocally raised property claims, such that peoples 
without established property systems lack the pertinent duty. Second, 
Western settlers must interact with non-state peoples from the global 
standpoint. It is their own state citizenship that binds them, in the 
context of cosmopolitan encounters, to treat their counterparts as earth 
dwellers and to go no further than offering themselves for ‘commerce’. 
Chapter 4 continues the search for a shared basis on which the 
participants in disjunctive community could coordinate their 
coexistence. To that end, I turn to Onora O’Neill’s suggestion that all 
it takes for principles to be shareable and hence authoritative for a 
plurality of agents is a specific, namely law-like, form. Principles simply 
need to be abstract and general enough in order to hold for all earth 
dwellers, statist and non-statist alike. Ultimately, however, O’Neill 
overlooks that the coordination of a plurality of interacting agents requires 
norms that are vested with interpersonal authority. Private agents are 
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constitutively unfit to come up with such principles. However, given 
that at the level of cosmopolitan right Kant also denies a shift to the 
coercive public standpoint, we are left with the unsettling prospect of an 
actual dialogue with non-state peoples through which we can hope to 
gradually get to know and understand each other. 
Chapter 5 argues that our obligation to interact with other earth 
dwellers from the global standpoint is to be implemented at the state 
level. In order to make this claim, I read Kant’s two domains of rights 
relations beyond the domestic context not as depicting a blueprint for a 
global institutional order, but as spelling out a set of juridical obligations 
that are predicated on the existence of states and the discharge of which 
is incumbent on states (and their citizens) themselves. Rather than a 
public global order, Kant’s mature cosmopolitanism is thus geared 
towards a world of radically reformed and distinctly outward-looking 
states that bind themselves to rightful comportment towards other states 
and non-state peoples of their own accord. In the absence of truly public 
rights relations that encompass the entire cosmopolitan plurality, we 
must constrain our own comportment in order to find peaceable terms 
of coexistence with other states and non-state actors.  
Based on this notion of a ‘cosmopolitanism within one country’, 
Chapter 6 reconceives Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan progress as a 
process in the course of which states gradually move towards conformity 
with their own underlying cosmopolitan principles. Focusing on the 
Doctrine of Right’s agent-oriented conceptualisation of progress rather 
than the process-oriented teleology central to Perpetual Peace, I read 
perpetual peace – a condition in which all states interact with other 
states and non-state peoples on the basis of mutually agreed terms – as 
an idea of reason that arises as a corollary of our obligation to take up 
the global standpoint. Insofar as we act on our own duty to transform 
states in line with cosmopolitan principles, we can reasonably hope that 
other states will act likewise and that non-state peoples accept our offers 
for commerce, such that we can gradually approach a condition of 
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peace. The practical belief in the attainability of the “entire final end of 
the doctrine of right” (DoR 6:355) serves to orient our cosmopolitan 
activity from the global standpoint analogously to the way in which, in 
the ethical context, the postulates of practical reason allow us to set the 
highest good as an end without a sense of moral despair. 
3. Some Remarks on Method  
This project originally started out with the aim of making Kant’s mature 
political philosophy fruitful for contemporary disputes about global 
justice. My initial worry was that, despite the fact that the debate has by 
now gone through a number of consecutive “waves” (Wollner 2013) and 
is already in the process of being historicised (Forrester 2014; Moyn 
2016), its heavily practice-oriented character continues to drive its 
proponents towards a certain kind of philosophical impatience. 
Consequently, the deep and systematic reflection on the question what 
unites individuals globally that I hoped to find in the Doctrine of Right 
promised to directly enrich global justice disputes. 
As I went along, however, I quickly noticed that by seeking to 
simultaneously interpret and normatively defend Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism, I was running the risk of inheriting the very 
predicament I associated with the prevalent ‘normative Kantianism’ 
that I had set out to avoid. For the compromises that such an endeavour 
unavoidably requires would have allowed me neither to go beyond the 
philosophical surface textually speaking (such that I would end up 
saying hardly anything new or surprising as far as Kant is concerned) 
nor normatively to justify the ensuing position in a way that would 
satisfy contemporary proponents of global justice. Lest I fail to 
successfully speak to either audience, I thus decided to engage with 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism on its own philosophical terms, going much 
more into interpretive depth than initially expected. 
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Concretely, this means that I read Kant’s cosmopolitanism not 
only as intricately connected to the notion of right but also through the 
lens of his philosophical system as a whole. In this, I depart from much 
work at the heart of the recent revival of Kant’s political thought 
particularly in the Anglophone context, which proceeds from the 
assumption that isolating Kant the political theorist from Kant the 
systematic philosopher goes some way in making the former more 
accessible to contemporary readers (e.g. Ripstein 2009; Ellis 2005). In 
contrast, I shall claim that we will not be able to come to terms with the 
form of Kant’s global thinking unless we link it, at least to some extent, 
to the general form of his philosophical thinking. I simply do not think 
that the most promising way to demonstrate the continued practical 
relevance of Kant’s politics is necessarily to vindicate it  “without taking 
on the full commitments of his broader project in practical philosophy” 
(Ripstein 2009, p.356). 
That is not to say, however, that this thesis should be read as a 
purely exegetical exercise in Kant-scholarship or a project of historical 
reconstruction. I say this not only because I will indeed indicate at 
several points throughout the thesis (and sum up more systematically in 
its Conclusion) where I see striking contrasts between the Kantian 
conceptual framework and the contemporary global justice mainstream 
arise. It also speaks to a more fundamental view about the point of 
studying the history of philosophy in the first place: that it is precisely 
engagement with great philosophers that can help us understand and 
get a new perspective on our own concerns and philosophical problems, 
and be it in virtue of coming to appreciate an entirely different way of 
approaching the pertinent questions. As Allen Wood pointedly puts it, 
“solving a philosophical problem is not like solving a problem in 
engineering” (Wood 2002b, p.218) in the sense that the issue is not 
primarily to find a solution that enables us to do something in the future 
that we could not do in the past, but rather to come to better understand 
the problem in the first place. And given that most of our philosophical 
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questions have been created and shaped through a long historical 
process in which philosophers over and again adopted, criticized and 
modified the thoughts of earlier ones, we cannot even fully understand 
them unless we understand their origins. 
In interpreting a text, however, our aim should not be to rethink 
an author’s thoughts – this would be an impossible task, particularly 
when it comes to a contested and at times obscure work such as the 
Doctrine of Right, where we can hardly hope for a single correct 
interpretation (which is not to deny that there are more or less coherent 
and convincing ones). Our aim should rather be to work out what the 
author meant by what they said, and that may include asking a text our 
own questions and making sense of it using concepts and ideas that the 
author herself may not have had at her disposal (Wood 2002b, p.223). 
The corollary is that the very attempt to recover, understand and 
articulate the meaning of a text can provide the most original and 
surprising insights into our own contemporary problems – it can tell us 
who and where we are philosophically. This, however, requires that our 
interpretive engagement is serious, detailed and sustained lest we simply 
find our prior commitments reflected in the text. Given that my aim in 
reconstructing Kant’s cosmopolitanism is thus to speak to Kant-scholars 
and normative political theorists alike, I have tried to employ his 
technical vocabulary sparingly – whilst remaining aware that there are 
insights we would genuinely miss if we dispensed of it altogether and 
likened Kant’s vernacular outright to that of contemporary political 
philosophy.
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Chapter 1 
The Right to be Somewhere 
 
 
In the Introduction, I gave an overview of some of the predominant 
ways in which Kant’s political philosophy is currently read. We saw that 
interpreters interested in Kant’s cosmopolitanism have traditionally 
focused on the institutional parameters of a cosmopolitan world order 
laid out particularly in Perpetual Peace. At the same time, I identified 
something like a ‘statist backlash’ driven by the rediscovery of Doctrine of 
Right’s property argument, on the basis of which interpreters construe a 
distinctly moral justification for modern statehood. 
My reconstruction of what I call Kant’s global standpoint will 
lead us away from both of these interpretative trends. This is not 
because I believe them to be without merit in principle, rather they may 
distract from what I take to be among the most fascinating and original 
aspects of Kant’s political philosophy, namely a deeply systematic 
reflection on the way in which human beings relate to one another 
merely in virtue of their concurrent coexistence on the spatially 
bounded earth.  
It is important to put my cards on the table from the outset 
particularly with regard to the (by now) widely accepted centrality of 
statehood and property in the context of the Doctrine of Right. I take it 
that the mere amount of space, effort and philosophical sophistication 
Kant dedicates to justifying a property-based duty of state entrance 
makes a strong case for its systematic importance. While, in Chapter 3, 
I will endorse a modified reading of this argument (that questions its 
scope of validity in particular), I do not want to challenge its significance 
as such. My aim is rather to point out an important way in which the 
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property argument is not the end of the story either textually or 
systematically speaking – that, on its own, it is bound to give us an 
incomplete picture of what is going on in Kant’s mature political 
philosophy. Specifically, it leads us to overlook a distinct cosmopolitan 
vision that is central to the Doctrine of Right as a whole. 
The aim of the present chapter is to do some necessary 
groundwork by creating conceptual space for this reading. I will do this 
by suggesting an interpretation that does not build on the Doctrine of 
Right’s much-ploughed sections on international and cosmopolitan right 
(which I turn to in later chapters) rather than a rarely appreciated 
passage of the section on ‘private right’, i.e., the very part that is usually 
invoked in the context of state-focused interpretive frameworks. My 
intention is to point to a crucial yet insufficiently acknowledged concern 
in the Doctrine of Right: the conditions of embodied agency under spatial 
constraints as constituted by the earth’s limited surface. In this chapter, 
I start to illustrate this concern through Kant’s mysterious ‘right to be 
somewhere’, pointing out that sustained reflection on this right offers a 
vital insight into a particular kind of moral relation that is ‘external’ (as 
located in time and space), but not property-mediated – a relation 
among what I will call ‘earth dwellers’. Given their focus on Kant’s 
central distinction between innate right and acquired right, interpreters 
have rarely appreciated the significance of this relation, or indeed what 
follows from it. In the course of this chapter, I will develop the 
conceptual tension that the right to be somewhere constitutes with 
regard to the Doctrine of Right’s overall architecture, a tension that will 
pave the way for a reconceived account of Kant’s global theorising in 
the next chapter.  
The argument proceeds as follows: I start, in Section 1, with a 
sketch of the right to be somewhere as introduced by Kant in the Doctrine 
of Right’s section on private right. The remainder of the chapter then 
focuses on the difficulty of making sense of this right within the broader 
architectonic structure of the work, namely that it eludes classification 
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with regard to Kant’s vital characterization, introduced in Section 2, of 
all rights as either ‘acquired’ or ‘innate’. After excluding the right to be 
somewhere from the domain of acquired right (Section 3), Section 4 sets 
out to show that it cannot be part of the innate right on either of the 
latter’s currently predominant readings. My reflection on the normative 
implications of the concurrent existence of physically embodied agents 
under circumstances of spatial constraints thus brings to light a distinct 
kind of moral relation that can neither be reduced to our shared 
humanity in a ‘noumenal’ sense, nor to legal-institutional membership 
in a shared polity. It is this moral relation – between physical beings that 
act and affect one another in virtue of inhabiting a particular, limited 
space – that will be at the centre of subsequent chapters.  
Let me also mention that, as we go along, I shall raise a number 
of questions that I will only be able to answer (or, for that matter, fully 
grasp) at later stages. But this should not keep us from achieving this 
chapter’s aim, which is to sketch the conceptual landscape on which the 
main argument of the thesis as a whole shall unfold.  
1. On Original Acquisition of Land  
As I just mentioned, the idea that the property argument not only 
contains the key to Kant’s justification of political authority but is 
indeed central to the Doctrine of Right (if not his entire mature political 
philosophy) as a whole is now well-established among interpreters.1 
Ever since Reinhardt Brandt’s (1982) seminal analysis, debates have 
focused on the precise nature of the (partly obscure) argument, and how 
the duty of state entrance is supposed to follow from it. The gist of the 
account – while individuals have claims to property in the pre-civil 
                                                
1 E.g. Flikschuh (2000), Ripstein (2009), Byrd and Hruschka (2010). This is of course 
not to say that the property argument is the only site of debate with regard to the 
Doctrine of Right. To name just one example, there is an extensive body of literature 
on the domain of public right and its institutional implications (e.g. Waldron 1996). 
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condition, they can vindicate those claims only through entrance into 
the civil condition – is increasingly popular even among contemporary 
normative theorists (e.g Stilz 2011a). The latter appreciate both the 
refreshing nature of its account of property rights (one that is reducible 
neither to the traditional natural rights nor purely conventionalist 
accounts) and the unconditional kind of political obligation following 
from it. I will save closer consideration of the property argument for 
later chapters. For now, I want to leave these much-trodden 
battlegrounds behind and turn to something Kant adds only after having 
laid out the details of the actual property argument (DoR 6:245-57). His 
enigmatic claim there is that 
all human beings are originally (i.e., prior to any act of 
choice that establishes a right) in a possession of land that 
is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be 
wherever nature of chance (apart from their will) has 
placed them. (DoR 6:262) 
Surely, the passage’s marginal location within the text explains at least 
to some extent why it has, with few exceptions,2 largely dropped off 
interpreters’ radar. I postpone until Chapter 3 the important question 
as to why Kant introduces the idea that every person has a right to be 
somewhere only after the bulk of his discussion of property. For now, 
let us get a first grip on what he is doing in this passage by taking a closer 
look at the more immediate context. 
Having painfully ‘deduced’ the conditions of possibility for 
having something external as one’s own – the details of which we can 
bracket for now – Kant turns to the question how objects can be 
rightfully acquired (DoR 6:258ff.). He starts by distinguishing two kinds 
                                                
2 For instance Byrd and Hruschka (2010, pp.126-129) and Niesen (2007; 2011). In 
contrast, the widely cited volumes by Timmons (2002) or Denis (2009) contain not a 
single reference to the right to be somewhere. If anything, systematic reflections tend 
to be found within discussions of ‘cosmopolitan right’, where Kant repeats a line of 
argument from the passage in ‘private right’ that I will focus on. I say more about 
the relation between these two passages in the subsequent chapter.    
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of acquisition: things can either be acquired by being derived from what 
belongs to someone else (through a contractual exchange), or they can 
be acquired originally. It is the latter kind that Kant is primarily 
interested in. Readers familiar with Kant’s theoretical philosophy may 
associate the notion of original acquisition with his account of concept 
formation. There (see in particular Discovery; ID), Kant argues that the 
a priori forms of space and time as well as the categories are ‘originally 
acquired’: they are grounded in innate receptive capacities of the mind 
(and hence ‘original’ in the pertinent sense), but these cognitive 
capacities can in turn only be enabled or activated by sensible 
impressions.3 While I will return to this analogy later on in this chapter, 
it is important to notice that in the present context, Kant of course has 
a different kind of original acquisition in mind: the acquisition of a 
previously unowned object by bringing it under one’s control.  
Kant then goes on to focus his attention on a particular kind of 
original acquisition, namely first acquisition. Claiming that “first 
acquisition of a thing can only be acquisition of land” (DoR 6:261), he 
argues: 
Land (understood as all habitable ground) is to be 
regarded as the substance with respect to whatever is 
movable upon it, while the existence of the latter is to be 
regarded only as inherence. Just as in a theoretical sense, 
accidents cannot exist apart from a substance, so in a 
practical sense no one can have what is movable on a 
piece of land as his own unless he is assumed to be 
already in rightful possession of the land.  
Admittedly, this claim is no less puzzling than the right to be 
somewhere, which it immediately leads up to. What does seem to be 
clear is that Kant is proceeding regressively here, from reflections on 
the possibility of property rights, to the more fundamental conditions of 
                                                
3 See also Zoeller (1989), Longuenesse (1998, pp.221-225; pp.249-253). 
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raising anything like a claim to an object as “ours” in the first place. But 
what argumentative work is this regressive move intended to do?  
An intuitively appealing explanation – and the one generally 
adopted by interpreters with a serious interest in this passage – is that 
Kant is simply alluding to a straightforward sense in which people’s 
relationship to land precedes their relationship to other external things: 
I need to own the land in order to possess something that is placed on 
it (e.g. Byrd & Hruschka 2010, pp.123-143). But this reading seems 
dubious both conceptually and textually speaking. Conceptually, there 
may very well be a sense in which stable enjoyment of my property right 
in my car depends on my ability to park it on a ground that I have 
secure access to. But surely my ownership right in itself cannot be 
contingent on that. Textually, notice that Kant is not talking here about 
ownership in the sense of private property (something which I can claim 
as mine regardless of whether I am physically connected to it) at all, but 
about mere physical possession or occupation.4 Consequently, he is not 
referring to land in the sense of a fenced-in plot of territory – described 
as “residence (sedes), a chosen and therefore an acquired lasting 
possession” – but merely as “habitable ground” (DoR 6:261). The fact 
that Kant seems to have something weaker in mind when it comes to 
(original acquisition of) land suggests that the thought presently under 
consideration is not as swiftly continuous with the prior property 
argument as it may seem at first. 
This suspicion is further nourished if we read a bit further on. 
At first sight, things seem to get even more confusing. For Kant now 
introduces an aspect that so far has played no role at all: the earth’s 
spherical surface. The finitude of the globe, he explains 
                                                
4 The term “rightful possession [rechtlicher Besitz]” may at first sight conflict with this 
reading. Yet, it is defined by Kant as that “with which I am so connected that 
another's use of it without my consent would wrong me” (DoR 6:245) – physical 
possession – and opposed to the notion of “merely rightful possession [bloß rechtlicher 
Besitz]”, which refers to actual ownership. 
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unites all places on its surface, for if its surface were an 
unbounded plane, people could be so dispersed on it that 
they would not come into any community with one 
another, and community would not then be a necessary 
result of their existence on the earth – The possession by 
all human beings on the earth which precedes any acts 
of theirs that would establish rights (as constituted by 
nature itself) is an original possession in common [...]. (DoR 
6:262) 
The core idea (unpacked in more detail in the subsequent chapter) 
seems to be that the earth’s spherical surface makes it physically 
impossible for human beings to get out of each other’s ways once and 
for all. Instead, they stand, from the beginning, in a relation of “possible 
physical interaction” (DoR 6:352) with everyone else globally in the 
sense that the earth’s circumference entails that interaction is 
unavoidable. If the world were an unbounded plain instead of a limited 
sphere – if interaction was avoidable – nobody would have to make any 
claims to exercise their capacity for choice and action against another. 
But let us not get ahead of ourselves. Only in the subsequent 
chapter will we take up the task of getting to grips with the kind of moral 
relation that Kant seems to associate with (or even ground in) the simple 
fact that a plurality of humans concurrently coexist on the globe. At this 
point, I shall limit myself to drawing a more basic conclusion 
concerning the notion of ‘original acquisition of land’. Notice, to that 
effect, that the spherical surface of the earth (that is to say, the spatial 
constraint it constitutes) only accrues its moral relevance in conjunction 
with another material factor: that human beings are not only morally 
accountable, but also physically embodied agents who necessarily act in 
time and space. Borrowing a concept from Sharon Byrd (2010, p.107), 
we can think of humans in this sense as “earth dwellers”: corporeal 
beings who have to share the earth in common with a plurality of agents 
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of the same kind and who (unlike lions, rabbits and bees) are able to 
grasp the normative implications of this fact.5  
This context, I take it, strongly suggests that the notion of 
‘original acquisition of land’ is at most indirectly continuous with the 
property argument. What it actually does is introduce a novel topic: the 
way in which, as embodied agents who act in time and space, humans 
inevitably make a particular kind of seizure, namely the piece of land that 
they take up in virtue of the very fact that they are spatially extended 
(embodied) agents. Having ‘somewhere to be’ thus constitutes a basic 
presupposition for the very kind of moral interaction which, I hope to 
show, is at the heart of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Cases like that of 
refugees or stateless persons illustrate how failing to have one’s place on 
earth secured, and hence being vulnerable to the arbitrary choices of 
others, essentially deprives humans of this (external) kind of moral 
agency (Ypi 2014, pp.294/5; Flikschuh 2000, pp.156/7).6  
Notice that our reconstruction of the notion of ‘original 
acquisition of land’ as introducing the theme of embodied agency rather 
than simply another kind of property claim also equips us with an acute 
awareness of its problematic status. For on the one hand, there is a sense 
in which ‘original acquisition of land’ is, qua unavoidability, ‘blameless’: 
unlike any other acquisition, acquisition of a place on earth occurs 
without an individual’s act or fault but merely by virtue of their physical 
entrance into the world (Flikschuh 2000, p.157). We just are the kinds 
of beings that, in virtue of pursuing projects and holding each other 
morally accountable within time and space, need to be somewhere. On 
the other hand, though, while entering the world itself is not something 
                                                
5 Any (potential) corporeal rational beings of other planets are not earth dwellers and 
hence not members of this original community of land. On the role of “extra-
terrestrials” within Kant’s philosophical framework, see Szendy (2015). 
6 I am not asserting that, without a place, we would be deprived of all moral agency 
– presumably, we could for instance still be virtuous (in the ethical sense of wiling in 
accordance with the moral law). Notice also that I am interested in the way in which 
the external kind of moral agency I am talking about requires a place in general 
rather than a specific place. Nomadic peoples or ‘travellers’ such as the Roma, for 
instance, are thus not per se deprived of it. 
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we choose to do, the very fact that we enter the world with the capacity 
for choice and action has normative implications: where and how we 
pursue our ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do so. 
In Kant’s owns words, it implies that “the choice of one is unavoidably 
opposed by nature to that of another” (DoR 6:267). We are, as it were, 
not just apathetically thrown into the world, we actively claim a place 
on earth as ours – just in virtue of acting. 
Over this chapter and the next, I will develop this puzzle more 
systematically and reconstruct the two-pronged argument Kant 
develops in response to it: on the one hand, he grants earth dwellers a 
right to be somewhere. On the other hand, he attaches strings to this 
right, namely to conceive of their own legitimate possession of a place 
as a “possession in common” (DoR 6:262) with all others. I will bracket 
the latter part of this argument until the next chapter and focus for now 
on the right to be somewhere. Given that the brevity of the passage to 
which we have limited our attention so far precludes a more 
comprehensive picture of this right, we need to contextualise it with 
regard to its systematic role within the broader architectonic of the 
Doctrine of Right. This is what I shall turn to in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
2. Embodied Agency under Spatial Constraints  
So far we have tried to make sense of the right to be somewhere within 
the narrow confines of a few crucial paragraphs in the Doctrine of Right’s 
section on ‘private right’. I will now turn to the bigger picture and try 
to relate it to a distinction generally deemed of vital importance to the 
argumentative structure of the work as a whole: that between innate 
right and acquired right. It is not only Kant himself who points us to 
the distinction’s significance for what is to follow by introducing it at the 
text’s earliest stages (DoR 6:237); recent interpretive debates on Kant’s 
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political philosophy have confirmed its indispensability for 
understanding the Doctrine of Right as a whole.7 In this section, I will seek 
to fit the right to be somewhere into either of these categories and 
conclude that these attempts are doomed to fail. Yet, as it will turn out 
in the subsequent chapter, this failure proves instructive with regard to 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism. 
But let us go a step back first. The concern with embodied 
agency under conditions of spatial constraints does not only appear in 
the final version of the Doctrine of Right. To the contrary, Kant struggles 
with it already in the preparatory works. At this stage, he seems to be 
aware of the conundrum emerging from the insight that the space I 
occupy is, on the one hand, “inseparable from my existence” (VRL 
AA23:237) but on the other hand a claim to something external to me 
that has normative implications for others. In the face of the strange 
conceptual ambiguity that attaches to this ‘right to be somewhere’, Kant 
dithers noticeably and seems unsure how to fit it into the overall 
architectonic he envisions for his political philosophy. Eventually, he 
settles on provisionally characterising it as an “innate but nevertheless 
established [entstandenes] right to a thing which should not be conceived 
as acquired because it is connected to my existence” (VRL AA23:237). 
Quite surprisingly, in the Doctrine of Right’s published version, any 
explicit reference to this ambivalence disappears completely. Kant 
apparently takes himself to have solved the problem. Indeed, the 
distinction between innate right and acquired right is introduced as 
exhaustive. As he explains in a short appendix attached to the 
Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, which sets out to provide a “general 
division of rights” (DoR 6:237):  
The highest division of rights, as (moral) capacities for 
putting others under obligations (i.e., as a lawful basis, 
titulum, for doing so), is the division into innate and acquired 
                                                
7 As an example, consider the exchange between Flikschuh (2010a) and Ripstein 
(2010).  
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right. An innate right is that which belongs to everyone 
by nature, independently of any act that would establish 
a right; an acquired right is that for which such an act is 
required. What is innately mine or yours can also be 
called what is internally mine or yours (meum vel tuum 
internum); for what is externally mine or yours must 
always be acquired. 
Every right, we are told, belongs to either of two categories: either it is 
innate, thus belonging “to everyone by nature, independently of any act 
that would establish a right” (following a Roman law term that Kant 
takes up here, it belongs to us ‘internally’), or it is acquired, that is it 
requires an act to be established. Kant goes on to explain that there is 
only one innate right: a right to “freedom (independence from being 
constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the 
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (ibid.). 
Surprisingly, though, the innate right is not unpacked any further. 
Instead, it is “put in the prolegomena” (DoR 6:238) immediately after 
being introduced and not taken up again. There seems to be something 
about the innate right that renders it unsuited for inclusion into the 
body’s main text, which goes straight into the domain of acquired right 
(what is “externally mine or yours”), i.e. property rights broadly 
construed.  
We can illustrate the wider conceptual significance of this 
distinction by focusing on the two moral domains that the categories 
ground respectively. More specifically, let us look at their scope of 
inclusion. On the one hand, the innate right is something all free and 
finite beings have “in virtue of [our] humanity” – a specification that I 
will focus on shortly. In contrast, acquired rights (as Kant will go on to 
argue in subsequent sections) are possible only in the civil condition, 
that is under a general will that makes coercive public laws valid for 
everyone (DoR 6:255). The pertinent kind of property relations are thus 
relations among co-citizens sharing membership in an empirical 
institution that embodies such a will. Acquired right is not only more 
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momentous in its implications (ultimately yielding state entrance), its 
possibility is also much more difficult to establish and requires Kant to 
engage in a complicated deduction the details of which are all but clear 
(DoR 6:249). Given the architectural significance of the distinction 
between the two rights categories, we would like to know how Kant 
takes himself to have solved the puzzle that apparently caused him so 
much headache in drafting the work: is the right to be somewhere an 
acquired right or is it an innate right?  
3. An Acquired Right to be Somewhere  
The intuitively most plausible answer would be to file the right to be 
somewhere under the class of acquired rights.8 At least this is what 
Kant’s own placement of the notion in the text seems to suggest. As we 
saw in the first section, it is introduced in the Doctrine of Right’s section 
on private right (as concerned with ‘acquired rights’), more specifically 
in the part that deals with the question “how to acquire something 
external” (DoR 6:258). Moreover, this reading seems to be in line with 
                                                
8 In this chapter and for most of the thesis (with the exception of my discussion of 
contractual relations in Chapters 3 and 5), I will equate the category of acquired 
right with property rights, that is the rightful entitlement to call an object of choice 
one’s own. In so doing, I neglect to some extent the two further titles included in it: 
contract rights –  the right to “another's choice” (DoR 6:270) – and status rights – 
the right to “a person akin to a right to a thing” (DoR :260), for instance that of 
parents over a child. I do this mainly because I take it that property has a kind of 
conceptual priority over the other two instances in the sense that it constitutes a 
‘paradigm case’ that most clearly illustrates what Kant considers problematic about 
“having external objects as one’s own” (DoR 6:245) in general. Most importantly, 
the corresponding kind of acquisition (DoR 6:260) – by deed, as opposed to by 
agreement (contract) and as required by law (status) – is uniquely problematic in 
putting (unaffected) others under an obligation through a unilateral act. This priority 
relation notwithstanding, let me also emphasise that the two other instances of 
acquired right share with property the two crucial features that my discussion – at 
least within the confines of the present chapter – will focus on: on the one hand, they 
are material rights to something external located in time and space. On the other 
hand, the pertinent rights require an act to be established – an act that brings a 
contract into existence, or one that brings people into the respective fiduciary 
relation (e.g. marrying or begetting a child). Hence, regardless of how one stands to 
my claim from conceptual priority, my exclusive focus on property does not actually 
change the substance of my discussion as far as the present chapter is concerned.  
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Kant’s conceptual map as just outlined. Recall that, as we were told 
earlier, rights in external objects require an act to be established. The 
definitional point was to distinguish acquired rights from that which is 
ours innately or, in Kant-speak, ‘internally’. It seems to follow that 
anything external to me that I claim as mine must fall under the 
category of acquired right. My place on earth, as occupied by my 
physical self, is of course external to me. And there is surely a sense in 
which I ‘acquire’ a place on earth in virtue of being born. On the other 
hand, I have already hinted to the way in which the concern 
instantiated in the notion of ‘original acquisition of land’ is not directly 
continuous with the property argument. Let me now underpin this 
argument systematically by offering three considerations that speak 
strongly against treating the right to be somewhere as an acquired right. 
First, as I have already briefly mentioned above, the category of 
acquired right is concerned with claims to objects as ‘mine’. What Kant 
deems interesting when it comes to control over external objects is not 
the possibility of ‘holding’ an object – that there is a sense in which I 
can legitimately call an object ‘mine’ as long as I have it under actual 
physical control (in my ‘empirical possession’) Kant takes as given, but 
also not very interesting. The actual conceptual challenge is to vindicate 
the possibility of calling something ‘mine’ “even though I am not in 
possession of it” (DoR 6:246). It is what Kant calls ‘intelligible 
possession’, possession of an object without holding it that the category of 
acquired right is primarily concerned with and the possibility of which 
the section on private right aims to proof. Such a non-empirical 
(intelligible) connection between my capacity for choice and action and 
an object of my choice (ultimately parasitic on the possibility of the 
pertinent relation between persons) amounts to a synthetic a priori 
judgment that requires a deduction in order to be vindicated (DoR 
6:249).9  
                                                
9 The details of this deduction are obscure and perennially contested. Given that the 
textual order seems to partly brake down at the relevant passage it is not even clear 
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Importantly though, the right to be somewhere is limited to 
physical possession, or occupation. It is not a right to this or that specific 
place (that we could claim even in our absence), but a right to be granted 
a place somewhere on the earth such that the conditions of embodied 
agency are fulfilled. Consequently, Kant specifies in a footnote, “merely 
physical possession of land (holding it) is already a right to a thing, 
though certainly not of itself sufficient for regarding it as mine” (DoR 
6:251). Hence, he concludes, the right to be somewhere is “consistent 
with the principle of outer freedom” (ibid.) and does not require a 
deduction in order to be vindicated – notably unlike acquired rights, 
from which it must thus be systematically distinct.10  
Second, while acquired rights require an act to be established, it 
is highly questionable whether our coming into the world is to be 
considered an act in the relevant sense. In a passage of the general 
introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines an action of legal 
relevance (a factum or ‘deed’) as one whose author can be considered to 
have freely caused it, that is if “the agent is regarded as the author of its 
effect, and this, together with the action itself, can be imputed to him” 
(DoR 6:223, see also 6:227). Moreover, this ability to bring about 
imputable actions (to be a ‘cause libera’) is precisely what constitutes 
moral personality (DoR 6:227). Note that on this definition, a deed 
contrasts both with a coerced act, and with one that causes an 
unintended chain of events (Kersting 1984, p.3). So if, in falling off my 
bike, I knock you over, your potential injuries cannot be imputed to me.  
Now, Kant seems unsure how to evaluate our coming into the 
world in this respect. As he notes in the preparatory works to the Doctrine 
                                                
whether Kant does in fact provide the “Deduction of the concept of merely rightful possession 
of an external object (possessio noumenon)“ (DoR 6:249) that §6 announces. While Ludwig 
(1988) suggests a relocation of part of §2 to §6 in order to replace what he considers 
the missing deduction, others like Byrd and Hruschka (2010) resist that move. 
10 I concede that at this point Kant comes very close to calling the right to be 
somewhere an innate right, by presenting it as an analytical implication of the 
universal principle of right or what he here calls “law of outer freedom”. Yet, as we 
shall see below, settling on this verdict would be premature. 
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of Right, the space that I occupy “is inseparable from my existence” 
(VRL AA23:237). Strictly speaking, my “existence is not yet a deed and 
hence not unjust [injustum]” (VRL AA23:279). On the other hand, 
there is of course a sense in which I have seized a piece of land in virtue 
of being born (“ihn einmal gleichsam apprehendiert habe durch 
Geburt”, VRL AA23:237) and our physical presence does have an 
impact on others. As mentioned in the last section, even if we do not 
enter the world at will, we do so with a will. There is thus a sense in which 
earth dwellers “claim entitlement to the land they occupy“ (Flikschuh 
2000, p.158) and which is a precondition for acting in the actual sense.  
While this means that, on some level and in some way, we can 
be held to account even for the normative implications of something we 
have never set out to do,11 what does seem clear is that this cannot be the 
same way in which we are held to account for consciously and actively 
apprehending and claiming things as ours. For, notice that the 
obligation we incur in virtue of appropriating objects is indeed far-
reaching: property acquisition effectively comes with a duty of state 
entrance. Kant does not seem to regard the normative implications of 
original acquisition of land – the “sheer facticity of our placement, willy-
nilly, on the surface of the earth” (Shell 1996, p.150) – as that 
consequential. 
This leads me directly to my third point, which requires a look 
at the larger structure of the Doctrine of Right. We have seen that Kant 
affirms a strong connection between acquired right and statehood: the 
kind of moral relation that would render the exclusion of others from 
objects of one’s choice permissible is possible only under territorially 
organised political authority. Now, if the right to be somewhere were an 
acquired right, we would expect a universal duty to enter the state to 
hold among all agents, who, in virtue of their embodiment, ‘acquire’ a 
place on earth (cf. Niesen & Eberl 2011, p.261). This duty could take 
                                                
11 I save considerations on how exactly our coming into the world is obligation 
entailing for the next chapter. 
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one of two forms. First, Kant could vindicate a global polity. Yet, in 
contrast to the powerful cosmopolitan metaphors we know from other 
works of the critical period,12 the mature political philosophy is 
reluctant to vindicate global institutions that in any sense resemble the 
modern state:13 while in earlier writings, Kant’s considers versions of a 
coercive global authority, at the point where the concept of right is most 
systematically developed – in the Doctrine of Right – he backpedals and 
restricts the sphere of inter-state relations to a loose, voluntary alliance 
of states “that must be renewed from time to time” (DoR 6:345). The 
sphere of ‘cosmopolitan right’, moreover, is restricted to a so-called 
hospitality right (the “right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility 
because he has arrived on the land of another”, PP 8:357).  
Alternatively, rather than a duty to enter one single global state, 
Kant could prescribe a universal duty to enter just any state (among a 
number of states). I take it that, in this regard, the evidence is at least 
inconclusive. While there are of course passages were Kant remarks that 
it is “wrong in the highest degree” to remain in a condition that is not 
rightful (DoR 6:307-308), he is also also highly sceptical of any attempt 
at forcing communities that do not live under state-like political 
institutions into states.14 Both in Perpetual Peace (PP 8:358) and in the 
Doctrine of Right (DoR 6:266), he fiercely condemns European states’ 
colonial practice at the time, whose malicious attempt at conquering 
foreign lands under the false pretext of mere visiting he decries as 
“inhospitable behaviour” (PP 8:358). It seems that in these passages, 
Kant does not only want to say that peoples who fail to organise 
                                                
12 See the pertinent notions from the ‘moral world’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
through the ‘kingdom of ends’ in the Groundwork, to the moral cosmopolitan 
community in the Religion (Kleingeld 2011, pp.161-164). I will come back to some of 
these ideas in later chapters. 
13 This has traditionally bothered Kantians with strongly cosmopolitan inclinations, 
who have argued that were Kant to have taken seriously his own moral universalism, 
he should have embraced more ambitious ideals like world citizenship and global 
democracy (e.g. Held 1995), or even a full-blown world state (Hodgson 2012).  
14 See for instance the contributions by Kleingeld, Niesen, and Stilz in Ypi and 
Flikschuh (2014).  
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themselves in states cannot be compelled to do so, but he even remains 
silent as to whether he takes them to be committing a wrong in the first 
place (see also Muthu 2009, p.199).  
This puzzle will be at the centre of attention in Chapter 3. For 
our current purposes, the diagnosis that there is a textual ambiguity 
suffices to support the primarily negative conclusion that we aim to 
draw. For, the least we can say is that Kant is very cautious about 
affirming anything like an analytical connection between the general 
circumstances of human agency and modern statehood, which would 
indeed leave the latter as the uniquely permissible living arrangement. 
Yet, given the strong connection, throughout the Doctrine of Right, 
between the concepts of acquired right and statehood, this is precisely 
what we would expect if the right to be somewhere was meant to be 
included in the former category. 
4. An Innate Right to be Somewhere  
So while Kant himself introduces the right to be somewhere in the 
section on acquired right, it is hard to make sense of this placement on 
a systematic level. It is thus not surprising that interpreters who have 
approached the notion in more depth have generally agreed with this 
assessment and tended to classify it as somehow contained in the innate 
right (e.g. Byrd & Hruschka 2010, p.126 ff.; Kleingeld 1998b, p.79; 
Kleingeld 2011, p.84; Benhabib 2004, pp.25-48). Rejecting this move 
turns out to be more demanding and requires us to take a closer look, 
in this section, at the concept of innate right. My aim is to show that on 
either of the two dominant contemporary readings of the innate right, 
which I will call the relational and the foundational views, the empirical 
circumstances of our concurrent corporeal existence (constituted by the 
spherical surface of the earth) extend the purview of the innate right. 
The right to be somewhere thus cannot be part of it. 
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To start with, we can register a simple yet indubitable fact as to 
the pertinent set of rights holders: from a table and a taxonomy (DoR 
6:240) Kant provides, it seems clear that “humans [Menschen]” are the 
subjects of the innate right. Notice, however, that this descriptive 
specification – whosoever can be identified as a member of the human 
species must be accorded an innate right to freedom – leaves open the 
two crucial normative questions concerning the grounds and the content 
of the right.15 Ultimately, we are interested in the latter question: what 
is the innate right a right to, and (most importantly) does it contain the 
right to be somewhere? In order to answer this question, however, we 
also need to attend to the former question concerning which feature of 
human beings precisely gives rise to it or, textually speaking, how we 
should understand Kant’s claim that the innate right belongs “to every 
man by virtue of his humanity [Kraft seiner Menschheit]” (DoR 6:237).  
The relational reading  
Let us start with what I shall call the relational reading (Ludwig 1988; 
Flikschuh 2009, pp.434-439; Zylberman 2016), for on this account it is 
not hard to see why the right to be somewhere should not be included 
in the domain of the innate right. According to the relational reading, 
the notion of humanity (as grounding the innate right) should be 
understood as referring to human beings’ noumenal status as expressed 
in their capacity for morality, i.e. to act from pure principles of practical 
reason alone. To be more precise, we each have the innate right in 
virtue of our capacity to morally account for the way in which, in 
choosing and acting, we affect and constrain others. It is with regard to 
this relation of reciprocal influence that the innate right ascribes to every 
person a certain standing, namely one of juridical equality. 
                                                
15 Peter Niesen’s (2005, pp.55-58) attempt to reduce the innate right to the 
descriptive function seems unsatisfying to me given the technical significance that the 
notion of humanity plays across Kant’s writings. 
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Consequently, the innate right amounts to an a priori, formal 
entitlement affirming the equal validity of everyone’s reciprocal claim 
to be recognised as an agent with full legal status: each has the same 
moral power to “put others under an obligation” (DoR 6:237) through 
their choices as everyone else. Motivating this reconstruction is an 
underlying, broader view about the general concept of right as 
operating, like all of Kant’s moral concepts, at the level of intelligible or 
merely rational relations between persons (Flikschuh 2009, p.438). It 
structures a particular subcategory of intelligible relations between us as 
morally accountable agents: those which concern the form of each 
person’s respective exercise of their capacity for choice – notably in 
contrast to Kant’s ethics that is merely concerned with our maxims for 
action. This picture in mind, the innate right just falls into place as the 
subjective, first-personal formulation of the idea of reciprocal constraint 
under general laws. Within the system of right, understood as an 
external – but formal and a priori – morality, the claims to exercise their 
capacity of choice of each do not exceed those of anyone else.16  
Proponents of the relational reading take it that evidence for 
their interpretation of the innate right as a formal and reciprocal claim 
to juridical equality – grounded in our (noumenal) capacity to morally 
account for our actions – comes from the various ‘authorizations’ (DoR 
6:237) Kant attaches to it: innate equality, original innocence and strict 
reciprocity of juridical obligation. For these constitutive features of 
innate right, which are “not really distinct from it”, are all specified in 
strictly relational terms, invoking treatment that each person can 
rightfully expect from all others independently of any act of theirs. 
                                                
16 The relational reading thus invites us to understand the innate right and the first 
of the three “Ulpian formulae” (honeste vive) as mutually constitutive. That is to say, 
the system of right as a system of reciprocal constraint is spelt out not just in virtue of 
an obligation to respect others as juridical equals, it also requires me to assert myself 
as a juridical subject of equal standing in my interactions with others. As an “inner 
outer rights duty” (Ludwig 2013), the duty of rightful honour prescribes to every 
agent a duty to assert their own “worth as a human being in relation to others” (DoR 
6:236), i.e. not to allow others to treat them in certain ways by claiming their rights. 
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Consequently, the innate right can be understood as mainly delivering 
a normative criterion for legitimate laws of any kind including, for 
instance, those regulating property relations.  
In order to make sense of the innate right along these lines, we 
do not need to go as far as Flikschuh (2009, p.438) and claim that it 
contains no substantive rights entitlements at all. Kant himself mentions 
a substantive right that can be understood as directly entailed by the 
innate right (consistently with the present interpretation) and a direct 
object of external law-making: the right to freely communicate one’s 
thoughts to others (DoR 6:238).17 What is indeed a necessary 
implication of the view, however, is that the innate right, understood as 
a purely relational and a priori moral claim to a certain moral standing 
vis-à-vis others, cannot possibly contain anything “external” in the sense 
of a material right to something located in time and space – such as the 
right to be somewhere.  
 
The foundational reading  
Let us turn to the second prominent interpretation of the innate right. 
On the foundational reading (Ebels-Duggan 2012; Hodgson 2010; 
Ripstein 2009; Stilz 2011a; Pallikkathayil 2010; Byrd & Hruschka 
2010), it is grounded not relationally in moral accountability, but 
foundationally in the capacity of each to rationally set and pursue the 
ends we have set for ourselves.18 Rather than in the way persons 
reciprocally relate to one other through their actions, the source of 
innate right is located in a higher order capacity of each person 
independently. This “ability to make choices in general” (Hodgson 
                                                
17 I am grateful to Peter Niesen, who has repeatedly pointed this out to me. 
18 Ripstein (2009, p.34) is actually ambivalent between a foundational and the 
relational reading. While sometimes he talks about innate right as a relational 
entitlement “within a system of reciprocal limits of freedom”, his prevalent talk of 
purposiveness, bodily self-control, and self-mastery as normatively basic (e.g. ibid. 
24) makes his account at least ambivalent between the two (cf. Flikschuh 2010a). 
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2010: 800) functions as a fundamental value, a normative bedrock on 
which Kant’s entire political philosophy is thought to be constructed. It 
is this ability that identifies human beings as the object of juridical 
concern and that the innate right is supposed to protect.  
The relational aspect of right comes in only indirectly, as a 
requirement of rational consistency: in valuing my own fundamental 
capacity for choice and action, I must thereby also value that capacity 
in every other rational agent (Hodgson 2010, pp.797-800). The innate 
right to freedom thus has internal (and coercively enforceable) limits 
built into it that allow for everyone’s equal exercise of their capacity for 
choice and action. It endows each person with an “equal sphere of 
discretionary space in virtue of her capacity for self-directed action” 
(Pallikkathayil 2010; p.133, my emphasis, see also Ebels-Duggan 2012, 
p.564). Ends that a rational agent chooses and pursues are to be 
respected insofar as they remain within the confines set by the fact that 
others’ choices are just as valuable. 
Initial reasons to be wary of this reading emanate from the 
observation that it sits uneasily with Kant’s wider (practical) 
philosophical commitments, in particular his non-foundationalism 
(Flikschuh 2015) and his non-instrumentalism (Zylberman 2016, p.105). 
As to the former, Kant’s views about human finitude and the fallibility 
of judgment are usually deemed to ground a deep scepticism – 
prominent throughout all parts of his philosophical work – about 
(particularly Cartesian) forms of justificatory foundationalism that 
proceed from indubitable first principles. As to the latter, the idea that 
principles of right are instrumental to the protection of each our 
individual freedom (rather than being constitutive of a distinct kind of 
moral relation) seems in tension with his focus on the form rather than 
the matter (and hence the consequences) of practical laws. 
A forceful attack on the foundationalist reading would require a 
detailed analysis of the notion of humanity in the context of Kant’s 
Groundwork. For, notice that proponents of both predominant views of 
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the innate right generally assume that the notion of humanity within the 
passage currently under scrutiny “presuppose[s]” (Ludwig 1988, p.102) 
or “follow[s] from considerations similar to” (Hodgson 2010, p.792) 
those underlying the concept’s arguably more famous appearance, 
which is in the Groundwork’s Formula of Humanity – the second formulation 
of the categorical imperative (Gr 4:427-29), which asks us to “act in such 
a way that you treat humanity in your own person and in that of others 
never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end in itself” 
(Gr 4: 429).19 In the context of laying out this idea, Kant repeatedly talks 
about humanity or rational nature (which are used equivalently) as 
something of “unconditioned and incomparable” or even “absolute” 
worth. Among interpreters of the Groundwork this has given rise to the 
perennial question which characteristic feature it is that makes 
humanity the appropriate material for a principle of practical reason 
and thus the ultimate object of moral concern. 
Proponents of the foundationalist reading tend to take their cue 
from a particular answer to this question developed by Allen Wood 
(1999, pp.118-132) and, most systematically, Christine Korsgaard 
(1996a; 1996b). On this interpretation, the notion of humanity depicts 
a ‘value-conferring’ property of persons individually, namely their 
capacity to rationally set ends for themselves (Korsgaard 1996a, p.110). 
Again, the clue is that this capacity – properly understood! – already 
has limitations built into it: in viewing ourselves as having value-
conferring status by virtue of our power to set ends, we are bound to 
view anyone with the same power as having an equal status (Korsgaard 
1996a, p.123; Sussman 2003).  
Proponents of the relational reading, in contrast, draw on an 
interpretation of the idea of humanity as invoking agents’ part-
noumenal nature accrued through their capacity to act from duty alone. 
In virtue of their shared humanity, they stand in a moral relationship 
                                                
19 Pallikkathayil (2010, p.132) even goes so far as to say that the “foundational 
elements of Kant’s political philosophy are justified by the Formula of Humanity”. 
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that cannot be reduced to or grounded in a prior, non-relational value 
such as the individual capacity to set one’s own ends. Individual human 
beings’ standing as objective ends is both constituted and constrained 
by the higher-order idea of humanity in which they participate by virtue 
of their power to act from pure practical reason.20  
While I consider the foundational take on humanity in the 
Groundwork to be flawed as an interpretation (cf. Timmermann 2006) 
and questionable as a normative argument in its own right (cf. Langton 
2007), I do not have the space here to make good on these claims. In 
fact, a wider critique of rights foundationalism would distract from the 
main purpose of this section, which concerns the possibility of filing the 
right to be somewhere as part of (or necessarily implied by) the innate 
right. Instead, I shall set out to show that even if we run with the 
foundational reading of the innate right, the right to be somewhere 
cannot be included in it.  
Let me first explicate how precisely its proponents link the right 
to be somewhere to the innate right. Keep in mind, to that effect, that 
the foundational reading comes with a shift in emphasis: away from the 
way in which our choices affect others, to the foundational value of that 
very capacity (and our opportunity to exercise it). This turns our 
attention to the conditions of purposiveness itself. Proponents of the 
foundational reading thus suggest that, since the only way in which 
individuals can act in the external world is through their bodies – 
“having control over my body is essential to my ability to set and pursue 
ends” (Hodgson 2010, p.811) – the innate right at its core describes a 
                                                
20 This reading also seems to be more in line with the argumentative structure of the 
Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, which does not start with the innate right – in 
fact, it does not appear until the appendix (DoR 6:237) – but by introducing and 
systematically developing the moral concept of right as depicting a certain kind of 
relation (DoR 6:231). This gives further plausibility to reading the former as 
following (analytically) from the latter, such that it is the normative relationship that 
functions as a bedrock of Kant’s discussion rather than a first-personal capacity. 
Ebels-Duggan (2012, p.897), for instance, overlooks this when she argues (to the 
opposite) that “based on the innate right to freedom, Kant formulates his Universal 
Principle of Right”. 
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right “to your own person” (Ripstein 2009, p.57). This right is 
understood in an explicitly physical sense, endowing its subjects with 
basic powers of bodily self-control. While a more extreme version (e.g. 
Hodgson 2010) of this claim almost likens the innate right to a kind of 
property right in one’s body, Ripstein’s (2009, p.68) more moderate 
version cautions that “I do not have property in my own person; I just 
am my own person”.  
The implication is that, notably in contrast to the relational 
view, the innate right does include a material right to something 
“external” in time and space: our bodies. Let me be clear that I have no 
fundamental objection to the claim that the subjects of innate right are 
corporeal beings who use their bodies for the pursuit of the projects they 
have set for themselves. What I do want to block is a further extension of 
this right so as to include the right to be somewhere. The thought here 
is the following: given that we do not act in empty space but on the 
earth’s surface, a right to not have my body interfered with by others 
should also include a right to the place on earth that I occupy. After all, 
the space our bodies occupy is necessarily space on the earth’s surface 
(Ripstein 2009, p.372)! Under conditions where space is scarce, the 
right to a place on earth is thus thought to just come with the innate 
right. As Byrd and Hruschka (2010, p.128) have it, the right that nobody 
“throw me against my will into the ocean or rocket me into the 
universe” is supposed to be entailed by the “internal (in contrast to the 
external) mine and thine”. 
Notice that if this argument were sound, proponents of the 
foundational reading would have successfully shown that we should 
treat the right to be somewhere as part of the innate right. In order to 
reject it, I will have to make a more general argument about the 
pertinent sense of space in the context of Kant’s construction of the 
concept of right in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right.  
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Constructing Right in A Priori Space  
So let us take a closer look at the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right. 
Towards the end of the last section, I already mentioned that the innate 
right is introduced only in an ‘appendix’ (DoR 6:233) attached at its 
very end – the bulk of the Introduction serves Kant to set out the 
conceptual contours of the domain of right more generally as the object 
of the entire investigation to follow. Kant starts (in §B) with the moral 
concept of right. It is defined as the “sum of the conditions under which 
the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance 
with a universal law of freedom” (DoR 6:230) and explicated through 
three features: first, the concept of right refers to the external and 
practical relation of two or more persons, “insofar as their actions, as 
deeds [facta] can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other” (DoR 
6:230). Having encountered Kant’s definition of a deed in the last 
section, we can infer that right is concerned with the reciprocal 
influence of imputable acts of morally accountable agents. Second, it 
only concerns the relation between persons’ respective capacities for 
choice and action (‘Willküren’). In the sphere of right, that is to say, 
agents encounter each other through the reciprocal effects of each of 
their external actions on all others, not by way of their ‘passive’ wishes 
or needs. While both actions and wishes are expressions of the human 
faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), only the former is “joined with one's 
consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one’s action” 
(DoR 6:213). And third, right deals only with the form of the relation of 
choices, not their respective matter; the motivations for an action as well 
as its ends are entirely irrelevant as far as right is concerned. In a 
nutshell, the moral concept of right pertains to the formal external 
relation between the power of choice of two or more persons. 
It is absolutely vital to understand what is going on at this stage. 
Some interpreters (Höffe 1999, pp.47-50; Kersting 2004, p.14) take 
Kant to be developing the concept of right by applying the general 
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concept of morality to the basic empirical fact of the coexistence of 
embodied rational beings within limited space. A peculiar kind of 
anthropology of right (Höffe 2013, p.117 ff.) is said to set out the 
relevant “conditions of application” that make right necessary in the 
first place. Yet, notice – and this is a crucial insight in the context of this 
chapter – that there just is no reference to the empirical circumstances 
of human coexistence on the earth in the relevant passage. Neither the 
limited space circumscribed by the spherical surface of the earth, nor 
the normative implications this yields in the face of our own corporeal 
existence, play any constitutive role as Kant develops the moral concept 
of right. As we saw in the first section, these aspects are first mentioned 
far into the section on private right. Kant’s argument in §B is an entirely 
analytical answer to the question, posed in the antecedent paragraph, 
regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions of legitimacy for any 
actual body of positive laws (Ludwig 1988, p.92).21  
This is not to deny that there is a sense in which time and space 
in general enter into Kant’s analysis of the concept of right: after all, Kant 
takes external agency to be constitutive of rights, so spatial 
considerations are analytically relevant (Ludwig 1988, p.86). That is to 
say, space matters with regard to the form of juridical relations – the only 
way in which deeds as “facta” (DoR 6:230, see also 6:227) can 
reciprocally relate to one another in a juridically relevant sense is in 
space. Yet, the particular conditions of bounded space as crucial to the 
right to be somewhere are not in view at this stage of the argument (see 
also Hirsch 2012, pp.36/37). This becomes particularly clear in a 
memorable yet puzzling statement in §E (DoR 6:232/3) of the 
Introduction:  
                                                
21 In §A of the Introduction, Kant distinguishes between a doctrine of positive right 
(the study of an actual positive legal order) and a doctrine of natural right (which can 
be cognised a priori by reason), whereby the latter is supposed to provide something 
like a legitimacy criterion for the former.   
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The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord 
with the freedom of everyone under the principle of 
universal freedom is, as it were, the construction of that 
concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a 
priori, by analogy with presenting the possibility of 
bodies moving freely under the law of the equality of action 
and reaction. 
In order to understand this passage, we need to go a step back first. In 
§C (DoR 6:230), Kant had derived from the moral concept of right (in 
conjunction with a universalizing rule) the universal principle of right:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's 
freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its 
maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law.  
This principle is then rephrased into its imperatival form, the universal 
law of right (“so act externally that the free use of your choice can 
coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal 
law”, DoR 6:231). In omitting all references to the agents’ maxim, the 
universal law specifies right in the strict or narrow sense: as being 
externally enforceable. The enforceability in turn is a direct corollary of 
the interpersonal character of right: given the equal status of everyone’s 
claim to exercise their freedom for choice and action, my own freedom 
is (coercively) limited to the condition of its compossibility with everyone 
else’s equal freedom. The rightness of my action is not a matter of my 
personal inner judgment but that of an external authority capable of 
determining the validity of my freedom claims relative to everyone else’s 
equally valid claims (Flikschuh 2011, p.142). I am juridically obliged 
(and can be coerced to act accordingly) whether I acknowledge my 
obligation or not.  
Given that the universal law of right thus connects right 
analytically with the permission to use coercion, it can also be 
“represented as the possibility of a fully reciprocal use of coercion that 
is consistent with everyone’s freedom in accordance with universal 
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laws” (DoR 6:232). Right in this strict sense need not appeal to the 
agents’ own consciousness of duty “as an incentive to determine his 
choice in accordance with this law”, but “rests instead on the principle 
of its being possible to use external constraint” (ibid.).  
Back to §E. Kant there seeks to explicate the universal law of 
right further by connecting it back to the moral concept of right. Let us 
look more closely at the two analogies he employs in this context. First, 
there is the claim that we arrive at the law of reciprocal coercion by 
constructing the moral concept of right “in pure intuition a priori”. 
What does it mean to ‘construct’ a concept? In a well-known passage of 
the first Critique (CPR A713/B741), Kant explains that the construction 
of concepts is characteristic for mathematical reasoning (cf. Shabel 
2004). When we construct a concept we “exhibit the a priori intuition 
corresponding to it” (CPR A713/B741). Kant’s pertinent case for 
concept construction understood in this technical sense is geometry: all 
we need to do in order to prove that two sides of a triangle are together 
longer than the third side is to ‘construct’ or represent such a three sided 
figure – whether on paper or in the imagination – in a priori space. This 
is why, as Kant had argued much earlier in the first Critique, geometrical 
cognition is synthetic a priori: it rests on propositions that include an 
extension of cognition independently of all experience (CPR B40). 
In the present passage, Kant evidently likens juridical space (the 
form in which we relate to one another externally) to geometrical space 
(the form in which objects appear as outer).22 In so doing, he emphasises 
that the concept of right is constructed with “mathematical exactitude” 
(DoR 6:233) in non-empirical, unbounded space. In analogy to the first 
Critique’s denomination of space as that (a priori) necessary form of 
intuition through which it is possible for us to perceive particular 
objects, here space as a form of intuition a priori similarly figures as the 
necessary formal condition through which the construction of (external) 
                                                
22 I borrow the useful term ‘juridical space’ from Moggach (2000). 
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rights relations is possible for us in the first place. The “law of reciprocal 
coercion” places individuals in a precise and systematic relation in non-
empirical, unbounded space. Alluding to the conciseness characteristic 
for the geometrical construction of a straight line between two points, 
“a doctrine of right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been 
determined” with precision (DoR 6:233). 
But mathematical space is not the only image Kant uses in this 
passage in order to illustrate the construction of the moral concept of 
right. We also see him comparing the law-governed external relations 
between agents (that the concept of right constructs) with law-governed 
relations between “bodies moving freely under the law of the equality 
of action and reaction”. Just as mechanical laws bring physical objects 
into systematic interaction with one another, so does right enable 
individuals to coordinate their interactions by placing them in a precise 
and systematic relation in non-empirical space. This construction of 
juridical space in terms of interacting, mutually determining forces that 
operate with the necessity of mechanical laws evokes associations with 
the category of community or reciprocity as developed in the Critique of 
Pure Reason (CPR A80/B106, B110-11). This analogy is a crucial one 
whose full implications (particular for Kant’s cosmopolitanism) I will 
develop at length in the next chapter. At this point suffice it to say that 
the invocation of physical space serves Kant to further exemplify the 
construction of rights relations in a priori (unbounded) space. Just as a 
physical law imposes a priori an order on objects in space, so does the 
law of “reciprocal coercion” impose an order on individuals and their 
potentially conflicting freedom claims. In the Prolegomena, Kant repeats 
the mechanical analogy of force and counter-force, which emphasises 
both the equal validity and the reciprocity of freedom claims: 
Thus, there is an analogy between the legal relation of 
human acts and the mechanical relation of motive 
powers. I can never do something to someone else 
without giving him a right to do the same to me in the 
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same circumstances; just as no body can act on another 
through its motive power without thereby causing the 
other to react equally against it. (Proleg 4:358 fn.) 
Let me sum up my discussion of the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right 
in this subsection, which has yielded two important insights. First, I 
pointed out that the moral concept of right is modelled in pure intuition 
a priori. It is unbounded (a priori) space that constitutes a formal 
condition for the construction of something like a general schema of 
rights relations. It is not until the section on acquired right that we move 
from a vision of rights relations as essentially unbounded (extending 
across possible persons in space indefinitely) to bounded (empirical) 
space and hence the conditions under which these relations play out on 
the spherical surface of the earth. Only once “the a priori construction 
of rights relations [is mapped] onto empirical space” (Flikschuh 2011, 
p.145) is a possible world in which “people could be so dispersed on it 
that they would not come into community with one another”’ (DoR 
6:262) off the table. Within the confines of the Introduction, however, 
the pertinent spatial framework is that of space as an a priori form of 
intuition. 
I think that this narrative provides the most plausible account of 
the (important) role that the earth’s spherical surface plays within the 
argumentative structure the Doctrine of Right. I do not want to pretend, 
however, that it allows us to fully come to terms with this notion in the 
context of Kant’s wider philosophical framework. In order to see why, 
let me distinguish two ways in which empirical facts can be contingent 
or non-necessary: first, there are facts that are subjectively contingent in 
the sense that they result from human agency. The fact that I have an 
obligation to pick up your daughter from school is contingent on my 
having promised you to do so – I could have done otherwise. Second, 
there are facts that are objectively contingent in the sense that they could 
have been otherwise but they are not a function of human willing and 
agency. For instance, I take it that the fact that humans are finite agents 
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with certain cognitive capacities is objectively contingent; we may very 
well have been omniscient beings. The fact that the earth’s surface is 
spherical, I want to suggest, is contingent in this latter way; it may very 
well have been an unbounded sphere. The empirical circumstances of 
our coexistence on the earth are not in principle open to modification 
by human willing and agency. Instead, they constitute an objectively 
given condition within the limits of which human agents are constrained 
to establish possible rights relations.  
The upshot is that the earth’s circumference is not simply an 
empirical given that triggers or conditions an a priori obligation 
(analogous to the way in which the fact of my promise to pick up your 
daughter relates to my a priori obligation to keep my promises).23 
Instead, it is itself co-constitutive of a specific kind of moral 
interdependence relation (and the ensuing obligations): as we have just 
seen, the relevant kind of juridical normativity would simply not be 
pertinent under circumstances in which agents could infinitely disperse 
rather than being constrained to articulate their claims to freedom of 
actions and action within limited space. As mentioned, this does not 
necessarily make it easier to fit the earth’s spherical surface into the 
wider conceptual framework of Kant’s practical philosophy, built as it 
is upon a set of related distinctions such as those between a priori and a 
posteriori, noumenal and phenomenal, or empirical and intelligible. 
Helping ourselves to notions such as that of an “impure [nichtreines] 
synthetic a priori” (Höffe 1999) in this context may be useful in order to 
articulate and illustrate this predicament, but not solve it. 
                                                
23 I take it that this speaks against a possible teleological rendering of the notion, 
according to which the earth is spherical in shape because, morally speaking, 
person’s fates are bound together. Kant’s claim, in Perpetual Peace (PP 8:362/3), that 
we are warranted to read nature as having created conditions in which we 
unavoidably have to put up with one another given our duty to find terms on which 
to get along, may be taken to speak to such a reading. In my view, however, the 
empirical circumstances of coexistence are significant in virtue of being constitutively 
intertwined with our juridical obligations rather than arising from our 
acknowledgement of them. 
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Let me finally turn to the second and more immediately relevant 
insight, which specifically concerns the right to be somewhere. It turns 
out that even if we insist, following proponents of the foundational 
reading, on the corporeality of juridical agents, the right to be 
somewhere cannot be included in the innate right. For the empirical 
circumstances under which rightful relations play out on the earth, that 
is the concurrent existence of a plurality of corporeal agents within a 
bounded sphere, are not covered by the moral concepts introduced by 
Kant in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right.  
Conclusion 
The modest aim of this chapter is to create conceptual space for a 
domain of moral inquiry – pertinent to the concurrent existence of a 
plurality of earth dwellers – that is rarely acknowledged in 
interpretations of Kant’s mature political philosophy. I have done so by 
presenting the right to be somewhere as a rather recalcitrant notion that 
can be accommodated neither within the category of innate nor within 
that of acquired right. I want to close this chapter by going back once 
more to the analogy, briefly alluded to in the first section, with Kant’s 
account of concept formation. It is startling that there, in a completely 
different context, the notion of ‘original acquisition’ equally provides a 
middle path between something that is neither purely ‘innate’, nor 
‘acquired’ in the pertinent sense. 
Concerning the origin of notions such as time and space, Kant 
is faced with (and intervenes in) what he perceives to be a deadlocked 
debate between rationalist and empiricist positions (Zoeller 1989). On 
the one hand, empiricists see the world itself as intrinsically ordered 
spatiotemporally and argue that we can acquire, or derive, concepts like 
time and space through the senses. On the other hand, rationalists like 
Descartes and Leibniz assume the existence of ‘innate ideas’, including 
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time and space, that do not originate in external objects but solely in 
the “power of thinking within me” (Descartes 1984, p.303): they are the 
product of mere human mental activity. Kant is particularly concerned 
to distance himself from the rationalist account. In a reply to his critic 
Eberhard, who had collapsed Kant’s position in the first Critique into a 
straightforward form of rationalism, Kant emphasises that  
[…] the Critique admits absolutely no divinely 
implanted or innate representations. It regards them all, 
whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the 
understanding, as acquired. (Discovery 8:221)  
Crucially, time and space as the forms of intuition (just as the twelve 
categories) do not lie in the mind ready to be discovered, but first 
emerge through the mind’s activity of coordinating, according to 
certain universal laws, the formation of sensory material. What is 
innate, according to Kant, is the possibility (or form) of representation 
– its underlying ground – not representation itself. Yet even the 
cognitive power that precedes and conditions all representations does 
itself require sensible impressions in order to be first enabled. In the 
earlier Inaugural Dissertation (ID 2:406), Kant presents the acquisition 
of space and time as an “abstraction […] from the very action of the 
mind, an action coordinating the mind’s sensa according to perpetual 
laws”. The kind of ‘acquisition’ (of forms of intuition and pure concepts) 
Kant has in mind thus differs significantly from the acquisition of 
empirical intuitions and concepts: it is an original acquisition that has its 
source in an a priori capacity of the mind, but in turn only occurs under 
the effect of sensible impressions. It does not presuppose anything like 
innate ideas, but the mere spontaneity of thought. As Kant nicely 
summarizes himself (Discovery 7:222, my emphasis):  
The ground of the possibility of sensible intuition is […] 
the merely particular receptivity of the mind, whereby it 
receives representations in accordance with its subjective 
constitution, when affected by something (in sensation). 
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Only this first formal ground, e.g., the possibility of a 
representation of space, is innate, not the spatial 
representation itself. For impressions are always required 
in order first to enable the cognitive power to represent 
an object (which is always its own act). Thus, the formal 
intuition which is called space emerges as an originally 
acquired representation (the form of outer objects in 
general), the ground of which (as mere receptivity) is 
nevertheless innate and the acquisition of which long 
precedes determinate concepts of things that are in 
accordance with this form.  
Although Kant’s use of juridical metaphors in his epistemology is well-
established (e.g. Henrich 1989, O’Neill 1989), I do not want to overstep 
the limits of plausible comparison. It is nonetheless interesting to see 
Kant reverting to the notion of original acquisition – first developed to 
describe his position with regard to a crucial epistemological question – 
when it comes to the piece of land that we unavoidably take up in virtue 
of coming into the world as embodied agents. Just as the concepts of 
time and space are neither innate nor acquired, so original acquisition 
of land is accounted for by a kind of right that is neither innate nor 
acquired in the pertinent sense. Stretching this analogy yet a bit further, 
we may even say that while human beings have an innate status of moral 
equality, this standing becomes juridically relevant only under spatial 
circumstances in which they are bound to originally acquire a piece of 
land. 
Of course, while Kant’s epistemological agenda ultimately is to 
reject both the rationalist and the empiricised outlook that he distances 
himself from by appeal to original acquisition, when it comes to the 
Doctrine of Right innate and acquired right do indeed remain of central 
architectonic importance. My aim in pointing out the puzzling status of 
the right to be somewhere has not been to question the usefulness of this 
distinction as an overall organizing principle for (an interpretation of) 
the text, but merely to cast some doubt upon its exhaustiveness. What I 
hope to have shown in this chapter is that the kind of moral relation 
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emanating from insight into the normative implications of our 
concurrent existence, as embodied agents, on the earth – a relation 
among what I called earth dwellers – displays features of either category 
and ultimately eludes classification. Indeed, that there is such a 
conceptual space is occasionally even acknowledged in passing by 
interpreters. Herb and Ludwig (1993, p.294) for instance remark that 
human beings enter the world as “beings who are subject to obligations 
which are neither innate nor freely assumed through an act that 
establishes an obligation“. The implications of this puzzling insight, 
though, are rarely systematically explored. This is due, more than 
anything, to the general assimilation in the literature – admittedly 
following Kant’s own presentation – of external relations to property 
relations. Given its marginal position in the text, the fact that relations 
among earth dwellers are external but not property-mediated can of 
course easily slip attention. Yet, it constitutes an essential concern of 
Kant’s throughout the mature political philosophy that, as we will see 
in the next chapter, is particularly crucial for his global thinking. 
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Chapter 2 
On Original Common Possession 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I introduced a moral domain that, according 
to my reading, figures prominently in the Doctrine of Right yet easily slips 
attention: the domain of embodied agency under spatial constraints. I 
developed its contours drawing on the concepts of original acquisition 
of land and the ensuing right to be somewhere. The relation between 
what I called earth dwellers – embodied moral agents interacting with 
other such agents on the spherical surface of the earth – turned out to 
be ‘external’ but not property-mediated. It thus eludes a distinction 
(between innate and acquired right) generally deemed both definitive of 
Kant’s mature political philosophy, and exhaustive.  
In the present chapter, I seek to go a step further by showing 
how this relation serves as a template for Kant’s global thinking. I will 
make two main claims in this regard: first, Kant’s cosmopolitanism is 
one of earth dwellers. That is to say, the mere fact that embodied agents 
can affect and constrain each other with their choices unites them in a 
community with all those who jointly inhabit a bounded territory, the 
earth. Kant’s cosmopolitanism thus neither depicts a global ‘kingdom 
of ends’ constituted by ‘noumenal’ beings united in their shared 
humanity, nor a shared polity with actual legal-institutional 
membership, but a community of physical beings that act and affect one 
another in virtue of inhabiting and sharing one space. 
Second, the concern with embodied agency in limited space 
entails a radical shift in perspective when it comes to global theorising: 
Kant’s global standpoint is not that of an Archimedean observer with a 
‘view from nowhere’, but a distinctly first-person standpoint through 
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which agents reflexively recognise their systematic interdependence 
with other agents in a world of limited space. In other words, our 
interactions with other earth dwellers is perspectival just as much as (on 
Kant’s view) our experience of the world is. 
I will develop both these claims through a discussion of the 
notion of original common possession of the earth. Central to my 
reconstruction will be a conversation and contrast between Kant’s 
construal of the concept and that prevalent in natural law thinkers such 
as Grotius, with which the idea of original common ownership is 
typically associated and against the background of which Kant himself 
developed his own account. The contrast with this tradition will also 
help to further elucidate the precise way in which embodied agency 
matters for Kant. On Kant’s formal, relational account of global 
connectedness, physicality does not matter (as on a material conception) 
qua bodily needs and interests, but in virtue of grounding a particular 
kind of moral agency.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: I start (in Section 1) by 
sketching Grotius’s conception of common ownership with a particular 
view on Mathias Risse’s recent adaption of it, which is pitched as a 
contrasting foil for the remainder of the chapter. Over the following two 
sections, I go on to systematically develop Kant’s alternative notion of 
original common possession of the earth. Given that the insight to be 
gained from the (by now familiar) passages of the Doctrine of Right’s 
section on private right is limited (Section 2), this requires a detour into 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy (Section 3). Specifically, I will take my cue 
from Kant’s characterisation of original common possession as 
‘disjunctive’ in order to draw an analogy between the epistemic 
“standpoint on the whole” (Longuenesse 2005) as identified in the 
category of community, and  what I develop as the global standpoint: it 
is a reflexive and first-person standpoint the thinker constructs by 
shifting his ground to the standpoint of the other. Awareness of this shift 
in perspective will allow us, in Section 4, to draw together how 
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thoroughly Kant’s understanding of original common possession differs 
from that prevalent in the natural law tradition: it describes a system of 
mutual exclusion in which a plurality of different persons stand in a 
relation of ‘possible physical interaction’, compelling them to take up a 
reflexive stance towards those with whom they share a spatially 
bounded world. The concluding Section 5 puts further flesh on the 
bones of this contrast by way of contrasting my account of a 
cosmopolitanism for earth dwellers with Peter Niesen’s empiricised 
notion of ‘earth citizenship’. This confirms that Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism, as construed from the global standpoint, is not 
primarily interested in material entitlements, but in framing the 
question of how individuals relate to one another globally. 
1. Grotius on Common Ownership 
The idea of humanity’s original common ownership of the earth – 
ultimately of biblical origin – has a long pedigree in the history of 
political thought. While, starting with Aquinas, the notion was invoked 
by a large array of theorists from diverse traditions, it received its most 
systematic development in the work of early modern thinkers from 
Grotius to Pufendorf and Hobbes. Particularly Hugo Grotius’s 
conception of original common ownership as laid out in De Jure Praedae 
(Grotius 2006, henceforth DJP) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Grotius 2005, 
henceforth DJBP) turned out seminal not only for the natural law 
tradition but in fact much of the early modern discourse on property 
(Brandt 1976). It is his account – together with Mathias Risse’s recent 
adoption of it – that I want to sketch in this section, in order to 
subsequently reconstruct what Kant makes of it. Like his 17th century 
contemporaries, Grotius employs the notion of original common 
ownership in order to justify property rights and state boundaries, which 
he does by presenting them as the result of an (idealised) historical 
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process that saw the division of an initially common stock. He starts with 
the assumption that God gave the earth to humans in common for the 
satisfaction of their needs (DJBP II.2.2.1). This original community 
though is not one of actual joint ownership, but rather a “negative 
community” where nothing belongs to anyone (de Araujo 2009, p.256). 
As part of a natural right to their “life, limbs and liberty” (DJBP I.2.1.5), 
people are free to take possession of things and use them for the 
satisfaction of their needs. But this restricted right to use what is owned 
in common does not authorise anyone to accumulate objects or exclude 
others from similar use before or after physical possession (Salter 2001, 
p.539). The lawful use of things is confined to the immediate usage or 
consumption of what people find growing on the common, grounded 
in a right of self-preservation.  
Much of Grotius’s account is then concerned with telling a story 
of how this initial, universal use-right was gradually transformed into a 
scheme of property rights and territorial boundaries. This narrative is 
pervaded by a fundamental ambiguity that arises from Grotius’s 
notorious combination of what he calls “a priori” and “a posteriori” 
methods (DJBP I.1.12.1). While, on the one hand, he offers a narrative 
of (idealised) historical developments drawing on a number of 
philosophical, literary and theological sources, he does so against the 
assumption that “the acknowledged facts of human history are not 
arbitrary or accidental, but necessary” (Buckle 1991, pp.5-6). Given that 
human nature so drastically constrains possible solutions to given 
problems that the particular outcomes can be seen to be inevitable, 
history reveals the logic of a distinctively human situation. Grotius 
wants to show that history “proofs the existence” (DJBP Proleg. §40) of 
the independently valid laws of nature. In inferring the a priori from the 
a posteriori, the rational history of property becomes its justification – 
what happened ought to have happened.  
The emergence of rights in property and territory figures as part 
of a wider account of the evolution of society from simpler to more 
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refined ways of life, which starts with a very basic conundrum: the 
exercise of a use-right with regard to objects that are incorporated in 
some way, particularly food, de facto already amounts to the exercise of 
an exclusive right because it is in their very nature that they cannot be 
re-used (DJP Ch.7 Section 101). A clear-cut distinction between use and 
property right is thus impossible from the outset. A major shift then 
occurs once people start to grow discontented with a way of life that 
merely allows them “to feed on the spontaneous product of the earth, 
to dwell in caves, to have the body either naked or clothed with the bark 
of trees or skins of wild animals” (DJBP II.2.2.4). In the process of 
leaving this relatively simple life, they treat more and more objects as if 
they were bound up with their purposes of consumption and thus 
limited in re-usability. Initial forms of occupation thus lead to other, 
more extensive forms. This transition from a simple way of life to a more 
refined one is only possible with more extended forms of exclusion and 
abstinence (Salter 2001, p.544) – the primitive form of use-right is no 
longer feasible. As soon as community members (publicly) start to 
recognise this fact, an elementary form of private property is underway. 
The initial act of seizure to satisfy bodily needs is treated as grounding 
a right to recover possession after usage. 
Hence, the need for private ownership arises as a natural 
response to circumstances generated when human beings abandoned 
their original life of primitive simplicity, proceeding through an 
extension of a right to use unclaimed things. How exactly this process 
goes ahead is not always entirely clear. In the earlier DJP, the transition 
from mere use to the ‘institutional fact’ of legitimate property is rather 
vaguely described as a mental act that is “produced by reason” and 
“retained in mind” of all parties involved (DJP Ch.7; see also de Araujo 
2009, pp.361/2). An occupation that began with physical effort may, 
after a while, endure mentally, just because individuals continue to treat 
an object as if it were still occupied. Yet, it remains unclear who exactly 
has to recognise the validity of property or how they do so. Sometimes 
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it sounds as though all the claimant is required to do after the initial act 
of seizure is to maintain the intention of possession, for instance through 
“some activity involving construction or the definition of boundaries 
such as fencing in” (DJP Ch.7 Section 102).  
In DJBP, Grotius is more explicit that private property cannot 
arise by “a mere act of will”, given that “one could not know what things 
another wished to have, in order to abstain from them – and besides, 
several might desire the same things” (DJBP I.2.6.2). Instead, ownership 
arises “by a kind of agreement, either expressed, as by division, or 
implied, as by occupation” (DJBP II.2.2.5). That does not mean that 
there was once an explicit original agreement about the division of the 
common stock. Rather, private property arises gradually out of a series 
of many explicit and tacit contractual steps between consenting parties. 
Absent visible objections “it is to be supposed that all agreed, that 
whatever each one had taken possession of should be his property” 
(DJBP II.2.2.5). The division of movable objects (like cattle) is followed 
by immovable property (like land), eventually leading to the drawing of 
territorial boundaries and the formation of states. Yet, even after 
division, rights in property and territory retain a close connection to the 
original purpose of basic needs satisfaction, as expressed in a right of 
necessity that sanctions the revival of the primitive use right (i.e. taking 
from the surpluses of property holders) in cases of extreme and 
unavoidable hardship (DJBP II.2.6.1-4). The rightfulness of each co-
owner’s share of resources, and each state’s share of space, of what was 
originally a common stock remains conditional upon everyone else’s 
equal ability to satisfy their basic needs. 
The rough outlines of Grotius’s account of humanity’s original 
common ownership of the earth at hand, I now want to look at Mathias 
Risse’s (2012; 2013; 2015) recent revival of the concept, which had 
fallen out of fashion for quite some while. The main motivation for 
turning to Risse is that it is only in his work that we see the notion 
employed as a fundamental conceptual pillar of a theory of global 
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justice.1 Note that, strikingly, Grotius himself is not overly interested in 
questions of genuinely global concern, but in justifying particular 
property holdings and state boundaries. Risse however identifies a 
“universally acceptable, non-parochial standpoint” (Risse 2013, p.22) 
in Grotius’s needs-based framework, a standpoint he takes to be ideally 
suited for the adjudication of issues of global concern – including those 
pertaining to resources, territory, immigration and environment. The 
need to theorise from such a standpoint is said to arise from a twofold 
empirical development: in a globalised economy, humanity is 
increasingly interconnected, while at the same time confronting more 
and more problems that “concern our way of dealing with the earth as 
a whole” (Risse 2015, p.84) and thus point out to us the limitations of 
our planet. 
Risse adopts the overall outlook of the Grotian framework as 
just outlined, modifying it in two important respects. First, he explicitly 
de-historicises the account. His talk of ‘original’ common ownership 
does not aim at an originally actual state of affairs, but seeks to highlight 
the – exclusively normative –2 sense in which resources and spaces that 
exist independently of human activities might be taken to be owned in 
a way that is prior to the moral claims that individuals or groups have 
to these resources based on, for instance, occupancy or invested labour 
(Risse 2013, p.8). Second, he secularises Grotius’s account by replacing 
the appeal to God (and His ‘divine gift’) with intuition-based natural 
rights talk.3 Risse’s aim is to “make maximally uncontroversial claims 
that lead to a universally acceptable, non-parochial standpoint to 
adjudicate question of global reach” (Risse 2013, p.8). More specifically, 
                                                
1 Strictly speaking, the idea of common ownership only provides one of five grounds 
of justice that Risse appeals to in the course of On Global Justice (2012), but without 
doubts it figures crucially in its overall argument and is developed at length. 
2 I say ‘exclusively’ because Grotius’s own account seems to have both a normative 
and a historical dimension – as seen in his shifting back and forth between a priori 
and a posteriori methods. 
3 Risse (2013, p.2) defines natural rights as “moral rights whose justification depends 
on natural attributes of persons and facts about the non-human world”. 
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his notion of original common ownership draws on the intuitive 
plausibility of three separate claims (Risse 2012, pp.113/4): first, the fact 
that resources and space are valuable and necessary for all human 
activities. Second, the (normative) claim that the satisfaction of human 
needs matters morally. And finally, the assumption that nobody has a 
claim to resources and space based on contribution or personal 
achievement, given that they exist independently of human activity. 
These three claims in conjunction are supposed to warrant the 
theoretical starting point that “all human beings, no matter when and 
where they were born, are in some sense symmetrically located with 
regard to the earth’s resources and space” (Risse 2015, p.88) – in a 
nutshell: they originally own the earth in common. Bringing in Risse 
will not only allow us to see even more clearly how Kant departs from 
the natural law tradition, whether it is embodied by its early modern or 
contemporary adherents. It also opens up a wider contrast between 
Kant’s global thinking and the (distributive and needs-based) 
methodological framework predominant in the more recent global 
justice literature that Risse reflects paradigmatically. 
2. Kant on Original Common Possession 
I now want to turn to Kant’s notion of original common possession. A 
superficial look into the Doctrine of Right will indeed make it appear not 
all that different from the Grotian tradition. As we saw in the preceding 
chapter, the idea is first introduced in the section that deals with the 
rightful acquisition of external objects. To acquire something means to 
“bring it about […] that it becomes mine” (DoR 6:258). Recall, in 
particular, that Kant is interested in the possibility of acquiring 
something originally, as opposed to deriving it (through exchange) from 
someone else. At the very beginning of the pertinent passage, Kant then 
specifies that what is acquired originally is never acquisition of what 
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does not belong to anyone (a res nullius), because “possession of an 
external object can originally be only possession in common” (DoR 
6:258).  
If we were merely to restrict our attention to what Kant says in 
this opening paragraph, where he essentially provides a condensed 
version of the argument to follow, we would most likely read Kant’s 
conception as very much in line with the natural law tradition.4 In other 
words, in introducing the idea of original common possession of the 
earth within the context of a justification of property rights, Kant may 
easily be read as claiming that individual acquisition must somehow be 
thought of as ‘derived’ from what is originally possessed in common. 
And yet Kant, who is presumably aware of the resemblance, 
immediately distances himself from Grotius on that point (Edwards 
1998, p.127). What he has in mind is explicitly not a “primitive 
community (communio primaeva), which is supposed to be instituted in the 
earliest time of relations of rights among human beings and cannot be 
based on principles [like Kant’s notion, JH] but only on history” (DoR 
6:258).  
In order to get a grip on Kant’s eagerness to delimit his 
conception of original common possession from that of the natural law 
tradition, we need to recap last chapter’s reconstruction of the dilemma 
that arises, on the following pages of the Doctrine of Right, from reflection 
on original acquisition of land. Recall that, on the one hand, acquisition 
of a place on earth occurs without any fault of ours – given that we need 
to be somewhere, we cannot be ‘blamed’ for coming into the world and 
taking up space. At the same time, and as beings with the capacity to 
act and be held morally accountable for our actions, there is an 
important sense in which we do claim a place as ours. Our original 
                                                
4 Recently see Pinheiro Walla (2016), who takes Kant’s account of original common 
possession to address the same problem as that of Grotius, namely the implausibility 
of inflexibly vindicated acquired rights when this would go against the very rationale 
of their introduction (on her view, individuals’ basic needs fulfilment).  
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acquisition of land thus yields normative implications: where and how 
we pursue our ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do so 
– in virtue of the earth’s spherical surface, “the choice of one is 
unavoidably opposed by nature to that of another” (DoR 6:267).  
In the last chapter, I mentioned that Kant offers a two-pronged 
argumentative move in order to deal with this puzzle; I there focused 
on the first part: the right to be somewhere, which is granted to every 
embodied agent in virtue of coming into the world. Yet, while we have 
such a right (otherwise we could not act), we also need to take into 
account that the piece of space we take up at any particular point in 
time cannot be taken up by any other person. In a second step, Kant 
thus attaches conditions to the right to be somewhere: while “all human 
beings are originally (i.e. prior to any act of choice that establishes a 
right) in possession of land that is in conformity with right”, we need to 
conceive of this legitimate possession of a place as a “possession in 
common” (DoR 6:262) with all others. And lest we still fail to notice that 
what is going on in this line of argument is very different from Grotius, 
Kant adds again that his notion of original common possession is 
not empirical and dependent upon temporal conditions, 
like that of a supposed primitive possession in common 
(communio primaeva), which can never be proved. Original 
possession in common is, rather, a practical rational 
concept which contains a priori the principle in 
accordance with which alone people can use a place on 
the earth in accordance with principles of right. (ibid.) 
Let us take stock of what we have found so far. Two aspects of Kant’s 
puzzling line of argument, as we have reconstructed it, are striking. 
First, while Kant’s notion of original common possession seems to speak 
to a concern that arises from human beings’ embodied nature, it is of a 
very different kind compared to that of Grotius: Kant’s concern is with 
the kind of systematic interdependence relations that persist among 
embodied agents just in virtue of the fact that they act and coexist in 
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finite space. Such agents of course need to be somewhere – they need a 
place on earth in order to act in the first place. Yet, they are very 
different from (Grotian) needy beings that share a world of limited 
resources with beings that have similar needs, for the satisfaction of 
which they have to use, occupy and appropriate goods. Remember how 
in the last chapter, we saw Kant set out the moral domain of right as 
providing a formal account of the “external and indeed practical 
relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can 
have (direct or indirect) influence on each other” (DoR 6:230). 
Second, Kant seems to reverse the argumentative sequence as we 
know it from the natural law tradition (Flikschuh 2000, pp.152;163). 
While we saw Grotius (and following him, Risse) start with the idea of a 
common stock in order to subsequently divide it up in accordance with 
a predetermined distributive principle, the Doctrine of Right proceeds from 
unilateral acquisition of land to the idea of original possession in 
common. Original common possession, that is to say, is not an 
argumentative starting point but the conclusion: something like a 
normative implication of the fact of individuals’ acquisition of land 
under circumstances of spatial constraints constituted by the earth’s 
spherical surface. To think of the earth’s surface as possessed in 
common is an a priori necessary condition of the unavoidable act of first 
acquisition in virtue of one’s coming into the world as an embodied 
agent. Kant thus employs the idea of original common possession of the 
earth in order to visually express what it means to exist as an embodied 
moral agent, together with other such agents, within limited space: 
namely, to understand that the corollary of one’s own right to be 
somewhere is one’s acknowledgement of others’ equal right. For, 
among a number of moral equals, “originally no one had more right 
than another to be on a place on the earth” (PP 8:358).  
To sum up, Kant introduces original common possession in 
order to illustrate the way in which embodied agents that jointly inhabit 
a bounded territory are united in an original community. Yet beyond 
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that, the pertinent passage does not lead us very far in elucidating the 
concept. The precise nature of this community remains something of a 
mystery, nor is it clear why it constitutes the conclusion of Kant’s 
argument rather than its starting point. What is evident is that Kant 
operates with a more formal notion of community than the natural law 
tradition: the sense in which for Kant the original community takes the 
form of an “original community of land” (DoR 6:262) is not that of a 
resource repository for everybody’s needs satisfaction. Instead, what he 
is saying is that the earth’s spherical surface constitutes the unavoidable 
conditions of (potential) interaction. Kant is less interested in rightful 
entitlements to this or that piece of land, resource, or object. Instead, he 
is interested in the way in which human beings stand, from the 
beginning, in a relation of “possible physical interaction” (DoR 6:352) 
with everyone else globally – given that, as physically embodied beings, 
they are constrained to occupy a portion of space on the earth (which 
cannot simultaneously be occupied by anyone else).  
Echoing this line of thought, Kant repeatedly calls his 
conception of original common possession “disjunctive” (Preparatory 
DoR AA 23:321; 322; 323). In a passage of the preparatory works 
(23:322) that nicely gathers some of the core ideas discussed in this and 
the preceding chapter, he argues for instance that 
[…] every man occupies, if and wherever on earth he 
comes to exist with no fault of his own, a place on earth, 
and can think of this as a rightful act of apprehension, 
that is in virtue of the disjunctive-universal possession of 
this or that place on the surface of the earth (as a sphere).  
 It is this notion of ‘disjunction’, I want to claim, which is key to 
understanding the precise nature of Kant’s original community of 
possession.5 Given that it is a term with structural significance in Kant’s 
                                                
5 The similarity between disjunctive community and the disjunctive judgment has 
been extensively explicated by Milstein (2013), whose work has been of great use to 
me in this context. 
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philosophical system, its further elucidation requires a detour to his 
theoretical philosophy. 
3. Disjunctive Judgment and Original Community 
In the last section, we got a first impression of Kant’s conception of 
original common possession as laid out in the context of the Doctrine of 
Right’s passage on original acquisition of land. The present section seeks 
to further deepen our understanding, drawing on Kant’s 
characterisation of original community as ‘disjunctive’. The notion of a 
’disjunctive community’ is a technical term that Kant develops in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, where it is introduced in the course of a wider (and 
perennially contested) argument about the nature of space, objects, 
temporal relations and the unity of experience. While it would go well 
beyond the scope of this chapter to try to elucidate every single claim 
that Kant makes in this context, we do need to keep in mind one of the 
most important tenets of the first Critique as a whole: human beings’ 
knowledge of the world depends on a system of fundamental categories 
or what he calls ‘pure concepts of the understanding’. Controversially, 
Kant thinks that he can develop these categories from nothing more 
than logical forms of judgment expressed in a systematic “table” (CPR 
A70/B95). After all, that is what the human intellect fundamentally is 
for Kant: a capacity to make judgments (CPR A69/B94, A81/B106, 
see also Longuenesse 1998). 
One of these forms of judgment is the ‘disjunctive judgment’, 
the exclusionary ‘either…or’ (CPR A73/B99). In a disjunctive 
judgment one divides a concept, call it A, into its mutually exclusive 
specifications, call them B, C, and D. The affirmation of any of these 
specifications of A is a sufficient condition for negating the others (if A 
is B, it cannot be C or D), and conversely the negation of all but one is 
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a sufficient condition for affirming the remaining one. What is 
important to understand here is that the disjunctive form of judgment 
divides a logical space (the extension of a concept) into mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive spheres. The known constituents 
mutually exclude each other (they are logically opposed to one another) 
but together exhaust the space of logical possibility, i.e. they "determine 
in their totality the true knowledge" (A74, see also Watkins 2011, p.44). 
Thus, there is a sense in which the state of each is bound to the others: 
the affirmation of one member implies the negation of the others, and 
the negation of all members but one implies the affirmation of the 
remaining member. A disjunctive judgement, that is to say, relates all 
concept subordination to a unified logical space within which concepts 
reciprocally delimit each other’s sphere and meaning.  
As already mentioned, the logical forms of judgment then 
ground categories or ‘pure concepts of the understanding’. In our case, 
the disjunctive judgment yields the category of ‘community’ as the third 
category of ‘relation’, alongside ‘substance’ and ‘causality’ (CPR 
A80/B106, B110-11). What connection Kant precisely has in mind 
between forms of judgment and the categories is perennially contested. 
In order to avoid falling prey to the very Leibnizean rationalism that he 
had himself rejected in the earlier ‘Amphiboly’ section, however, Kant’s 
idea cannot be that relations of things in space are essentially the same 
as relations of concepts (Longuenesse 2005, p.194 ff.).6 Yet even 
granting that Kant is not guilty of assimilating logical and material 
relations, the weaker claim that the same acts of mind or “procedure[s] 
of understanding” (CPR B113) that generate the forms of judgment also 
generate the synthesis of spatiotemporal manifolds under concepts is no 
less puzzling. The argument is that similar to the way in which, in a 
disjunctive judgment, a concept is divided up into its constituent 
                                                
6 Watkins (2005) agrees that when Kant talks about “the same procedure of the 
understanding” (CPR B113) that underlies judgment and the use of categories, he 
does not in any straightforward way ‘derive’ one from the other but merely points 
out a similarity among the respective mental acts. 
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components (bringing them into a relation of mutual determination and 
exclusion), so in a material whole, things mutually determine one 
another in an object or body considered as a whole (CPR B112/3).7 In 
both, members are represented as reciprocally coordinated with one 
another as parts that come together to constitute a whole. Just as two 
logically opposing propositions exclude each other, so two objects 
cannot occupy the same spatial position (at the same time). And just as 
the constituents of a disjunctive judgment, taken together, include the 
entire sphere of knowledge in that particular domain, so substances, in 
order to be an object of experience, must stand in a unified space, a 
whole that is the product of its various constituents. Consequently, the 
category of community has two names: ‘Reciprocity’ (with an emphasis 
on the relation of causal interaction) and ‘Community’ (with an 
emphasis on objects’ being part of one space). 
In order to elucidate the surprising connection that Kant 
stipulates, between the understanding’s representation of relations 
among concepts and empirically given things in space, we need to have 
a closer look at the first Critique’s section on the “Analogies” (CPR A 
177-218, B 218-265). There, Kant tries to show how precisely the 
categories of relation provide the human understanding with ‘schemata’ 
through which we synthesize the manifold of appearances into an 
intelligible horizon of spatiotemporality. Each of the three analogies 
examines how a particular category constitutes the condition of a 
particular type of temporal experience.  
In the third Analogy (CPR A211/B257), Kant claims that we 
can only experience appearances as co-existing simultaneously by 
applying the concept of community.8 This, in turn, is to suppose that 
                                                
7 Guyer (1987, p.452, fn.17) notes that “as is often pointed out, Kant’s connection of 
the real relation of reciprocal influence with the logical notion of an exclusive 
disjunction is the most tenuous of all”. 
8 For extensive treatments of the third analogy (which was for a long time neglected 
in Kant scholarship), see Watkins (2005, pp.217-229), Longuenesse (2005, Ch.7),  
Shell (1996, Ch.6). 
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the objects are in relations of mutual interaction – they “reciprocally 
contain the ground of the determination” of the other (CPR B 258). 
Why is this so? It would seem that I can just look at my chair, then look 
at the table standing next to it and simply know without further ado that 
they co-exist simultaneously. Yet, Kant does not think it is that easy, for 
while we always apprehend objects successively (we see one object first, 
then the other), we have no given (absolute or objective) framework 
within which we might locate events and states of affairs in time. Hence, 
we need the help of the categories that relate the perception of objects 
in time “prior to all experience, and indeed make it possible” (CPR 
A177/B219). For instance, if we look at the table first and then at the 
chair, we can only judge that they exist simultaneously (instead of being 
two perceptions following onto each other) if we could reverse the 
perception, i.e. look at the chair first and then at the table (CPR A211). 
Unfortunately, given that time is not perceivable, we cannot directly 
read this reversibility off our perception – it requires subjecting our 
apprehension to a rule that cannot be derived from that apprehension 
itself (Allison 2004, p.265). This rule, which allows for the judgment that 
each object occupies part of a larger unified space, takes a disjunctive 
form and requires regarding the coexisting things as constituting a 
community.  
So the sense in which simultaneously existing objects stand in 
“dynamical community” (CPR A213) and determine certain features of 
each other is primarily spatial: one substance is thought to be the cause 
of certain determinations in another and vice-versa insofar as each is in 
some sense responsible for the spatial position of the other. If two things 
exist simultaneously, they mutually exclude each other, as each object 
has its place by virtue of the place of everything else. And as only 
spatially separated objects are capable of coexisting simultaneously, 
spatial positions partly condition temporal positions. To sum up, we 
cannot locate particular objects vis-à-vis one another without first being 
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able to comprehend them as coordinate participants in a unified 
horizon of possible experience. 
This enlightening comparison already leads us some way to 
understanding what Kant seeks to suggest by calling the original 
community of possession ‘disjunctive’. Just as a disjunctive judgement 
relates mutually exclusive concepts to a unified logical space, so the idea 
of a disjunctive community elucidates how in virtue of sharing the earth 
in common, we each affect one another in the phenomenal world. Kant 
thus picks up the general construction of rights relations in analogy with 
the mechanical law of action and reaction in the introduction to the 
Doctrine of Right (as discussed in the preceding chapter), which now serves 
as a template upon which to conceive of rights relations within the 
empirical space constituted by the earth’s spherical surface. 
Again, spatial and temporal aspects are mutually constitutive: 
from a temporal perspective, the idea of disjunctive community grasps 
the essential simultaneity of our coexistence with one another on the earth’s 
limited surface. In explicating the notion of original common 
possession, Kant clarifies that the relation among participants in the 
original community of possession is not “a relation to the land (as an 
external thing) but to other humans in so far as they are simultaneously on 
the same surface” (Preparatory DoR AA23:322, my emphasis). Our own 
corporeal nature and the earth’s surface are only normatively relevant 
(in the way they are) in virtue of our concurrent existence. To sum up, 
Kant’s original community describes a system of mutual exclusion in 
which persons stand in a relation of ‘possible physical interaction’ in 
virtue of simultaneously occupying different parts of the earth. 
In order to fully exploit and appreciate the significance of the 
notion of disjunction and the pertinent category, we have to go yet a 
step further. Following Beatrice Longuenesse (Longuenesse 1998, 
pp.375-394; Longuenesse 2005, pp.184-211), we need to notice what 
makes the category of community so interesting and indeed unique 
among the categories: the perception of spatiotemporal simultaneity 
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does not merely require us to perceive, or presuppose, interaction 
among the things we observe. It also requires us to posit ourselves within 
that interaction as phenomenal bodies that coexist among them. Kant 
takes our body to mediate our perception of the simultaneous existence 
of other substances: we can only experience substances as standing in 
relations of community under the condition of experiencing them as 
coexisting with our own body. A change of our own location is only 
noticeable through its altered relation to other objects (and the other 
way round), as Kant explains:  
From our perspective it is easy to notice that only 
continuous influence in all places can lead our sense from 
one object to another, that the light that plays between 
our eyes and the heavenly bodies effects a mediate 
community between us and the latter and thereby proves 
the simultaneity of the latter, and that we cannot 
empirically alter any place (perceive this alteration) 
without matter everywhere making the perception of our 
position possible; and only by means of its reciprocal 
influence can it establish their simultaneity and thereby 
the coexistence of even the most distant objects (though 
only mediately). (CPR A213-14/B 260) 
Our experiencing the coexistence of other substances with our own 
body – through the light that “strikes our eyes” and “plays between the 
bodies” – is the condition for our experiencing their respective relations 
of community. Each objective change of spatial position of our body is 
made evident to us by the alteration of its relation to other bodies.  
Kant illustrates this idea particularly nicely in his (little-known) 
essay What is Orientation in Thinking. There, he develops his stance with 
regard to the wider philosophical issue of ‘orientation in thinking’ 
(pertaining to the scope of reason and the existence of God) by way of a 
comparison with two more familiar and seemingly manageable forms 
of orientation. First, he reflects on the possibility of geographical 
orientation (WOT 8:134/5). At first sight, it may look as though we are 
able to orient ourselves in a landscape by drawing on certain objects or 
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fixed points – the altitude of the sun, the position of the stars or a 
compass. Yet, Kant thinks the idea that we could merely orient 
ourselves by drawing on external things misleading. Instead, the most 
immediate (and important) point of orientation is in fact our own 
subjective feeling of left and right, which we (implicitly) rely on when 
distinguishing South, North, East and West. Without this “feeling of a 
difference in my own subject” (WOT 8:134) we would be ignorant of 
the relation in which we ourselves stand to the world surrounding us 
and thus remain entirely disoriented.  
This becomes even clearer when we imagine ourselves 
attempting to find our way around in a pitch-dark room (WOT 8: 
136/7). Given that we are familiar with the room’s general lay-out, all 
we require in order to spatially locate all items in the room is knowledge 
of the position of one piece of furniture together with – importantly – 
our feeling for left and right. If instead somebody had rearranged the 
furniture, we would be completely lost. In both examples, it is a 
subjective feeling that serves as a relevant point of orientation in space. 
More specifically, it is my body – its location in space – that provides 
the necessary reference point: the subjective feeling of left and right is 
nothing else than a “feeling of a difference between my two sides” 
(WOT 8:137). We can only grasp space through our own position in it.9 
Now, Longuenesse argues that by requiring us to locate 
ourselves in the world,10 the category of community provides us with 
what she calls a ‘standpoint on the whole’: a reflexive standpoint from 
which we locate and situate ourselves in interaction with the world 
                                                
9 The larger philosophical point in this context relates to the perspectival change that 
comes with Kant’s Copernican turn: given that a topography of reason has to be 
done without the bird’s eye view that (which he takes to be at the root of both 
rationalist megalomania and empiricist scepticism), what we are left with is our 
ability to determine the limits of reasons through reflection upon reason itself – 
similar to the way in which we can only grasp space through our own position in it. 
10 ‘Us’ here refers to the “empirical unities of consciousness associated to a body we 
represent as our own in the unified empirical space and time whose representation 
we thereby generate” (Longuenesse 1998, p.391). On the relation between self-
consciousness and consciousness of one’s body, see also Longuenesse (2006). 
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surrounding us.11 I want to suggest that it is this standpoint on the 
whole, and in particular the reflexivity that comes with it, which can be 
understood as providing the template for Kant’s global standpoint.12 
Unlike in the theoretical philosophy, where we relate to the external 
world around us with a speculative interest (to gain knowledge about it), 
in the domain of right we practically relate to other agents that we affect 
and physically encounter in it. It is the same intellectual capacity that 
enables us to take a common epistemic “standpoint on the whole” of 
objectively existing things, and which allows us to take a moral-juridical 
standpoint on the “whole of interacting beings” (Longuenesse 2005, 
p.206). And in the same way in which our perception of the world is 
perspectival, so are our interactions with other agents. 
As we will see in subsequent chapters, the step from the 
community of material substances, to a cosmopolitan community of 
individuals each with their own respective standpoints is all but trivial. 
For what we now relate to are no longer objects, but a plurality of 
diverse and interacting agents, each of whom makes claims (to exercise 
their capacity for choice and action) upon us from their own 
perspective. While I will thus have to make sure to identify the limits of 
my analogy between theoretical and juridical domains, for now I want 
to focus on the relevant similarity. That is to say, I want to zoom in on 
the way in which the idea of a disjunctive community elucidates how in 
virtue of sharing the earth in common, we each affect one another in 
the phenomenal world, but we are each able – from the global 
standpoint – to reflexively relate to the whole of human beings with 
which we are in thoroughgoing interaction. It compels us to take up a 
reflexive stance towards those with whom we share a spatially bounded 
                                                
11 Longuenesse goes as far as to say that “by the location of us in the empirically 
given world”, not only “the astonishing edifice of Kant's Analogies of Experience 
comes to completion“ (Longuenesse 1998, p.392), but in fact Kant’s critical 
philosophy as a whole. It is at this point that we truly are the authors of the 
representation of the very world in which we locate ourselves. 
12 Here I follow Milstein (2013, p.124). 
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world. This is the way, I take it, in which in Kant’s political philosophy, 
the ‘standpoint on the whole’ becomes the ‘global standpoint’.  
4. Kant and Grotius on the Global Standpoint 
With our analysis of Kant’s original community as ‘disjunctive’ at hand, 
we can now sharpen the contrast with the Grotian framework. I will 
start by laying out what distinguishes the two conceptions on a 
substantive level, subsequently turning to their role in the respective 
broader argumentative structure. It is the crucial insight into Kant’s 
shift in perspective that will allow us to see just how different his global 
standpoint is.  
On a conceptual level, an essential contrast has emerged over 
the last three sections between Grotius’s material, needs-based principle 
for the division of the common stock of resources and land on the one 
hand, and Kant’s formal argument pointing out relations of 
interdependence that obtain among individuals globally in virtue of 
their unavoidable coexistence on the earth on the other. In both 
arguments, human physicality grounds the idea of original common 
possession, yet in very different ways. Risse’s Grotian account provides 
a legitimacy criterion for rightful appropriation of land and resources 
grounded in the satisfaction human bodily needs. In Kant, embodiment 
comes in as a mere precondition for a particular kind of moral agency 
(‘Willkür’, i.e. our capacity for choice and action), a formal account of 
which the Doctrine of Right sets out to provide. The ensuing contrast is 
nicely elucidated by drawing a distinction between Grotian relations of 
ownership – focused on the “usefulness for human purposes of three-
dimensional spaces” (Risse 2015, p.91) – and a Kantian relation of wills 
of individuals (Deggau 1983, p.100).  
Kant himself articulates this difference most clearly in the 
preparatory works for the Doctrine of Right. There, he clarifies that the 
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relation between original common owners is not “a relation to the land 
(as an external thing) but to other humans in so far as they are 
simultaneously on the same surface” (Preparatory DoR AA23: 322). 
This of course makes for a stark contrast to the Grotian model, which 
Risse takes to provide an explicitly “nonrelational” (Risse 2012, p.89) 
ground of justice: it gives rise to principles of just entitlement that “apply 
among all human beings regardless of what relations they share” (Risse 
2012, p.7). For Kant instead, to say that the earth constitutes the basis 
of possible physical interaction just is to make a claim about how 
individuals relate to one another globally.13 Of course, in depicting a 
mere form of relations of choice between subjects, such a conception 
does not lend itself to substantive implications of the kind we can get out 
of the Grotian understanding of common ownership. Following the 
latter, natural law already contains a principle of just distribution: the 
principle of need as determined by human nature and discerned by 
reason. On the Kantian picture in contrast it is, in a way, ‘all up to 
humans’: it is them who have to come to terms with the fact that they 
have to share the earth in common. What the idea of original common 
possession points out is the fact that, and the way in which, their fates 
are inevitably bound up with one another. It merely provides a 
standpoint from which individuals can think and act globally with the 
intention of finding shared solutions for shared problems. 
With regard to the broader argumentative structure, we have 
already noticed that original common ownership occupies contrasting 
places in the respective justificatory sequences. Grotius starts with 
original community conceived of as a historically real state of affairs and 
proceeds from there – embedded within a wider account of societal 
                                                
13 Johan Olsthoorn has rightly pointed out to me that Kant’s “relationality” is 
conceptually distinct from what Risse invokes as “relational” grounds of justice in a 
way familiar from current normative debates, where relations are usually taken to be 
mediated through social practices (Risse 2012, pp.7/8). Yet, I take it that the 
contrast I construe still helps to illustrate the way in which a Grotian notion of 
common ownership is only indirectly or derivatively inter-personal. 
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evolution – via distribution in accordance with a principle that derives 
its validity from the structure of human nature, to individual property 
and territorial boundaries. Risse replaces the historical narrative with 
an appeal to secularized natural rights reasoning. What renders the 
assumption of humanity’s collective ownership of the earth intuitively 
plausible is the mere insight that there is something all humans need 
(space and resources) but which none of them can make a prior claim 
to, for instance based on individual achievement or labour. Yet, he does 
abide by Grotius’s argumentative sequence: original common 
ownership figures as a conceptual starting point from which a 
distributive rationale unfolds.  
We saw Kant turning this sequence upside down: he starts from 
the insight into the conundrum of original acquisition of land, from 
which the need to think of the earth as possessed in common follows as 
a normative implication (Flikschuh 2000, p.168). The requirement to 
think of the earth as possessed in common, that is to say, is a corollary 
of (unavoidable) first acquisition we make by virtue of coming into the 
world as embodied agents. Kant employs the idea of original common 
possession of the earth to visually express what it means to exist as an 
embodied moral agent, together with other such agents, within limited 
space. It would thus be misleading to say that this fact just makes it the 
case that we possess the earth in common. Rather, original common 
possession is something we judge to be the case, reflexively acknowledging 
the need, and at the same time our ability, to come to terms with the 
plurality of perspectives that humans bring to bear on each other on the 
earth’s spherical surface.  
The inverted structure of Kant’s argument reflects his 
fundamental shift in perspective that amounts to a radical redefinition 
of what it means to think globally. The global standpoint is not a pre-
established view ‘from nowhere’, but it is reflexive and first-personal: a 
standpoint the agent constructs by shifting his ground to the standpoint 
of the other. To think of the earth as possessed in common illustrates 
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the requirement, directed at each particular agent, to take a reflexive 
stance towards their own existence as an embodied agent in a world of 
limited space. It is a standpoint through which we acknowledge our ability 
to locate ourselves vis-à-vis everyone else, and from which we act and 
interact with others. Kant’s global standpoint is premised on each of the 
particular standpoints a multitude of agents initially hold. 
It is this radical shift in perspective that endows Kant with the 
deep, systematic view of how individuals relate to one another globally. 
For, it means that Kant is engaged in a justificatory project that is 
fundamentally different from that of Grotius or his contemporary 
follower Risse: his aim is not to explain or vindicate the individual 
distribution of what was ‘originally’ given to all in common. Kant is 
interested in a much more fundamental question than how to divide up 
the world; he uses the idea of original common possession in order to 
explore the most fundamental way in which individuals relate to one 
another globally. Importantly, this way is independent or at least 
derivative of the ways in which each of us relate to biophysical space.  
It seems plausible to argue that Kant’s motivation for inverting 
the sequence of Grotius’s argument is precisely the latter’s tendency to 
obliterate the global standpoint by essentially consolidating existing 
holdings and borders rather than questioning them. By contrast, in 
arising from the unavoidable conditions of our coexistence on earth, 
Kant’s global community has priority over contingent, man-made 
communities of right-holders or co-owners. I will have more to say in 
subsequent chapters about what this means precisely. For now, suffice 
it to anticipate that Kant is not suggesting that we should do away with 
all kinds of particular relations, commitments and institutions.14 Rather, 
the global standpoint is one from which we critically reflect on existing 
relations of property, territory or sovereignty that we have inherited.  
                                                
14 Compare, again, Kant’s reluctance to embrace a world state solution.  
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5. Earth Dwellers and Earth Citizens 
Over the course of the preceding sections I have provided a formal and 
relational interpretation of Kant’s notion of original common 
possession. This interpretation was based on my reconstruction of the 
right to be somewhere in Chapter 1. I presented the original community 
of what I call earth dwellers as one between embodied moral agents in 
direct physical interaction with each other. They are united with all 
those with whom they jointly inhabit a bounded territory, the earth, by 
the mere fact that they can affect and constrain each other with their 
choices. Moreover, insight into the normativity of embodiment under 
conditions of spatial constraints endows earth dwellers with a distinctly 
first-person standpoint through which they reflexively recognise their 
systematic interdependence with other agents in a world of limited 
space. I have argued that it is this standpoint from which agents are able 
to think and act globally that makes Kant’s cosmopolitanism in the 
Doctrine of Right most distinctive. 
In developing this interpretation, I largely focused on the 
pertinent passages in the ‘private right’ section. I now want to leave this 
context behind and turn to the category of cosmopolitan right as laid 
out in the Doctrine of Right and Perpetual Peace. As I briefly intimated 
before, Kant there repeats the argument now well-known to us: in virtue 
of the fact that “nature has enclosed [us] all together within determinate 
limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a globus 
terraquaeus)”, he writes, we stand “originally in a community of land”, 
which is a “community of possible physical interaction” (DoR 6:352). 
Given that I will investigate the domain of cosmopolitan right in much 
detail over the course of subsequent chapters, I here want merely to 
indicate that the interpretive framework I have just developed broadly 
fits the concern that there drives Kant’s discussion. Moreover, my aim 
is to show that the formality of Kant’s argument does not make it any 
less interesting, or indeed devoid of normative implications. I will do so 
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by contrasting an interpretation of cosmopolitan right based on my 
formal and relational reading of original common possession with Peter 
Niesen’s attempt to extract from it a material conception of what he 
calls “earth citizenship”. 
To start with, notice that Kant equates cosmopolitan right with 
a right to hospitality, that is “the right of a foreigner not to be treated 
with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another” (PP 
8:357).15 This right entitles a visitor of foreign territory to be dealt with 
justly for the duration of her (temporary) stay and to seek what Kant 
calls ‘commerce’ (broadly understood as including a broad range of 
cultural, economic or political exchange). In a nutshell, I take it to be a 
communicative right to attempt contact with distant strangers. What 
hospitality explicitly does not contain is a right to remain permanently 
on the land of a foreign country or even settle there (DoR 6:353).  
In order to get a better grip on cosmopolitan right, we can follow 
Peter Niesen (2007; 2011), who deserves credit for providing a unified 
account of it. On Niesen’s view, the two examples Kant discusses in this 
context pertain to a negative and a positive dimension of the right to 
hospitality respectively. On the one hand, the negative dimension 
figures prominently in Kant’s condemnation of European states’ 
colonial practice at the time, whose attempts at conquering foreign 
lands with recourse to misleading claims to hospitality he decries as 
“inhospitable behaviour” (PP 8:358). Newly ‘discovered’ lands may not 
be appropriated without the consent of those who have already settled 
in the region. The second group of cases Kant considers are those where 
individuals end up at some place through no fault or responsibility of 
their own, but merely due to unfavourable circumstances. In a 
preliminary draft for Perpetual Peace (Preparatory PP AA23:173), Kant 
                                                
15 Cosmopolitan right itself has only recently received increased attention in the 
literature, with different motivations: Benhabib (2004) makes it fruitful as a way to 
think about refugee and asylum rights; Byrd and Hruschka (2010, pp.205-11) take it 
to be dealing with rights to engage in international trade; Niesen (2007, pp.90-108) 
stresses its role within Kant’s critique of colonial occupation.  
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discusses the victims of a shipwreck washed ashore, as well as sailors 
seeking refuge from a storm in a foreign harbour (Kleingeld 1998b, 
p.76). Both, he argues, can legitimately claim hospitality rights to 
remain on the host lands and cannot be returned to the sea or their 
homeland if this would in any way endanger them (PP 8:358).16  
Niesen’s own aim in turning to cosmopolitan right is to develop 
a conception of what he calls “earth citizenship”, which endows 
individuals with a list of substantive rights immediately derived from the 
right to be somewhere (Niesen 2007; Niesen & Eberl 2011, p.329; 
Niesen & Owen 2014). What Niesen takes to be the common 
denominator in the two examples just outlined is an affirmation of the 
fact that “we need to be somewhere rather than nowhere, and that we 
need to use and appropriate territory and territorially based stuff” 
(Niesen & Owen 2014, p.20). The right to be somewhere, Niesen thus 
claims, includes a set of entitlements that account for the “territory-
based nature of human lives” (Niesen & Owen 2014, p.20), or as he calls 
it, our “earth citizenship”. The idea of territory-based entitlements is 
meant quite literally here: through mere reflection upon our concurrent 
existence on the earth, Niesen hopes to assemble a “substantive list of 
human rights like the one articulated in […] the Universal Declaration” 
(Niesen & Owen 2014, p.21), including far-reaching entitlements like a 
transnational right to freedom of communication.  
Yet, Niesen’s account of the right to be somewhere in terms of 
‘earth citizenship’ raises a number of questions that cast doubt on 
whether Kant’s account does actually lend itself to such a list: is his right 
to be somewhere a general right to just any, or to some particular place 
that, through ‘nature of chance’, I happen to occupy? While the case of 
the shipwrecked person only seems to give us the former, Kant’s 
discussion of non-state peoples points beyond that, to the latter. More 
                                                
16 Notice that the two cases also specify the range of agents covered by cosmopolitan 
right. While the anti-colonial argument pertains to interactions between states and 
non-state peoples, the shipwrecked examples involves an interaction between a state 
and individuals who are not their citizens (Niesen 2007, p.97). 
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importantly, how much space do I have a right to? Sure, given that 
human agency is at stake, someone who is locked up in a suitcase fails 
to have a place on earth in the relevant sense.17 But beyond that? Why 
do the relative small nomadic communities have a right to occupy the 
‘great open regions’ they traverse (DoR 6:353) – disallowing other 
people, to whom the land might be equally useful, to even settle in the 
proximity of these lands?  
Against the background of my relational interpretation of 
original common possession developed in this chapter, it should be clear 
why these questions will ultimately have to remain unanswered. We saw 
Kant replacing a material, needs-based principle for the division of the 
common stock of resources and land that he inherits from the natural 
law tradition with a thoroughly relational argument pointing out 
systematic relations of interdependence that obtain among individuals 
globally just in virtue of their unavoidable coexistence on the earth. 
Such a conception does not lend itself to the substantive implications we 
can get out of a more Grotian understanding of common ownership, 
where natural law already inheres a principle of just distribution: the 
principle of need as determined by human nature and discerned by 
reason. Nor, pace Niesen, can our empirical existence as vulnerable 
beings with bodily needs have direct rights grounding justificatory force, 
such that their very structure might be taken to equip us with 
substantive entitlements when it comes to resources and land.   
Niesen’s conception of earth citizenship, I want to suggest, thus 
overestimates the extent to which we can derive particular substantive 
entitlements from the idea of original possession in common. For Kant, 
to account for the spatial or territorial dimension of human existence is 
not to draw up a list of rights, but to acknowledge the fundamentally 
global nature of rights relations – that humans both need to and are 
able to get to grips with the fact that they have to share the earth in 
                                                
17 I am grateful to Markus Willaschek for this example. 
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common. They need to do so because of the systematic interdependence 
that obtains globally just in virtue of the reciprocal relation between 
agent’s choices, and the ensuing ‘unavoidable unity’ of all places on the 
earth. And they are capable of reflexively and critically relating to their 
own respective standpoints, normatively structuring the common space 
they share by negotiating the terms of their coexistence. The focus of 
such a conception is not on a substantive list of pre-political entitlements 
that individuals bring to bear in their interactions, but on the quality of 
interaction it prescribes: how we ought to deal with one another 
globally. 
 It is in this spirit – with a focus on the mode of interaction among 
embodied agents – that we should read the section on cosmopolitan 
right. As guests, they may “present themselves for community” (PP 
8:358) or at least offer to engage in cultural, economic or political 
exchange (”commerce”, DoR 6:352). Guests may pass through, but – 
unless refusal involves their ‘destruction’ – they may not stay against the 
will of the inhabitants; this constraint holds even where inhabitants fail 
to accord with visitors’ view of what it is to make proper use of territory. 
The most pertinent case, to be discussed at length in the following 
chapter, is that of non-state peoples. Kant ascribes to Western 
emissaries or travellers (whatever the intention of their visit) a formal, 
communicative right to attempt contact of intellectual, commercial or 
any other kind with distant strangers. It is this mode of comportment 
that I take to be at the normative core of cosmopolitan right. Going 
back to the idea of original common possession this goes to show, once 
again, that Kant’s cosmopolitanism for earth dwellers is concerned with 
the quality of human interactions, not the quality of matter. The 
category of cosmopolitan right thus speaks to a fundamental thread of 
argument that lies at the heart of Kant’s mature political thought and 
pervades it throughout. It is a cosmopolitanism not of humanity in the 
abstract, but in direct physical confrontation with each other.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have drawn on my preceding reflections on the right 
to be somewhere in order to reconstruct what I called Kant’s global 
standpoint. My claim was that to think of oneself as an earth dweller is 
to think of oneself as participant in a cosmopolitan community of 
individuals whose fates are, in an important sense, inevitably bound up 
with one another. A crucial aspect of this framework was shown to lie 
in the change of perspective from which we think globally: away from 
the Archimedean observer that distributes global shares, to a reflexive 
first-person standpoint through which agents recognise their 
unavoidable interdependence. Kant’s global standpoint does not come 
with ready-made solutions to shared global problems, but seeks to 
provide a perspective from which agents can resolve to find them.  
Let me end by pointing out that, while in this chapter I drew on 
Grotius’s material conception of original common ownership in order 
to carve out Kant’s position, the implications of the emerging contrast 
go well beyond the specific comparison of two thinkers. For, Grotius’s 
needs-based framework (as recently adapted by Risse) neatly fits into a 
widespread tendency, among contemporary normative theorists, to 
reduce questions of global concern to questions of how to divide the 
world up. Indeed, it is fair to say that despite a global justice literature 
that has skyrocketed over the last decade, more systematic reflections 
on what it would mean to theorise globally still remain the exception 
rather than the rule. Much work retains a steady focus on the possible 
extension and application of values, concepts and principles originally 
developed from within and for the nation-state, to the world at large. 
Moreover, my reconstruction of original common possession 
also goes against the way Kant’s own cosmopolitanism tends to be read. 
Linking up with last chapter’s discussion, notice that the two most 
prominent interpretive approaches can be read to take their cue from 
the respective categories of innate or acquired right. Some construe 
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Kant’s cosmopolitanism as depicting a moral community among all 
rational beings qua shared humanity, constituting a ‘kingdom of ends’. 
On this view of Kant as a moral cosmopolitan,18 human beings have 
universal rights and obligations in virtue of being joint members of a 
‘supersensible world’ (Kleingeld 1999b, p.509; Benhabib 2004). Others 
(briefly discussed in the last chapter) ascribe to Kant a distinctly political 
cosmopolitanism of shared membership in some kind of global polity. 
This reading takes the notion of ‘world citizenship’ literally, aiming at a 
worldwide legal and political order that unites all human individuals in 
one political body.  
In contrast to both these dominant approaches, I have suggested 
to model Kant’s global community on the right to be somewhere 
(which, as we saw, cannot be collapsed into either of the two categories). 
This community is not one of shared humanity, nor of shared 
citizenship, but of embodied agents in direct physical confrontation 
with each other. And its function is not to provide an objective criterion 
for adjudicating distributive shares. Instead, is constitutes a reflexive 
insight through which individuals acknowledge their interdependence 
with others in a world of limited space. On such a view, we take up the 
global standpoint not primarily with the aim of dividing up the material 
world or – as I showed in the last section against Niesen’s notion of earth 
citizenship – arriving at a set of substantive entitlements from the 
armchair. Instead, the aim is to convincingly frame the question of how 
individuals relate to one another globally. As I will show in more detail 
in subsequent chapters, Kant’s global standpoint provides a normative 
criterion for how to interact with distant strangers with the aim of 
finding mutually agreed terms of coexistence.  
 
                                                
18 On the distinction between moral and political cosmopolitanism in wider debates 
about global justice, see Kleingeld and Brown (2014). 
  89 




The last chapter introduced the concept of Kant’s global standpoint. 
Drawing on the first Critique’s category of community and the 
‘standpoint on the whole’ it provides, I reconstructed the disjunctive 
community of original common possession. I took it to elucidate how, 
by virtue of sharing the earth in common, we each affect one another, 
whilst also being able reflexively to relate to the whole of humanity. The 
underlying thought was that we can think about the way in which we 
rightfully relate to other agents (with whom we are in thoroughgoing 
interaction) along lines similar to the way in which we situate ourselves 
in interaction with the world surrounding us. The most important 
upshot is that it is not only our perception of the world that is necessarily 
reflexive and perspectival, but also our interactions with other agents in 
it.  
An important motivation underlying my argument was the need 
to go beyond Kant’s property argument, taking seriously his subsequent 
discussion of what I presented as a more basic moral relation among 
earth dwellers. So far, I made this case on a textual level, inviting us to 
literally ‘read further’ than the argument from a property-based duty of 
state entrance. The present chapter aims to add further and more 
systematic evidence against an interpretation that effectively stops short 
at that point of the argument. I will do so by investigating an interpretive 
problem that has only recently gained increasing attention:1 how it is 
possible that the bulk of the Doctrine of Right seemingly concerns itself 
with the justification of a universal and coercible duty of state entrance 
                                                
1 See various contributions in Ypi and Flikschuh (2014). 
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(based precisely on the property argument), while on its final pages Kant 
seems to exempt non-state peoples from this duty. Call this the puzzle of 
non-state peoples. I take it that this is not just a marginal textual issue that 
is easily solved, but that it raises hard questions about the role of 
property rights and statehood with regard to the wider structure of the 
Doctrine of Right. 
My discussion of the puzzle of non-state peoples aims to make 
good on two claims in particular. The first one is that, on Kant’s view, 
the duty to enter the state is indexed to, and contingent on, the existence 
of a (publicly enforced) practice in which people raise reciprocal claims 
to objects as rightfully their own. Kant’s property argument is conceived 
from within the state and recursively justifies a system of public law-making 
qua its capacity to regulate reciprocally raised property claims. As a 
corollary, (non-state) peoples without established property systems lack 
the pertinent duty, nor can they be forced into the state by settlers or 
colonizers from abroad.  
Instead – and this is my second claim – the latter must interact 
with non-state peoples in acknowledgement of shared earth dwellership. 
For, Europeans arrive at the global standpoint through recursive 
reflection on their own, statist form of political organization, such that 
they cannot predicate any juridical obligations on non-state peoples. In 
the context of the cosmopolitan encounter, this standpoint binds them 
to go no further than offering themselves for interaction (commerce). 
The argument of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 lays 
out the puzzle of non-state peoples by contrasting the currently 
predominant reading of Kant’s property argument as grounding an 
unconditional duty of state entrance with his seeming exemption, later 
on in the Doctrine of Right, of stateless peoples from this dynamic. The 
central question is why Kant takes Westerners to be bound to interact 
with non-state peoples on the basis of cosmopolitan right rather than 
having a license to coerce them to enter the state.  
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In Section 3, I go on to scrutinise three different recent attempts 
to make sense of this puzzle, which approach it either from a rights-
based or an obligation-based perspective. While I follow Katrin 
Flikschuh’s claim that Western emissaries, settlers or traders are duty-
bound by their rightful condition ‘at home’, in Section 4 I argue that in 
order to obtain that very conclusion we need to extend the regressive 
move underlying her argument beyond Kant’s property argument and 
to the global standpoint. What juridically constrains Westerners in their 
interactions with non-state peoples is that they must think of themselves 
and their interlocutors as joint participants in the disjunctive 
community of original common possession, that is, as earth dwellers 
with the shared capacity to come to terms with the fact of their 
concurrent coexistence in limited space. However, they cannot equally 
predicate the relevant obligations of their stateless hosts, who might lack 
this reflexive awareness given that the relevant regress never gets off the 
ground for them. Hence, they are left with the mere attempt to establish 
cosmopolitan interaction. It remains an open question how precisely – 
on the basis of which shared principles – citizens of Western states and 
non-state peoples can coordinate their concurrent coexistence. 
1. Kant’s Puzzle of Non-State Peoples 
In order to get a grip on the puzzle of non-state peoples and its possible 
impact on the wider architectonic of the Doctrine of Right, we need to start 
with some textual groundwork. In this section, my aim is to juxtapose 
two pieces of textual evidence in particular. First, I will reconstruct the 
predominant reading of Kant’s property argument as grounding a 
universal and unconditional duty to enter into the state. I then go on to 
lay out his seeming exemption of non-state peoples from the very logic 
of this argument on the final pages of the Doctrine of Right. What appears 
to be his simultaneous affirmation and denial of the (property-mediated) 
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moral necessity of statehood sets the stage for the discussion in the 
remainder of the chapter. 
The Property Argument  
Let me start with a brief reconstruction of Kant’s property argument. 
As I intimated earlier, it was for long regarded as obscure, inaccessible 
and largely a failure. Only fairly recently has it come to be seen as 
containing the argumentative heart of the Doctrine of Right.2 I am 
interested here specifically in a distinctly non-instrumental justification 
of statehood construed around the unavoidable though problematic act 
of unilateral acquisition of objects of our choice (e.g. Brandt 1982; 
Flikschuh 2000; Ludwig 1988; Ripstein 2009).3   
While the proponents I have in mind disagree on some of the 
interpretive detail, they generally start with the concept of right (or the 
innate right as its first-personal formulation) as giving each agent 
something like an equal (formal) entitlement to exercise their capacity 
for choice and action.4 The complication arises from the fact that we 
typically pursue our projects not in empty space, but by means of using 
external objects. Any remotely complex project that individuals set out 
to pursue will require them to appropriate external objects. 
The moral vindication of claims to have objects as one’s own, 
however, is not at all unproblematic. For, the required license to exclude 
                                                
2 Ground-breaking to that effect were Brandt (1982) and Ludwig (1988). 
3 I will not discuss here in any detail an alternative, instrumental reading of Kant’s 
justification of statehood according to which property-claims are not per se morally 
problematic but simply incomplete prior to their vindication by political authority 
(e.g. Byrd & Hruschka 2010). While this interpretation would not fundamentally 
alter the wider narrative of this chapter, I do think that it risks loosing sight of what 
current interpreters take to be most distinctive about Kant’s argument, namely the 
unconditional necessity of statehood. I will come back to this distinction between 
instrumental and non-instrumental readings – which has been somewhat blurred in 
the course its absorption into contemporary liberal theory (Applbaum 2007; 
Valentini 2012; Stilz 2011a) – below in my discussion of Stilz’s take on the puzzle of 
non-state peoples.  
4 I will bracket at this point the different readings of the innate right outlined in 
Chapter 1, as they are immaterial to my present argument. 
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others from what is ‘mine’ cannot be got from the general concept of 
right.5 Equipping each with an equal entitlement to use their capacity 
for choice and action, it does include a right to physically use, occupy 
or hold objects of my choice such as the famous apple in my hand (DoR 
6:247/8) – what Kant calls “empirical possession” (DoR 6:250). Yet, 
whether I am also entitled to have a right over an object “even without 
holding it” (DoR 6:250) is a different matter altogether. For, this kind 
of “intelligible possession” (DoR 6:250) describes a moral relation 
between the wills of persons independently of space and time (DoR 
6:249): it does not pertain to the way in which I relate to an object, but 
to the way in which I relate to others with regard to an object (that they 
acknowledge as rightfully mine). In claiming an unowned object of my 
choice as mine (independently of my physical connection to it) I obligate 
not the object but all other persons, namely to refrain from further use 
of the object in question henceforth. 
The problem is that, in unilaterally imposing such an obligation 
on others, I presumptively arrogate to myself the authority to determine 
(as well as interpret and ultimately enforce) their rights and obligations. 
Yet, as their moral equal, I do not in fact have any such authority.6 As 
Kant puts it, unilateral wills are incapable of legislating “coercive law 
for everyone with regard to possession since that would infringe upon 
freedom in accordance with universal laws” (DoR 6:256). We thus face 
a seemingly irresolvable tension with regard to the possibility of 
intelligible possession. On the one hand, it would seem that the very fact 
that “I have the physical power to use an object of my choice” (DoR 
                                                
5 Given that intelligible possession is not analytically contained at the level of the 
very concept of right, Kant calls it a “synthetic a priori proposition of right” (DoR 
6:246), which is in need of a “deduction”. Whether he ever gets round to providing 
the announced deduction remains contested among interpreters. The preparatory 
works (23:271-336) are full of Kant’s repeated (though seemingly unsuccessful) 
attempts to deduce intelligible possession. 
6 One way of putting the point is to say that the possibility of acquiring external 
objects of choice, in licensing an additional way in which I can be entitled to achieve 
the ends I have set for myself, introduces a “mine or yours structure” (Ripstein 2009, 
p.59) that does not apply at the level of general rights relations. 
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6:251) requires that I can do so rightfully. A law that commanded that 
external objects cannot be owned by anyone (but have to remain ‘res 
nullius’), would thus be “contrary to rights” (DoR 6:251). On the other 
hand, though, we have seen that, in virtue of their necessarily unilateral 
nature, claims to rightful appropriation are morally highly problematic 
as they compromise the (innate) juridical equality of all others. For 
Kant, this is a real and serious conflict of practical reason that he 
presents, characteristically, in the form of an antinomy (DoR 6:255).7 
His solution consists in a twofold move. On the one hand, the 
“postulate of practical reason with regard to rights” (DoR 6:247) – that 
Kant also calls a ‘permissive law’ – authorises me to claim objects of my 
choice and thus to (problematically) put others under an obligation.8 
Yet, it does so under the condition that I submit to a public authority 
(thus entering into the state) that connects my claims to own external 
objects with a duty to respect the property claims of all others (DoR 
6:255). Only a public lawgiver that represents an omnilateral or ‘general 
united will’ has the authority to prescribe coercive law to everyone, thus 
turning merely provisional rights-claims into conclusive rights. The 
upshot of this argument is that state entrance is morally necessary: only 
the state can morally vindicate reciprocally raised property claims. This 
duty, moreover, is presented not only as unconditional but also coercible, 
such that I can force anyone who unilaterally (hence problematically) 
raises property claims against me to jointly enter the civil condition.  
                                                
7 Across Kant’s work, antinomies describe (seeming) paradoxes of two opposed yet 
equally justifiable claims or inferences that point to an illegitimate extension of finite 
human reason beyond its proper jurisdiction. While antinomies make their most 
famous appearance in a section of the Critique of Pure Reason that is concerned with 
four sets of dialectical inferences about the nature of the world, they also play an 
important role in the second and third Critiques.  
8 I will discuss the role of the permissive law in more depth in the following section. 
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Kant on Non-State Peoples  
With a good idea of Kant’s property argument (as grounding a universal 
duty of state entrance) at hand, we can now turn to another passage, 
which may potentially be taken to undermine the former. The 
comments I have in mind are located at the very end of the Doctrine of 
Right in the section on cosmopolitan right (DoR 6:352/3) and are 
concerned with the interactions between Western settlers or colonizers 
and non-state peoples (which I shall henceforth refer to as the 
cosmopolitan encounter). Let me be clear that, given both the brevity and 
ambiguity of Kant’s remarks in the relevant passage, I do not want to 
claim to have the only possible or correct interpretation (or that there 
could possibly be one). I do think, however, that there is a coherent and 
persuasive way of reconstructing the textual evidence that raises serious 
questions about the property argument as just outlined. It is worth 
quoting the relevant passage (DoR 6:353) at length:  
 
The question arises, however: in newly discovered lands, 
may a nation undertake to settle (accolatus) and take 
possession in the neighbourhood of a people that has 
already settled in the region, even without its consent? If 
the settlement is made so far from where that people 
resides that there is no encroachment on anyone's use of 
his land, the right to settle is not open to doubt. But if 
these people are shepherds or hunters (like the 
Hottentots, the Tungusi, or most of the American Indian 
nations) who depend for their sustenance on great open 
regions, this settlement may not take place by force but 
only by contract, and indeed by a contract that does not 
take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with 
respect to ceding their lands. This is true despite the fact 
that sufficient specious reasons to justify the use of force 
are available: that it is to the world's advantage, partly 
because these crude peoples will become civilized […] 
But all these supposedly good intentions cannot wash 
away the stain of injustice in the means used for them.  
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Kant’s primary concern in this passage is with Europeans’ 
comportment towards non-state peoples. He starts by denying the 
former a right to deprive the latter of their land by effectively treating it 
as ‘res nullius’ and settling there without obtaining their consent. In 
obtaining this consent they should not make fraudulent contracts, for 
instance by taking advantage of the “ignorance of those inhabitants with 
respect to ceding their lands”. This is in line with Kant’s prohibition, 
earlier in the Doctrine of Right, on forcing a people to adopt (what are for 
them) unfamiliar kinds of land-use – for instance, forcing a hunting 
people to become a farming people (DoR 6:265). While would-be 
settlers have a hospitality right not to be treated with hostility when they 
arrive on foreign soil, they are not entitled to permanently remain or 
settle there, but can be turned away (provided that they do not face 
certain death as a result).9  
Kant connects these remarks on land-use with a more general 
critique of the burgeoning colonial practice of his time and the very idea 
of a civilizing mission. Europeans cannot just go around establishing a 
civil condition for others wherever they may take it to be absent. While 
Kant suspects the civilizers’ intention to be “specious” anyway, even 
good intentions “cannot wash away the stain of injustice”.10  
Does the passage also allow us to gain any insights about non-
state peoples themselves? While Kant provides very little detail on this, 
it seems fairly clear that he takes them to lack the kind of established 
property systems Westerners are used to, at least as far as land-use is 
concerned. The groups he has in mind – for instance nomadic, hunting 
and pastoral peoples “like the Hottentots, the Tungusi, or most of the 
American Indian nations” – follow a non-sedentary way of life and 
merely use the land over which they roam for their sustenance without 
                                                
9 This argument seems particularly directed against a Lockean tradition of justifying 
colonialism based on appropriation of land qua innocent occupation. 
10 Earlier in the Doctrine of Right, Kant formulates a general prohibition to “found 
colonies, by force if need be in order to establish a civil union with them [i.e., non-
state peoples, JH] and bring them into a rightful condition” (DoR 6:266). 
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claiming property rights over it. Whether this is a historically accurate 
assumption for Kant to make is irrelevant at this point, given that what 
we are interested in is a purely conceptual question.11 
The further question of non-state peoples’ political standing is 
much more difficult to answer. Clearly, they do not live in what we 
commonly take to be modern states, that is territorial forms of 
centralised authority exercised through formal structures of 
government. Yet Kant also seems to deny that non-state peoples are just 
a wild, uncivilized bunch of individuals. His preferred term ‘peoples’ 
(Völker or Völkerschaften) is indicative in this context (DoR 6:343, 352/3):12 
peoples are defined as a union of a multitude of human beings, with a 
will uniting them (DoR 6:311). While Kant thus intimates that non-state 
peoples have some kind of (possibly informal) internal constitution or 
political organization, he hesitates (that is, he is unwilling or takes 
himself to be unable) to specify it any further. 
What is more interesting in this context, however, is actually 
something Kant does not say, namely that they have a duty to enter the 
state. Given his insistence, elsewhere, that it constitutes a “wrong in the 
highest degree” (DoR 6:307) to remain in the state of nature, the total 
omission of any claim to the effect that non-state peoples commit a 
moral wrong seems at least worth remarking on (Muthu 2009, p.199). 
The least we can say is that the question whether members of non-state 
peoples wrong one another by not entering the state is not the primary one 
in the current context. Kant’s focus is not first and foremost on non-
state peoples’ internal relations, but on their interactions with their 
                                                
11 Stilz (2014, p.204) worries that many non-state peoples, such as the native 
Americans, did actually claim distinct territories within which they allocated land 
rights to individuals. 
12 Mary Gregor translates both ‘Völker’ and ‘Völkerschaften’ as ‘nations’ (a notion 
closely associated with nation-states), yet particularly the latter is clearly supposed to 
be neutral between statist and non-state peoples (Niesen 2007, p.106 fn.13). Kant’s 
remark that the notion “right of nations [Völkerrecht]” is actually a misnomer and 
“should instead be called the right of states” (DoR 6:343), further confirms this. 
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propertied visitors, some of whom have arrived at their shores with the 
intention to settle there or even to ‘civilize’ them. 
Let me summarize the puzzle of non-state peoples as I have 
developed it in this section. On the one hand, there is Kant’s property 
argument as seemingly grounding a (coercible!) duty to enter into the 
state with all those against whom we cannot but raise claims to external 
objects. On the other hand, we have his silence as to non-state peoples’ 
duty to that effect, and a clear prohibition on colonizers’ possible 
attempts to coercively enforce it for them. The question then is what 
exempts non-state peoples from the distinct, property-based dynamic of 
state entrance. In other words, what is it here that “limits” the category 
of cosmopolitan right to hospitality?  
Recall that we first encountered (a less elaborate version of) this 
puzzle in the first chapter. There, my observation regarding Kant’s 
reluctance to vindicate statehood universally formed part of my 
argument that the right to be somewhere is not an acquired right. In a 
wider context, I took it to provide initial cause for resisting the 
widespread equation of external moral relations with relations of 
property, or acquired right. In the intervening chapter I went some way 
in sketching the moral domain (of earth dwellership) that fills this gap. 
The present chapter seeks to further explore the relevance of earth 
dwellership by showing that we need to mobilise its conceptual and 
normative resources in order to come to terms with the puzzle of non-
state peoples. 
2. Making Sense of Kant’s Puzzle   
In the preceding section, I assembled the textual evidence in support of 
what I have called Kant’s puzzle of non-state peoples. While 
interpreters have long ignored the possible tension it creates or at least 
tried to deny its systematic significance, this has recently started to 
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change. Over the following sections, I will scrutinize three different 
attempts to make sense of this conundrum within the confines of the 
Doctrine of Right.13  
I just hinted at the fact that we can approach the relevant 
passage from two perspectives: either we look for hints about non-state 
peoples’ own normative standing, or we focus on Kant’s claims 
concerning settlers’ comportment towards them. Accordingly, we can 
make sense of Kant’s rationale for the pertinent claims along either of 
these lines: if we focus on the former concern, we will tend to think that 
it is something about non-state peoples themselves which warrants their 
being treated in the specified ways. Call this the rights-based view. 
Alternatively, where our focus is on would-be colonizers’ moral 
comportment towards those whom they intend to ‘civilise’, we will tend 
to think of Kant as chiefly concerned with specifying Europeans’ 
obligations towards stateless peoples. Call this the obligation-based view. 
 I do not want to present these as hermetically separated or 
mutually exclusive exegetical strategies. Yet, it is interesting to see that 
in their attempts to make sense of the puzzle of non-state peoples, 
interpreters tend to opt for one or the other of these interpretive 
approaches. Hence, it is worth structuring the following discussion 
along the lines of this analytic distinction. While I will ultimately 
vindicate a version of the obligation-based view, I hope to show that the 
two perspectives are more intertwined than is usually assumed. 
                                                
13 A possible reading to which I will not pay more detailed attention ascribes to Kant 
the view that non-state peoples are so far down the scale of human development that 
they are just too immature to live in a rightful condition. Nevertheless, the argument 
goes, we would better approach them with an attitude of benign neglect and leave 
them to their own devices. In this vein, Kant’s comments about the lamentable 
attachment of “savages” to their “wild, lawless freedom” (DoR 6:316) could be read 
as in line with his earlier comments about the inability of non-white races to self-
legislate the moral law (e.g. Ant 15:878). Yet, as Pauline Kleingeld (2011, pp.92-123) 
has shown in meticulous interpretive detail, since the mid-1870s Kant had 
undergone a transition away from the racist views he had espoused earlier. Sankar 
Muthu (2009, p.202) suggests, for instance, that the mature Kant’s comments about 
the “barbarous, crude, and brutish” (PP 8:355) follow Montaigne’s ironic play with 
the idea of New World individuals as natural savages and cannibals, intended to 
criticize the violent behaviour of European states. 
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Stilz’s Rights-Based View  
A version of the rights-based view is defended by Anna Stilz (2014): she 
wants to show that we can coherently describe non-state peoples as 
operating under a system of property rights (if an incomplete or 
imperfect one) such that they can legitimately claim the pertinent moral 
status against statist settlers. Stilz’s key move is to argue that merely in 
virtue of their occupation of the land on which they reside non-state 
peoples acquire some form of rights over it. However, given that 
conclusive property rights are possible only under state authority, these 
rights are ‘provisional’. That is to say, they are “rights of empirical 
possession that are established through a process of physical 
appropriation that occurs in time and space” (Stilz 2014, p.213).14 
Importantly, notwithstanding their provisional status, these rights are 
still strong enough to impose binding duties on others. More precisely, 
they have a “rightful presumption” (DoR 6:257) in their favour even 
before and beyond their vindication by political authority. That is why 
European settlers have an obligation to respect indigenous peoples’ first 
possession of land (and thus, more generally their political form of life). 
I should point out that Stilz slightly diverges from the property 
argument as reconstructed above. More specifically, she operates with 
a different understanding of the way in which, outside the civil 
condition, property claims are merely ‘provisional’ such that we require 
the state in order to make them ‘conclusive’ (DoR: 256/7). My own 
exposition implied a justificatory relation between provisional and 
conclusive property,15 according to which the former notion points to a 
conceptual (or, more accurately, a moral) problem with unilateral 
                                                
14 Stilz’s account of acquisition of land as a generic kind of empirical (physical) 
possession contrasts with the way I have tried to develop this idea in earlier chapters. 
On her view, expelling someone from a piece of land they occupy is no different 
from wresting an apple from their hand. My own strategy was to show that there is 
more to the idea of original acquisition of land by connecting it to the broader 
circumstances of human agency under spatial constraints. 
15 I borrow the conceptual distinction between temporal and justificatory readings from 
Flikschuh (2017). 
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acquisition in the absence of public authority: only the state is able to 
make the required judgments that constitute property rights. Stilz, in 
contrast, defends a temporal reading, according to which provisional 
property just precedes conclusive property in time.16 That is to say, in 
the state of nature, people can have almost fully defined (yet 
insufficiently secure) rights in objects of their choice, for the vindication 
or enjoyment of which they (have to) enter into the state. 
I suspect that the latter interpretation, in virtue of the ensuing 
instrumental justification of state authority, risks losing sight of what is 
most distinctive about Kant’s account of political obligation as incurred 
through an unavoidable though highly problematic act of property 
acquisition. It seems to me that, on a textual level, this reading (to which 
Stilz subscribes) does not take seriously enough the inability of unilateral 
wills to legislate “coercive law for everyone with regard to possession 
since that would infringe upon freedom in accordance with universal 
laws” (DoR 6:256). Hence, its proponents have a hard time making 
sense of the way in which Kant sees himself (or reason more generally) 
confronted with an actual antinomy when it comes to the moral 
vindication of property rights. 
While I am thus sceptical of attempts to assign much 
prominence to the idea of provisional (property) rights, I shall not 
pursue this line of argument further at this point. For even if Stilz’s 
reading holds up, she still needs to explain why non-state peoples’ 
acquisition of land does not unleash a dynamic of state-building. As we 
have seen, she does not deny that provisional rights function as a 
conceptual link between state of nature and civil condition (as that 
condition in which property is conclusive). Stilz herself concedes that 
they come with political obligations, thus serving “as a prerequisite to 
the future establishment of a civil condition” (Stilz 2014, p.213). So how 
                                                
16 In fact, Stilz (2014, pp.209/210) takes her account to strike a middle way between 
the two interpretations. The claim, however, that provisional rights “have moral 
content, and they make normative demands on others in the state of nature” (Stilz 
2014, p.218) warrants my suspicion that she is much closer to the temporal reading. 
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come non-state people are somehow barred from this logic, both with 
regard to their internal relations and in their encounter with would-be 
colonisers? It would seem that the latter could simply force them into 
the state by settling on and thus making claims to their land. 
With regard to the former problem, Stilz (2014, p.205) bites the 
bullet. Notwithstanding Kant’s silence on the issue, she claims that 
“stateless people may wrong one another by refusing to enter into the 
civil condition”. All we can say is that Europeans lack “the 
authorization to coerce others to fulfil their political obligations” (Stilz 
2014, p.205; my emphasis).17 Her argument for that latter claim, in 
turn, draws on the idea that the duty to enter the state (and the 
authorization to coerce others to do so) is conditional on our physical 
coexistence being unavoidable rather than resulting from “nature or 
chance” (Stilz 2014, p.207). European would-be colonizers, however, 
bring about the pertinent interaction wilfully and could easily avoid it 
by “leaving their vicinity” (Stilz 2014, p.207). This is why the process of 
state entrance does not get off the ground.18  
Stilz thus opts for a reading of Kant’s ‘unavoidability clause’ 
according to which the need to enter the civil condition is contingent 
on a certain configuration of people at a particular geographic location. 
This argument is reminiscent of Jeremy Waldron’s (e.g. 2011) similarly 
empiricised version of Kant’s unavoidability clause that Waldron dubs 
the “proximity principle”. Yet, as I hope to have shown in previous 
chapters, this misconstrues the relevant modality. When Kant talks 
about unavoidability of contact and the way rights-relations become 
                                                
17 Sankar Muthu (2009, p.208) even goes a step further in denying such a duty on 
the grounds that non-state peoples could easily exit their social group. Only within 
groups with a sedentary lifestyle, he thinks, are internal interactions sustainable and 
unavoidable enough to trigger a duty of state entrance.  
18 In Chapter 2, I have myself pointed to the contrast between the deliberate 
missions of European would-be colonizers one the one hand, and the shipwrecked 
sailors washed ashore on the other hand (Preparatory PP AA23:173). Yet, there 
Kant’s point was precisely that individuals have the pertinent hospitality rights 
regardless of how interaction comes about. 
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pertinent among those living ‘side by side’, something other than (what 
I called subjectively) contingent proximity relations is at stake.  
Keep in mind that Kant introduces the idea of ‘unavoidable 
physical interaction’ in the context of remarking on the earth’s 
circumference (e.g. DoR 6:262, PP 8:358). In Chapter 1, I called the 
fact that the earth’s surface is spherical objectively contingent. While it could 
have been otherwise, it is not a result of human agency: it constitutes 
the objectively given spatial condition in which earth dwellers are 
constrained to establish possible rights relations. Consequently, what 
matters in the pertinent context is the necessity of interaction and the 
ensuing sense in which, ultimately, nobody can avoid living side by side 
with all others. The fact that we cannot just disperse infinitely in the 
way we could if we did, for instance, live on an unbounded plain, is 
juridically relevant. 
In a nutshell, it seems that Kant is not interested in the question 
whether an actual encounter has been brought about deliberately, such 
that it could also have been avoided. Rather, the way in which the earth 
is shaped makes it impossible for us to avoid interaction once and for all 
such that we must somehow put up and get to terms with being close to 
each other. This insight, however, blocks Stilz’s intended move and 
throws her back onto the shaky terrain she entered by invoking the 
notion of a provisional right. On the rights-based reading, it thus 
remains unclear how we can ascribe the relevant juridical status 
(somewhat analogous to that of propertied citizens) to non-state peoples 
without following the implications of the pertinent argumentative logic 
all the way down. 
Ripstein’s Obligation-Based Account  
Let us move on to the second, alternative strategy. On what I call the 
obligation-based reading, the constraints within which would-be 
colonizers’ must interact with non-state peoples are not grounded 
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primarily in the latter’s juridical status and their pertinent entitlements. 
Rather, they are justified with regard to the former’s own juridical 
obligations. The basic idea is that if we know the limits of our own 
claims, we also know the extent of theirs. 
Arthur Ripstein advocates such an account. On his view, non-
state peoples’ actual juridical situation is completely irrelevant as far as 
Westerners’ comportment towards them is concerned. When Ripstein 
argues that, from the outside, we must assume just “any multitude of 
human beings” to be in a rightful condition (Ripstein 2014, p.149), I do 
not think that he wants to assert that wherever we find a throng of 
people we must take them to constitute some kind of political 
community. Rather, I take him to affirm a kind of epistemic modesty 
with regard to non-state peoples’ form of political life. The idea seems 
to be that while Kant takes them to have some kind of internal 
organization (the exact nature of which we are unlikely to fully 
understand from the outside), we should refrain from judging whether 
they instantiate a lawful condition or not.19 Any uncertainty about the 
kind of arrangement we have in front of us notwithstanding, we “must 
treat a nomadic or hunter-gatherer society as though it is in a rightful 
condition” (Ripstein 2014, p.165) .  
Ripstein’s argument is thus not unlike Stilz’s in that its core is 
similarly anti-paternalist in spirit.20 The idea is to block the extension 
from a particular moral conduct that holds for members of one party, 
to the authorization of a third-party to actively enforce this conduct for 
them – to ensure the former’s compliance with their own obligations. In 
                                                
19 Ripstein’s awareness of Kant’s reference to nomads as ‘peoples’ – defined as a 
“union of a multitude of human beings (MdS 6:311),[that] has as its principle of 
unity a will uniting them” (Ripstein 2014, p.165) – seems to confirm this. On the 
other hand, though, Ripstein takes his argument to even hold for “violent multitude 
that interacts barbarously” (ibid.). Now, if this is his position, it seems to become even 
more difficult for him to systematically distinguish the grounds of cosmopolitan right 
from the dynamic of state entrance, such that my objection gains further traction. 
20 Sankar Muthu (2009, p.199) similarly grounds Kant’s take on non-state peoples in 
anti-paternalist considerations, claiming that stateless people are “duty-bound to 
become civilized through their own internal efforts”. 
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our case, this entails that Ripstein (like Stilz) refrains from ruling out the 
possibility that non-state peoples may themselves have a duty to enter 
the state with one another, whilst denying Europeans’ entitlement to 
rectify this wrong. In taking charge of stateless peoples’ affairs, 
Europeans wrongfully and “forcibly deprive” them of the “possibility of 
making their own arrangements” (Ripstein 2014, p.168). Regardless of 
whether we are aware of non-state peoples’ obligations or not, what we 
do know is that our own obligations do not extend so far as to tell them 
what to do: we must not take it upon ourselves to make arrangements 
for them. Even if we do not know ‘who is in charge’ around here, we 
can reliable rule ourselves out. 
As such, the argument that X is doing wrong while there is 
nothing Y can do to prevent X from doing it – simply because it lies 
outside Y’s sphere of authority – is certainly plausible. But Ripstein 
needs to say more than that. He needs to explain why Europeans do not 
have a right to force non-state peoples into the state with them, for 
instance simply be appropriating the land on which the latter roam. In 
order to make that further claim, Ripstein would need to provide a 
systematic ground for delimiting the normative purchase of the 
property argument to which he is otherwise committed. That is to say, 
he would have to provide reasons why the interactions between 
Europeans and stateless peoples lie outside the scope of the property 
argument. Otherwise put, we need to know what distinguishes the 
cosmopolitan encounter from the interactions of private individuals in 
a state of nature, who can indeed force recalcitrant individuals to enter 
into the civil condition with them. Unless Ripstein shows why European 
settlers and nomads stand in a kind of relation that differs from a private 
rights relation, he cannot block the logic of the property argument.  
Ripstein himself is well aware that Kant claims both “that 
everyone is entitled to use force to bring others into a rightful condition 
with them”, and that no group “may force another group to share a 
rightful condition with them” (Ripstein 2014, p.145). Yet, I do not see 
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that he provides a systematic criterion for distinguishing the two cases 
that would allow his ‘hands-off’ attitude in the latter scenario to go 
through. Ultimately, it remains unclear just what it is about non-state 
people’s very “existence” (Ripstein 2014, p.165) that imposes the 
pertinent “obstacle to colonization”, if it is not supposed to have 
anything to do with non-state peoples (i.e., their juridical standing) 
themselves. Even if Ripstein is correct to argue that all we need to know 
about the claims of non-state peoples are the limits of ours, he still owes 
us an account of the latter: why are our claims against non-state peoples 
limited to hospitality in the first place?  
 Two questions in particular remain unresolved on his 
obligation-based view: we are neither told why European settlers have 
the pertinent kind of obligations towards stateless peoples, nor why the 
latter qualify as the appropriate addressee of said obligations – why we 
should take them to have the relevant juridical standing. It seems that 
these two problems cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner without 
at least some kind of revision to the property argument. This motivates 
my turn to an alternative version of the obligation-based reading. 
Flikschuh’s Obligation-Based Account  
Let us for a moment go back to the beginning of this chapter. In laying 
out the puzzle of non-state peoples, I characterised it as consisting of 
two elements: a particular reading of Kant’s property argument as 
grounding a universal duty of state entrance on the one hand, and his 
seeming exemption of non-state peoples from such a duty on the other 
hand. The interpretations I scrutinised over the two preceding sections 
–  Stilz’s rights-based and Ripstein’s obligation-based reading – tried to 
come to terms with the second while keeping faith with the first. Each 
of them, however, encountered difficulties in making sense of the puzzle 
of non-state peoples within the parameters of the property argument as 
it is usually conceived.  
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In this section, I will look at an attempt to make headway with 
regard to this conundrum by rereading Kant’s account of property 
itself. In challenging the reconstruction of this argument as laid out in 
the first section, Katrin Flikschuh’s (2017, pp.64-99) version of the 
obligation-based reading seeks to push back against the idea of the 
modern state as a universally required form of political organization. 
Instead, Flikschuh presents the requirement to enter the state as indexed 
to the contingent social practice of reciprocally raised property claims, 
such that non-state peoples simply lack the pertinent duty.  
Before I turn to Flikschuh’s revisionary claim about the property 
argument’s scope of validity, I need to say a word about the wider 
methodological picture in the background. Emphasising Kant’s 
profound non-foundationalism, what Flikschuh calls his method of 
“recursive justification” does not start from indubitable first premises or 
innate ideas but from a first-personally affirmed experiential (hence 
fallible and revisable) condition – a subject’s own cognitive awareness 
of her having an experience of a specified kind (Flikschuh 2017, pp.70-
74).21 Recursive justification regressively “turns in” on this premise by 
inquiring into its subjective possibility conditions, that is the 
transcendentally necessary (mind-dependent) presuppositions that a 
person must accept as valid for her given that she affirms the experience 
in question. 
Flikschuh (2017, p.74) puts particular emphasis on the strictly 
first-personal nature of the recursive argumentative structure, making a 
sharp “distinction between subjective necessity and objective validity 
(reality)”.22 That is to say, the justificatory regress affords the agent 
insight into that which they must accept about themselves given their 
                                                
21 Flikschuh borrows the term recursive justification from O’Neill (1989, 
pp.21;23;43) 
22 This makes for an important contrast with other proponents of (versions of) the 
recursive reading such as O’Neill, Korsgaard or Ameriks, who typically vindicate the 
relevant initial experiential context as something we cannot but hold such that the 
ensuing regress accrues a novel (characteristically Kantian) kind of objectivity that is 
not mind-independent but indexed to the human standpoint.  
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initial affirmation of the relevant experiential premise. This is 
particularly pivotal in the context of practical reasoning, where the 
bindingness of recursively vindicated principles of action is limited to 
the reasoning subject herself and cannot be third-personally attributed 
to others given that they may not share the relevant experiential 
conditions. The thought is that I cannot infer a reason’s objective or 
indeed universal bindingness for everyone from its unconditional validity 
for me.  
In line with this methodological stance, Flikschuh reads Kant’s 
property argument as a recursive inquiry in the moral conditions of the 
possibility of existing property relations. To be more precise, the relevant 
first-personally affirmed experience consists in the fact that I raise (what 
I regard as) morally valid property claims against you. This claim in 
turn – to be more precise, the intelligible relation I thereby implicitly 
invoke – is morally possible only in the civil condition. Hence, the duty 
of state entrance is a necessary presupposition of the rightfulness of my 
property claim against you. The question, that is to say, is not whether 
I can claim objects of my choice as “rightfully mine” (DoR 6:245), but 
rather how I can do so (morally speaking). The answer is that the 
possibility of property is contingent on state entrance. For, only under 
public authority is the kind of moral relationship that our conventional 
property practices presuppose possible.  
Notice also that the experiential context Kant is said to have in 
mind is not some kind of pre-political property convention, which then 
leads (in the course of a historical sequence) into the state. Rather, he 
takes the empirical reality of a system of publicly enforced property rights 
as given and asks for its condition of possibility. That is to say, the 
argument proceeds from within the state context.23 The regulation of 
                                                
23 Flikschuh (2017, p.85) finds evidence for this view in the opening paragraphs of 
the Doctrine of Right’s Introduction (DoR 6:230), where Kant introduces his project as 
providing a normative criterion – “what is right” in a moral-juridical sense – for a 
positively given body of laws – “what is laid down as right”.    
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reciprocally raised property claims is a core feature of such a system of 
public law-making and, as it turns out, its justificatory ground.  
So on Flikschuh’s recursive reading, Kant’s property argument 
provides reflexive insight into the moral requirement of state entrance 
as a (recursively) necessary condition of reciprocally raised property 
claims: given that I raise property claims against others, I ought to enter 
into the state with them (Flikschuh 2017, p.85). Only the state as a 
particular, territorially structured institutional arrangement with a 
claim to exercise its authority over a specified geographical area makes 
property morally possible. The crucial implication of the fact that the 
duty of state entrance is triggered by, and hence premised on, the 
existence of a practice of property claims is that anyone who never 
commits an act of acquisition – as is the case, by hypothesis, of non-state 
peoples – simply does not incur the pertinent duty in the first place.24 
Kant can thus simultaneously (and consistently) affirm an 
unconditionally valid duty of state entrance for those who share the 
relevant experiential context, whilst denying it in relation to others.  
Now, notice that while Kant’s derivation of a duty of state 
entrance from the act of acquisition shows why non-state peoples 
themselves lack the pertinent duty, what it does not show is that settlers 
are wrong in depriving them of their lands by simply acquiring it. More 
generally speaking, while Flikschuh has cleared up why one party of the 
cosmopolitan encounter has a duty that the other side lacks, it remains 
to be seen what their interaction is supposed to be based on. 
At this point, Flikschuh argues that to say that non-state peoples 
themselves may not be in a rightful condition is not to say that Western 
settlers do not stand in a relation of right with them (Flikschuh 2017, 
pp.89-91; see also Flikschuh & Ajei 2014). In particular, the very fact 
                                                
24 The encounter between Western emissaries and non-state peoples itself is crucial 
for this narrative, for only the actual confrontation with ways of doing things 
otherwise can unsettle Westerners’ assumption as to the universality of their own 
experiential context, such that they can reflexively acknowledge the contingency of 
their own duty to enter the state (and, as a corollary, non-state people’s lack thereof). 
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that the latter are themselves in a rightful condition binds them to a 
certain form of interaction with non-state peoples. That is to say, in 
virtue of their membership of already established polities from which 
they have ‘sailed forth’, Westerners do not only have obligations of 
domestic and international right, but also of cosmopolitan right. Hence, 
they are bound in their interactions with non-state peoples by the very 
narrow confines constituted by the right to hospitality – they can offer 
themselves for trade and commerce and attempt contact with those on 
whose shores they find themselves. What they cannot do is simply acquire 
territory with the intention of unleashing the property-based dynamic 
of state entrance. Their own public rightful condition ‘back home’ binds 
would-be colonizers’ conduct on whichever soil they set foot and, more 
generally, differentiates the cosmopolitan encounter from that between 
individuals in the state of nature. 
Flikschuh’s obligation-based account fills an important gap that 
we identified in Ripstein’s version. For we are now in a position to make 
sense of Western settlers’ obligation vis-à-vis stateless peoples, namely 
as implied by their own juridical standing as state citizens. As emissaries 
of their own juridical condition, they travel with the (cosmopolitan) 
obligations they incur in virtue of their membership in it. It is the very 
fact that one party already is in a public (or rightful) condition that 
distinguishes the cosmopolitan encounter from the interactions of 
private individuals in the state of nature. 
I am less confident, however, that it also provides a sufficient 
answer to the second question raised by Ripstein’s account: what 
qualifies stateless peoples as the corresponding addressee of the 
pertinent obligation? Notice that we do not only have to account for the 
ground of Europeans’ duties, but also for why they should ascribe 
juridical subjectivity to stateless groups. Even if we assume (correctly, as 
I think) that the cosmopolitan encounter should be read as conceived 
from the perspective and as concerned with the obligations of (members 
of) statist peoples, what is it that compels them to identify their 
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counterparts as having a shared juridical standing that warrants the 
pertinent kind of treatment? 
Given her wider rejection of rights foundationalism, Flikschuh 
is understandably reluctant to ascribe the requisite standing to non-state 
peoples on the basis of third-personal considerations. On her view, any 
kind of formal juridical standing manifests itself only indirectly through 
empirically instantiated rights relations.25 In the current context, she 
helps herself to the normative implications of Western settlers’ 
widespread de facto (though abusive) appeal to hospitality rights in their 
interactions with non-state peoples (Flikschuh & Ajei 2014, pp.232/3). 
The idea is that by virtue of invoking a juridical concept such as 
hospitality, they necessarily presuppose the formal juridical equality of 
their claim’s addressees. If they then deny their counterparts the kind of 
treatment to which their claims’ reciprocal structure binds them, they 
commit a “critical conceptual error”: they use a juridical concept in 
order to justify an action that is inconsistent with rights talk in general. 
The purported rights claim fails to meet the condition of its own validity.  
While this strikes me as an elegant move, I am after a stronger 
conclusion. Exposing colonizers’ “Jesuistic” appeal to hospitality in 
order to deprive them “of such justificatory appeal to rights language“ 
(Flikschuh & Ajei 2014, p.233), I think, does not go quite far enough. In 
particular, it does not bind would-be colonizers to engage with non-
state peoples on juridical terms (the very invocation of which may very 
well oblige them immanently) in the first place. Hence, I want to know 
what (if anything) binds them regardless of the juridical concepts or rights 
they de facto invoke for specious justificatory purposes. As I hope to show 
in the final section, accounting for Westerners’ duty to ascribe to non-
state peoples the requisite standing does not require us to leave the 
reflexive, first-person standpoint: I shall not rely on the third-personal 
                                                
25 See for instance her related argument that the innate right, understood as a 
relation of reciprocally acknowledged legal imputability, requires acquired right for 
its empirical instantiation (Flikschuh 2017, pp.131/132). 
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ascription, to each, of earth dwellership as an objectively given ground 
of obligation. Instead, we can remain within the logic of recursive 
justification and simply regress further beyond the property argument 
and to the global standpoint. 
3. Encounters among Earth Dwellers  
In the last section, I introduced Flikschuh’s recursive interpretation of 
the property argument, which unfolds against the background of her 
more general reading of Kant’s philosophical method as regressing 
from given experiential starting points to their subjectively necessary 
presuppositions. On this reading, Kant’s justification of statehood falls 
out of a recursive reflection on the conditions of possibility of 
(contingently raised) property claims. Given that non-state peoples (at 
least on Kant’s view) fail to make any claims to objects as their own, 
they thus lack the pertinent duty of state entrance.   
I indicated my sympathy with this controversial move. Its most 
important merit lies in the acknowledgment of the fact that it is 
impossible to make sense of the puzzle of non-state peoples without 
rethinking the property argument (as it is currently read) at least to some 
extent. Yet, while Flikschuh’s proposal improves on Ripstein’s version 
of the obligation-based reading in an important regard (tying statists’ 
cosmopolitan obligations to their rightful condition ‘at home’), it leaves 
another problem unresolved: how non-state peoples can figure as a 
constituent component of a cosmopolitan relation. If the cosmopolitan 
encounter is a matter of statist peoples’ obligations, yet those obligations 
are not property-based, something more needs to be said about the 
relevant juridical standing that warrants non-state peoples’ treatment 
under the auspices of cosmopolitan right. In this section, I suggest that 
the required category is that of earth dwellership. That is to say, 
Western emissaries need to interact with non-state peoples from the 
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global standpoint. I shall moreover claim that we get to the global 
standpoint by further extending the regress initiated by Flikschuh beyond 
the property argument. 
Regressing to the Global Standpoint   
I have no principled issue with Flikschuh’s reading of Kant’s recursive 
justification of statehood as indexed to an existing property practice. In 
fact, its departure from a distinctly first-personal justificatory premise 
reverberates nicely with my argument in Chapters 1 and 2. Yet, I think 
her regress does not go quite far enough and needs to be extended beyond 
the property argument. My aim in doing so is to establish two claims in 
particular. First, I want to show that there is a further regress within Kant’s 
recursive argument that Flikschuh misses: a regress from reflection on 
the moral possibility of property (and the ensuing duty of state 
entrance), to a reflection on the possibility of having a place to act at all 
(and the ensuing need to think of the earth’s surface as possessed in 
common) as its condition of possibility.  
Second, I would like to suggest that this further step amounts to 
a regress from a contingent experiential starting point (the fact of 
acquisition in general) to its non-contingent presupposition (the fact of 
original acquisition of land). Consequently, the extension of the 
recursive strategy I advocate amounts to a regress to global standpoint. 
It is the reflexive awareness of shared earth dwellership which grounds 
statist peoples’ obligation to think of themselves as in a cosmopolitan 
relation with non-state peoples.   
In order to substantiate the first claim, we can go back, for a 
moment, to the beginning of Chapter 1 of this thesis. Recall my 
puzzlement, there, that what I presented as Kant’s crucial consideration 
from original acquisition of land (and, consequently, original common 
possession) comes only after the entire property argument. After all, I 
read the former as articulating something like a fundamental 
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presupposition of the latter. Flikschuh’s recursive method now puts us 
in a position to make sense of this textual order as a regressive move.  
Kant starts Chapter 1 of the Doctrine of Right’s section on private 
right from within the experiential premise that we raise property claims 
against each other, vindicating state entrance as its subjective condition 
of possibility. In Chapter 2, he then turns from the question how to have 
an object of one’s choice as one’s own, to the question “how to acquire 
something” (DoR 6:258). Here we get the further, familiar move from 
the concept of original acquisition in general, to the idea of original 
acquisition of land as the unavoidable though normatively non-
innocent first acquisition (DoR 6:261). The idea is that if property is to 
be (morally) possible, original acquisition of land needs to be (morally) 
possible. And the latter requires reflexive acknowledgement of the 
implications of our embodied agency under conditions of spatial 
constraints: we need to think of ourselves as in disjunctive community 
with other earth dwellers.  
This importantly clarifies the relation between the argument 
from property on the one hand, and the argument from original 
acquisition of land (leading to the idea of earth dwellership) on the other 
hand. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I argued that the latter introduces a 
novel topic, concerned with the normativity of corporeal agency under 
spatial constraints, rather than simply another sort of property claim. 
We now notice, however, that the relation is more complicated: what, 
so far, I presented as two distinct sets of considerations actually form 
part of a single regressive chain: the argumentative sequence leading to 
the reflexive awareness of ourselves (and others) as earth dwellers goes 
through the property argument.  
So while my amended reconstruction of the regress goes further 
than and beyond the property argument, the latter still constitutes a 
vital element of the justificatory sequence as a whole. This has a 
momentous implication: we only reach the reflexive awareness of 
ourselves and others as earth dwellers via the property argument – the 
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former is dependent on and presupposes the latter. While my move thus 
extends the scope of our obligations beyond those with whom we are in 
a property-mediated relation (i.e., our co-citizens) to all participants in 
disjunctive community, it does not similarly extend the scope of 
obligation bearers. For, the reflexive awareness of our systematic 
interdependence with other agents in a world of limited space is 
dependent on the property argument; and so are the pertinent (formal) 
constraints on our comportment when we engage with those others with 
the aim of finding shared terms of coexistence. These obligations do not 
bind anyone outside the relevant experiential context. In other words, 
insofar as non-state peoples do not raise property claims we cannot 
predicate of them a regress to the global standpoint.  
My second claim is closely related. The thought is that Kant’s 
transition from the property argument (and the pertinent duty of state 
entrance) to a more fundamental domain circumscribed by the 
concurrent existence of a number of embodied agents on the spherical 
surface of the earth amounts to a regress from a contingent starting point 
to its non-contingent implications. On the one hand, from the contingent 
fact that people raise property claims against each other follows, as its 
subjective presupposition, a (recursive) duty of state entrance that is 
restricted in scope to all those against whom we raise property claims. 
Yet, the further regress brings to light the way in which our relationship 
to the land precedes our relationship to other external things in the 
sense that having a place to be somewhere is a necessary presupposition 
not only of claiming rights over objects of our choice, but of juridical 
agency in the first place. We thus have the pertinent (cosmopolitan) 
obligation against whomsoever takes up space on the earth’s spherical 
surface as an embodied agent.  
I need to clarify what I mean by talking about a regress from a 
contingent starting point (the fact that we regulate our external 
interactions on the basis of a publicly enforced scheme of property) to 
its non-contingent presuppositions (the need to acknowledge that original 
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acquisition of land unites us with all other earth dwellers in a disjunctive 
community). What I do not have in mind is a shift from a reflexive first-
person to an objective third-person standpoint.26 Such a shift would 
precisely throw us back on to the Grotian terrain from which I sought 
to distinguish Kant’s cosmopolitanism in the preceding chapter. What 
the further regress does on my account is constrain the first-person 
perspective and hence our comportment towards others – it provides a 
normative foundation for our own comportment vis-à-vis others.27  
Specifically, the global standpoint binds us (that is, propertied 
citizens) to reflexively relate to the whole of human beings with whom 
we are in thoroughgoing interaction. In other words, the further regress 
does not entail that non-state peoples simply are earth dwellers, as 
though that was an objective status ascribed from an Archimedean 
standpoint. Rather, we are duty-bound to conceive of them as earth 
dwellers with whom we share a common predicament as well as the 
capacity to come to terms with it, and to interact accordingly. This is 
important precisely because it prevents us from third-personally 
predicating any obligations to those who do not share the contingent 
starting point. While the regress binds us in our own comportment 
towards other earth dwellers, it cannot equally bind those others unless 
they share the premise from which the regress gets off the ground, that 
is, the existence of publicly enforced property claims. To sum up, we 
have a duty of state entrance towards those against whom we first-
personally raise property claims, that is, our co-citizens. And we have 
                                                
26 This is a common move among some proponents of (versions of) Kant’s recursive 
argumentative strategy. Christine Korsgaard (e.g. 1997), for instance famously wants 
to get the categorical imperative (something non-contingent) out of the hypothetical 
imperative (something contingent). The idea is that reflection on the first-person 
standpoint yields obligations that are objectively binding, for instance by virtue of 
being ‘rationally non-rejectable’. This is not what my argument suggests. 
27 This, I take it, is also what early proponents had in mind in reconstructing Kant’s 
arguments recursively (e.g. Ameriks, 1978; O'Neill, 1989). For Onora O’Neill, for 
instance, to say that “all reasoning must have some standpoint, and what it 
establishes is conditional on that standpoint” (O'Neill 1989, p.64) is neither to fall 
into scepticism or subjectivism, nor to leave the first-person in favour of a third-
person standpoint, but constitutes a reflexive demand to constrain your own 
reasoning in a certain way. I return to this issues in the subsequent chapter. 
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duties to interact from the global standpoint with those against whom 
we (cannot but) first-personally raise a claim to have a place on earth, 
that is, all earth dwellers.  
Attempting Interaction 
According to my extension of Flikschuh’s recursive reading of Kant’s 
justification of statehood, reflection on the possibility of property rights 
does not only yield a scope-restricted obligation of state entrance. It also 
yields, further ‘downstream’ as it were, state-transcending obligations 
towards all those with whom we are in a disjunctive community in virtue 
sharing the earth’s spherical surface.  
The former, I take it, accounts for Western emissaries’ no-right 
to simply coerce non-state peoples into the state. For, it presents the 
need for the modern territorial state as arising in (and hence contingent 
on) a context in which individuals raise claims against one another to 
have external objects as their own. The existence of the relevant kind of 
property practice, that is to say, is both necessary and sufficient to 
unleash the process of state-building that determines and enforces the 
invoked rights within a specified geographical area. As Peter Niesen 
puts it, the obligation to enter the state and the authorization to coerce 
others to do so are thus “wedded to a specific vision of individual private 
property as the exclusion of others from the use of objects” (Niesen 
2006, p.268). According to Sankar Muthu, “the problems that the state 
is created for […] are those of settled peoples” (Muthu 2009, p.207). 
Westerners thus cannot simply extent their own particular institutional 
arrangement ‘overseas’ to non-state peoples. For given that the latter do 
not share the relevant practice, they also lack the pertinent duty. 
Now, what about the second kind of obligation, pertinent to our 
relations beyond the state context? What does it mean to act towards 
non-state peoples from the global standpoint, that is, in 
acknowledgement of their earth dwellership? It means that we need to 
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comport ourselves in a certain way: Western emissaries or travellers 
(whatever the intention of their visit) have a formal, communicative 
right to attempt contact with distant strangers. Cosmopolitan right is 
equated, after all, with hospitality, described as a right “of offering to 
engage in commerce with any other, and […] to make this attempt 
without the other being authorised to behave toward it as an enemy” 
(DoR 6:352). Hospitality constitutes something like a criterion for 
rightful contact between strangers, giving travellers arriving at the soil 
of a foreign people a right to make communicative offers without being 
treated with hostility or even “as an enemy”. As indicated in the final 
section of the preceding chapter, it binds us to a certain mode of 
comportment.   
Notice, though, that cosmopolitan right is non-coercive in an even 
more profound way. Western travellers and emissaries do not only lack 
entitlement to force non-state peoples into the state. Even their cautious 
attempts to make contact with the other side are not guaranteed to be 
reciprocated. Unless rejection would result in their ‘perishing’, their 
offer to establish anything like rights relations can be declined by their 
stateless hosts. Western emissaries cannot force non-state peoples to 
take up their offers of contact but are simply left to hope that they will 
do so.28  
Kant’s remark that we need to interact with non-state peoples 
on a contractual basis (DoR 6:353) is indicative to that effect. In general, 
a contractual relation is described by Kant as the acquisition of the right 
to another person’s deed (which may simply consist in handing over an 
object one has acquired) through a voluntary and mutually 
advantageous exchange (DoR 6:272-4). One party (A) acquires another 
party’s (B) action, while B acquires a right to whatever A has promised 
in return. I will have more to say about Kant’s likening of cosmopolitan 
                                                
28 In Perpetual Peace (8:358), for instance, Kant applauds the protectionist trade 
policies of Japan and China, who can be taken to refuse Europeans’ offers to enter 
into commercial relations (see also Muthu 2009, p.196) 
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relations to contractual relations in Chapter 5. For now, I want to 
emphasise a particular feature of a contractual interaction, namely that 
it consists of two parts or moments (Vanhaute 2014, pp.136-139): 
someone making an offer and someone else taking up or assenting to 
that offer. Agent A offers their bike to B, while B offers a piano lesson 
in return. Only if both parties have a positive and voluntary intention 
to exchange deeds do they enter a contractual relation, such that their 
wills can be conceptualised as “united” in agreement (DoR 6:272).  
This structure is very much reflected in the cosmopolitan 
encounter: while Western travellers are perfectly entitled to make an 
offer to engage in commerce (widely understood), whether the 
interaction actually comes about depends on whether the other side 
takes up that offer. In other words, a cosmopolitan relation is nothing 
we simply have. Rather, it is something we need to bring about. Notice, 
furthermore, that even if these relations do come about – if non-state 
peoples accept the offer to interact – the resulting relations are bound 
to remain non-coercive in yet another way. For although cosmopolitan 
right is  introduced and treated within the domain of public (rather than 
private) right, it crucially lacks a designated omnilateral rights enforcing 
authority (DoR 6:311, see also Kleingeld 2011, pp.86-91). The 
interactions between statist emissaries and their stateless hosts are not 
presented by Kant as (required to be) subjected to a higher coercive 
authority.  
I postpone my discussion of Kant’s motivation for presenting 
cosmopolitan right as non-coercive until Chapter 5. For now, notice the 
fact that he does leaves us in a rather odd situation. All we are left with 
are good faith attempts to make contact with our prospective hosts. Yet, 
where our offers are rejected, contact cannot be compelled. There is 
surely a sense in which, on a textual level, this fits within the parameters 
of the recursive reading. For it allows us to say that we are duty-bound 
to honour non-state peoples’ status as earth dwellers in our interactions 
with them, without thereby also predicating the pertinent obligations to 
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them. This, recall, was an implication of the fact that the regress to the 
global standpoint (and hence the pertinent insight into shared earth 
dwellership) goes through the property argument. What binds Western 
travellers abroad is their juridical situation ‘back home’, which is not 
shared by non-state peoples. 
But we need to be careful not to beg the question here. For what 
is left entirely open is how – on the basis of which principles – statist and 
non-state peoples can get along. Frankly, what is the point of our 
constrained comportment if it may as well lead nowhere? Why must we 
act from the global standpoint if we may have to put up with unilateral 
attempts? The requirement to make rightful contact appears to be on 
shaky grounds without the secure prospect that it will lead to a rightful 
interaction of some kind. Now, I want to withstand the temptation to 
look for quick fixes here. The idea of a non-coercive offer to enter 
juridical relations, on which I shall close this chapter, is curious and – 
as we shall see in the subsequent chapter – a real problem for Kant. Its 
conceivability let alone moral possibility will continue to occupy us. 
Suffice it to say at this point that it is very well possible that a neat 
solution may simply not be available to Kant. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have used a seemingly narrow textual puzzle in order 
to work through some issues of larger structural significance. In 
particular, I set out to investigate why (what is generally taken to be) 
Kant’s universal normativity of state entrance does not seem to apply to 
stateless peoples. My larger aim in doing so was to clarify the structural 
role of the property argument and its relation to the interpretative 
framework developed in prior chapters. Textually, I reconstructed a 
recursive argumentative move from Kant’s reflection on the possibility 
of property (and the ensuing duty of state entrance), to the more 
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fundamental domain spelling out the moral implications of the (non-
contingent) fact of embodied agency under spatial constraints.  
The implication is that Western emissaries are juridically 
constrained in their interactions with non-state peoples in a way that is 
predicated on their own juridical situation back home. It is a regress via 
and beyond the property argument that binds them to deal with non-state 
peoples in acknowledgement of their shared earth dwellership. While 
this interpretive move allows us to make sense of statist peoples’ no-right 
to force non-state peoples into the state with them, this is not to claim 
that it provides an easy fix for Kant’s puzzling characterization of the 
cosmopolitan encounter as a whole. In particular, we have made no 
headway on the looming question on the basis of which norms or 
principles a cosmopolitan plurality – including statist and non-state 
peoples – could coordinate their coexistence.  
Let me end by linking the discussion of the present chapter to 
the idea of a global standpoint on a more conceptual level. In particular, 
I think we need to draw out an important insight concerning the 
question what is involved in employing the global standpoint specifically 
as a concept of political morality. Recall that, in the preceding chapter, 
I developed the notion in analogy to what Longuenesse calls the 
‘standpoint on the whole’. The idea was the following: in the same way 
in which, in the speculative domain, we reflexively relate to the ‘whole’ 
of objects outside of us, in the cosmopolitan domain, we are each 
required and capable of reflexively relating – from the global 
standpoint! – to the whole of human beings with which we are in 
thoroughgoing interaction. 
Now, underlying the present chapter was an implicit move from 
the idea of agents approaching the world with a speculative interest, to 
agents approaching the world with the practical intention of finding 
shared solutions to shared problems. At the end of this chapter, we have 
to conclude that this transition – from epistemic to political 
cosmopolitanism, from geographic to political orientation, or indeed 
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from the standpoint on the whole to the global standpoint –  is far from 
trivial. For, the determination of our own spatial position with regard 
to the whole of objects outside of us differs significantly from the way in 
which we relate to the whole of embodied rational beings. What we 
relate to are no longer objects, but persons that share a limited space 
with us, each of whom makes claims (to exercise their capacity for 
choice and action) upon us from their own perspective.  
In a nutshell, the global standpoint, conceived as a notion 
specifically of political morality, is not a single standpoint on the whole. 
Instead, it is constituted by a plurality of first-personally reflexive 
standpoints in disjunctive relation, coming together under the concept 
of original common possession.29 In other words, the meaning of the 
very notion of disjunction shifts from a mere logical category that 
depicts relations of incompatibility between objects inhabiting the same 
space, to a normative one that articulates the way in which agents with 
diverse and potentially incompatible sets of principles and forms of 
political organization nevertheless share a common world. This leaves 
us with the difficult questions how – on the basis of which kind of 
principles – this genuine plurality of agents and communities can coexist 
and regulate their interactions. All we can say as we conclude the 
present chapter is that Kant seems confident that the solution cannot 
consist in a simple extension of the state-based model to the world at 
large. 
                                                
29 By “coming together” I do not have in mind some kind of convergence rather 
than the “dynamic relations between human forces of attraction and repulsion” that 
we saw Kant likening to relations of action and reaction between physical objects 
(Shell 1996, p.168).  





In the preceding chapter, I took a first step towards clarifying how the 
notion of the global standpoint impacts on our current property-based 
understanding of Kant’s political philosophy. Drawing on the puzzle of 
non-state peoples, I tied both the need to enter the state and our reflexive 
awareness of shared earth dwellership to the presence of publicly 
enforced property claims. The upshot is that cosmopolitan right is non-
coercive not only in a sense that rules out a simple extension of the 
modern state to the world at large. Beyond that, Western emissaries can 
go no further than unilaterally offering cosmopolitan relations to their 
stateless counterparts. 
I ended the chapter on the note that it remains unclear on the 
basis of which principles a genuine plurality of earth dwellers with 
diverse and potentially incompatible perspectives and political 
arrangements (encompassing statist and non-state peoples alike) can 
coordinate their interactions, that is, find shared terms for their 
concurrent coexistence. In particular, why should Western emissaries 
take up the global standpoint in the cosmopolitan encounter and 
constraint their comportment towards non-state peoples accordingly, if 
their interactions are bound to stop short of institutional mediation? 
The present chapter picks up at this point by scrutinizing a 
particular proposal how to deal with this conundrum. The idea, which 
I take to be at the heart of Onora O’Neill’s reading of Kant’s politics, is 
that it is precisely the constraint we impose on ourselves through which 
we obtain the required kind of principles. All it takes for principles to be 
shareable for a plurality of agents is a specific, namely law-like, form. 
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Consequently, principles simply need to be abstract and general enough 
in order to hold for all earth dwellers, statist and non-statist alike. On 
this view, to act from the global standpoint is to do so on the basis of 
principles that are universally authoritative by virtue of their form.  
Taking our cue from O’Neill’s important and influential reading 
of Kant will prove instructive, not least because she departs from an 
acute awareness that we need norms that are shareable among, and 
authoritative for, an actual plurality of agents. Ultimately, however, she 
does not sufficiently acknowledge the kind of plurality we are faced with 
in the domain of right, which is a plurality of interacting agents. Under 
these circumstances, I shall argue, we require principles with interpersonal 
authority, which private agents are constitutively unfit to come up with.  
The primary line of argument in the present chapter is thus 
negative: I shall deny that we obtain the required kind of principles by 
constraining our own reasoning (and hence comportment) accordingly. 
For each party in the cosmopolitan encounter lacks the unilateral 
juridical authority that would allow them to coordinate their 
interactions. This holds true regardless of how hard they may try to see 
their own judgment from the standpoint of others. Hence, we cannot 
from the global standpoint identify norms on the basis of which both 
sides, with their potentially incompatible sets of principles, could get 
along. There is a crucial difference between approaching one’s 
interlocutor from a constrained first-person (hence global) standpoint, 
and taking oneself to have the authority to issue mutually binding 
principles. However, given that Kant also denies that we can force those 
we encounter in the cosmopolitan context into coercive institutions with 
us (that could, from a public standpoint, issue the requisite principles), 
this line of argument has unsettling consequences also in the wider 
context of this thesis: as strict rights reciprocity cannot be had in the 
cosmopolitan context, all our constrained comportment does is initiate 
a dialogue through which we can hope to gradually find shared terms 
of coexistence. 
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The argument unfolds as follows: I start, in Section 1, with a 
brief reconstruction of O’Neill’s take on Kant’s politics, focusing in 
particular on the way in which agents create principles of justice by 
subjecting their own reasoning to a specific modal constraint. Section 2 
embeds this idea within O’Neill’s wider constructivist take on Kant’s 
philosophy. In particular, I lay out her continuity thesis – the idea that 
across all domains of rational activity, reasons are shareable and hence 
authoritative in virtue of having a certain formal property, namely that 
they are generalizable or law-like. In order to see where precisely her 
argument goes wrong, Section 3 looks more closely at each of the 
domains of rational activity, distinguishing the respective need for 
consistent thinking, consistent willing, and consistent interaction. Most 
importantly, it is O’Neill’s undifferentiated account of practical 
reasoning as focused on a certain logical property of reasoned principles 
which leads her to lose sight of the fact that we are looking for principles 
with the capacity to coordinate a plurality of interacting agents. Such 
principles require an interpersonal kind of authority that cannot be self-
legislated by each of them independently.  
However, as Section 4 reminds us, Kant also denies the 
possibility of a coercive institution that could legislate, from a public 
standpoint, principles that bind the entire cosmopolitan plurality. All 
we are thus left with is the unsettling prospect of an actual dialogue with 
non-state peoples through we can hope to get to know and understand 
each other – a process that unavoidably starts with the cautious 
communicative offers Kant puts front and centre of the cosmopolitan 
encounter. It remains to be seen how this leaves room still to make sense 
of cosmopolitan right in juridical terms at all. 
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1. O’Neill on Kant’s Politics 
Onora O’Neill takes the domain of politics in Kant to be fundamentally 
characterised by a “plurality of potentially interacting and diverse 
agents” (O'Neill 2004, p.156). I have already indicated that this starting 
point nicely reverberates with the problem that we have carried over 
from the preceding chapter. Not only do we need principles that can 
coordinate the coexistence of a plurality of agents each with their 
standpoint on the whole. O’Neill is also acutely aware of the first-
personal nature of the standpoint from which we interact with others, 
given that for Kant “all reasoning must have some standpoint, and what 
it establishes is conditional on that standpoint” (O'Neill 1989, p.64). 
This latter thought is of course closely connected to her wider 
constructivist reading, which I shall discuss in the next section. I begin, 
however, by focusing specifically on O’Neill’s take on the domain of 
politics in Kant and the requisite principles. 
Justice and Virtue 
The notion of justice is vital to O’Neill’s reconstruction of Kant’s 
political philosophy (O'Neill 1996, pp.154-183; O'Neill 2004, pp.65-80) 
and gets defined, most prominently, in opposition to the concept of 
virtue. Notably, O’Neill does not develop Kant’s account of justice out 
of the Doctrine of Right.1 Instead, she turns to a distinction between two 
kinds of duties that Kant makes in the context of the Groundwork’s 
discussion of the categorical imperative (Gr 4:424). These are 
introduced by way of her specification of respectively relevant negative 
criteria that in turn relate to Kant’s further distinction between two 
                                                
1 O’Neill rather bluntly confirms this when, in closing a chapter on Kant’s 
conception of justice, she concedes that “I have said nothing about the texts within 
which he discusses the connections between basic principles and just institutions“, 
that is “his political philosophy, and in particular the Doctrine of Right“ (O'Neill 
2004, pp.79, my emphasis). 
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ways in which a proposed maxim can give rise to a contradiction:2 what 
is contrary to perfect duty cannot even be consistently thought of as a 
universal law (it fails what is usually called the ‘contradiction in 
conception’ test). What is contrary to imperfect duty, in contrast, can be 
consistently conceived of, though not willed as a universal law (thus 
failing the ‘contradiction in willing’ test).3 
The main structural difference is that perfect duties – or duties 
of justice, as O’Neill goes on to call them – are correlative to rights 
(O'Neill 1996, pp.128-163).4 If a principle fails to pass the relevant test, 
the proposed action is generally and universally prescribed or 
prohibited. Justice, O’Neill (1996, p.184) argues, “is a matter of perfect 
obligations, matched by rights; its demands fall on all, and are owed to 
all”. Imperfect duties, in contrast, do not prescribe specific acts towards 
particular individuals (they can be observed in numerous ways), but call 
for virtues such as sympathy (O'Neill 1996, pp.184-5).5 
O’Neill spends the bulk of her discussion reflecting on the kinds 
of principles that would fail to pass the respective test. This involves, 
first and foremost, asking how to conceptualise the agents to whom the 
principles are meant to apply, that is how to make the appropriate kinds 
of “empirically accurate generalizations” (O'Neill 1996, p.57) while 
avoiding idealizing assumptions about their capacities, capabilities or 
vulnerabilities. The thought is that, if construed according to a 
conception of agency that is abstract and general enough, the proposed 
principles of justice will be shareable among (and have authority over) 
everyone who falls under the required description, thus effectively being 
                                                
2 Hope (2014) provides an illuminating discussion of this distinction. 
3 Kant’s example of the former is the maxim of false promising (Gr 4:422) – a 
successful false promise is impossible in a world where everyone makes false 
promises, because no one will trust another to keep their promise – while his 
example of the latter is the maxim of never assisting others in need (Gr 4:423). 
4 That O’Neill grounds rights in obligations and not, as is common, the other way 
round, is generally considered one of her significant contributions to debates about 
global justice, in particular socioeconomic (human) rights. See Brock (2011).  
5 I take O’Neill’s distinction, elsewhere, that “principles of right prescribe types of act; 
principles of virtue prescribe types of end” (O'Neill 2002, p.332) to essentially get at the 
same point.  
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global in scope. At the core of her account of justice is the rejection of 
what she calls principles of injury (O'Neill 1996, p.164), that is principles 
that aim to destroy, undercut or erode agency itself. From this general 
idea, she goes on to develop a set of more comprehensive obligations – 
applicable to individual actions, social practices and the design of 
political and economic institutions alike – not to coerce, exploit 
vulnerabilities, violate trust, or to damage the environment.  
Her account of virtue, by contrast, is built around a rejection of 
indifference to the needs of others. The thought is that, while actions 
based on principles such as indifference to or neglect of others’ needs 
may not inflict direct injury on specific individuals, they do undermine 
personal agency and social relations such that they are to be equally 
rejected (O'Neill 1996, pp.191-3). Hence, the ensuing imperfect duties 
(of virtue), such as that of charity, account for human vulnerability in 
ways that justice does not address.  
While this gives us a good idea of the contrast between justice 
and virtue on O’Neill’s account, let me highlight the structural similarity 
rather than the difference between the two domains of duties. For they 
do emanate from the same kind of modal constraint – the constraint 
that, according to O’Neill, applies across all kinds of practical reasoning: 
it is the simple question “what principles can a plurality of agents of 
minimal rationality and indeterminate capacities for mutual 
independence live by?” (O'Neill 1989, p.213) that yields duties of justice 
and virtue alike. The upshot is that, systematically speaking, there is 
nothing specific about the form of justice reasoning. Like all (practical) 
reasoning, it “begins with a minimal, modal, but authoritative demand: 
that others cannot be given reasons for adopting principles which they 
cannot adopt” (O'Neill 1996, p.3). Again, I want to bracket for now the 
wider rationale underlying the formulation of this modal constraint. 
What I would like to highlight at this point is that we obtain principles 
of justice by each constraining our reasoning accordingly. O’Neill’s 
view that, substantively speaking, this will deliver us no more than the 
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most abstract and general principles is an implication precisely of her 
acknowledgement that it is a plurality of agents for whom the proposed 
norms are meant to hold. 
Sharing as Generalizing   
We just saw that on O’Neill’s interpretation, there is nothing specific, 
for Kant, about justice as a species of practical reasoning more 
generally. All we have to do is constrain our reasoning by choosing 
principles that have the required generalizable (or law-like) form, such 
that they are shareable by all those to whom they are meant to apply. I 
suggested that, at least on a conceptual level, principles of justice can 
thus be legislated by each agent separately – notwithstanding the fact 
that the norms that will pass such a test will be highly abstract, given 
that they are meant to apply to a plurality of agents. I shall now further 
substantiate this claim by looking at two concepts that play a prominent 
role in O’Neill’s account: public reason and communal sense. I want to 
claim that her politicised take on these concepts further confirms that 
she takes principles of justice to emanate from an agent-internal, modal 
constraint.6 
Let us first look at the idea of a public use of reason (e.g. O'Neill 
1989, pp.28-50).7 In invoking this concept, O’Neill takes up a central 
line of argument from Kant’s Enlightenment essay, according to which, to 
free ourselves from the famous “self-incurred immaturity”, we must 
“make public use of [our] reason in all matters” (En 8:36). The fact that 
                                                
6 I take it that the primary inspiration for O’Neill’s inclination to politicise notions 
stemming primarily from Kant’s theoretical philosophy is Hans Saner (1973), one of 
the earliest (and most influential) interpreters to stress the importance of political 
categories for understanding the structure of all of Kant’s major writings, in 
particular the first Critique. Saner argues that core political concepts such as freedom, 
public reason or the rule of law are already there “in form” in the theoretical 
philosophy, although they unfold “materially” only in the later political writings 
(Saner 1973, p.68). Kant’s vision of perpetual peace, for instance, is said to grow out 
of his quest for eternal peace in philosophy based on reason (Saner 1973, p.254).  
7 Others have followed O’Neill in constructing an account of Kant’s politics around 
the idea of public reason, e.g. Velkley (1989), Deligiorgi (2005), Patrone (2008). 
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O’Neill follows Rawls’s subtle move from a public use of reason to an 
ideal of a public exchange of reasons speaks to her intention to use this 
concept specifically as a model for the generation of authoritative 
principles of justice in the realm of politics.8 Ultimately, however, what 
is crucial is not that we subject our disputes to the “free and critical 
debate among all those involved” (O'Neill 1989, p.38; see also O'Neill 
2004, p.143). Rather, what qualifies a reason as public in the requisite 
sense is that it can be followed in thought and adopted for action by 
everyone involved. This, in turn, is a matter of its formal property: we 
obtain public reasons not by literally reasoning with others, but by virtue 
of constraining our own reasoning appropriately. 
This is in line with Kant’s employment of the notion in the 
Enlightenment essay. Notice that Kant distinguishes public and private 
uses of reason rather unconventionally (from a contemporary 
perspective at least) through the respective audiences addressed.9 
Private reasoning is the kind of reasoning that is fit for a limited 
audience, for instance while in a specific role such as that of an 
employee: as a civil servant, military officer or churchman, we are 
bound to the dictates of a given authority. Now, this is also precisely 
what Kant associates with the situation diagnosed as self-incurred 
immaturity, where we do not think for ourselves, but defer to the 
judgment of others. Rather than making up our own minds, we rely 
exclusively on books for intellectual reflection, on spiritual advisors for 
our consciousness, on doctors for our diet (En 8:35). By contrast, the 
public use of reason is not bound to any given ends and is accountable 
to all: one speaks as a “citizen of the world” (En 8:37). The only 
authority we respond to is the authority of reason, as that which we 
share with all other human beings.  
                                                
8 Beyond that, O’Neill (1997) has herself explicitly rejected Rawls’s deflationary 
account of it as constrained to the limited purpose of political legitimacy. 
9 O’Neill (1989, pp.32/33) makes rather a lot of this distinction and the ensuing 
contrast between what she calls “civil” and “intellectual” freedom.  
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I do not want to deny that the Enlightenment essay has political 
overtones. Indeed, the idea of addressing all “citizens of the world” does 
invoke strong cosmopolitan associations. My unease is more specific 
and relates to O’Neill’s attempt to build a conception of (how to 
generate principles of) justice on the notion of public reasoning as Kant 
conceives of it in the Enlightenment essay. For, it strikes me that what he 
is primarily getting at in this context is a mode of reasoning, a particular 
way in which we constrain our own reasoning such that the ensuing 
principles have a specific formal property. O’Neill politicises that 
notion, using it as a template for an actual process of reasoning out 
norms that are mutually binding.10 
Let us now go on look at a related and no less prominent concept 
in O’Neill’s reading of Kant: the idea of communal sense [sensus 
communis, Gemeinsinn] (O'Neill 1989, pp.24-27). This notion is 
particularly prominent in the third Critique (CJ 5:293ff), where Kant 
argues that the highest achievement in the use of our rational faculties 
not only requires that we think for ourselves (to be the author of and 
stand in for our own thoughts) but further demands that we “put 
[ourselves] into the standpoint of others” (CJ 5:295). This “maxim of 
enlarged thought” does not ask us to take up a transcendent or detached 
Archimedean standpoint (that Kant considers constitutively unavailable 
anyway). Instead, and echoing my argument in Chapter 2, the common 
standpoint we are meant to develop is one that is premised on each of 
the particular standpoints we initially hold. To think in common, that 
is, to make use of one’s faculty of sensus communis, means to shift one’s 
own grounds to the standpoint of others and make it accessible and thus 
                                                
10 Of course, the Enlightenment essay is one of Kant’s earlier works, written long before 
he had worked out the moral domain of right and the significance of external 
coercive lawgiving in politics. I thus do not want to rule out that he intended to give 
the notion of public reasoning a broadly political dimension. 
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oneself accountable to them – to expose one’s judgments to the 
“collective reason of mankind” (CJ 5:293).11  
A similar line of argument can be found in the Orientation essay 
(WOT 8: 146 fn.). There, Kant goes so far as to assert that we do not 
reason or even think correctly unless we think in common with others 
(WOT 8:145). To discipline reason “means no more than to ask oneself, 
whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find 
it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into 
a universal principle for the use of reason” (WOT 8:146 fn.). That is to 
say, we need to think “in continuity with others to whom we 
communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us” 
(WOT 8:144).  
Again, what stands out is O’Neill’s attempt to invoke the idea of 
sensus communis specifically as a model for political community.12 It is 
supposed to encapsulate a “politics of reason” (O'Neill 1989, p.24) 
aimed at the generation of principles with authority among the 
members of any possible community. What suits this reading is the fact 
that, in the final pages of Orientation, Kant himself shifts from the idea of 
an individual agent who chooses a maxim to provide a subjective 
distinction or standard to orient her own thinking, to a defence of free 
speech in the context of a situation where multiple human agents whose 
lives are linked to each other set out to find shared principles through 
an exchange of reasons. 
Yet, once again I want to raise doubts as to whether the concept 
of sensus communis lends itself to the substantive political interpretation 
that O’Neill would like it to have. As Kant explains in Orientation, to 
think from the standpoint of others amounts “to nothing more than to 
                                                
11 Interestingly, in the Anthropology (7:219) Kant defines the inability to judge one’s 
thoughts from the standpoint of another, the loss of sensus communis, as the central 
characteristic of madness. 
12 The primary (and original) culprit here is of course Hannah Arendt (1982), who 
draws extensively on the idea of sensus communis in her attempt to reconstruct the 
third Critique as essentially a political work. 
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ask oneself with regard to everything that is to be assumed, whether he 
finds it practicable to make the ground of the assumption a universal 
principle of the use of reason” (WOT 8:146-7 fn., my emphasis). 
Similarly, in the third Critique we are told that to use one’s capacity of 
sensus communis is simply to weigh one’s judgment “with the collective 
judgement of mankind” (CJ 5:293). Again, what Kant affirms is that 
shareable principles are simply ones that have the right form. But for 
that purpose, we do not (literally) have to reason with others rather than 
constrain our own reasoning in the requisite way. 
My brief discussion of O’Neill’s employment of the notions of 
public reason and communal sense, I hope, provides further evidence 
for my point about the form of justice reasoning in her account of Kant’s 
politics. O’Neill politicises – or, to put it more charitably, 
overemphasises the political undertones of – both concepts, suggesting 
that principles of justice are somehow contingent on a prior exchange 
of reasons or a collective act of reasoning or even negotiation. Yet, what 
ultimately matters on her account for a principle to go through is a 
modal test that each agent can (fail to) apply appropriately. Either a 
principle does have the generalizable form required to be shareable 
among all, or it does not.  
Let me be clear also that despite some unease I have expressed 
about O’Neill’s politicised take on these notions, nothing I have said so 
far goes to criticise or even repudiate her reading. To the contrary, I 
indicated that the very fact that she starts from a predicament similar to 
ours implies that we should actually be inclined to follow her footsteps. 
Before I go on to scrutinize her argument further, let me briefly remind 
us of its potential implications for the ‘cosmopolitan encounter’ that was 
at the centre of the preceding chapter. Recall that we are still looking 
for principles with the ability to coordinate the coexistence of a 
cosmopolitan plurality, including statist and non-state peoples alike. 
O’Neill’s proposal, I take it, is that such principles simply need to have 
the right form. If they are abstract enough so as to be shareable by all 
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agents involved, they have the authority to bind all of them equally. In 
other words, by taking up the global standpoint – that is, shifting our 
standpoint to the standpoint of the other(s) –13 we can obtain juridical 
principles (i.e., principles of justice) that are global in scope. 
Western colonizers could then be reproached for failing 
precisely on that score: they simply refuse to put themselves into the 
standpoint of their potential hosts; or at least do a very bad job of it. If 
they did, by contrast, apply the pertinent universalizability test properly 
(while making accurate assumptions about their counterparts), they 
could, at least in principle, identify norms with authority over all of 
them prior to and independently of the actual cosmopolitan encounter. 
They could then arrive at foreign shores with the requisite, binding 
principles for coordinating their interactions with distant strangers 
ready at hand. This is the narrative that I shall seek to refute in the 
remainder of this chapter. In order to point out where precisely it goes 
wrong and how so, we need to contextualise O’Neill’s take on Kant’s 
politics with regard to the wider, constructivist interpretive framework 
from which it emanates.  
2. The Continuity Thesis  
Having laid out O’Neill’s take on the normativity of Kant’s politics, I 
shall now go on to embed these specific claims in the wider interpretive 
framework from which they emanate. Further down the line, this will 
allow me to locate precisely where I take her reading to go wrong. To 
that effect, I will introduce what I call O’Neill’s continuity thesis: the idea 
that across all domains of rational activity, standards of reasoning have 
authority in virtue of having a certain, law-like formal property. In other 
words, we must refrain from thinking, willing or interacting on the basis 
                                                
13 Recall that it was precisely this requirement of mutual perspective-taking through 
which I introduced the concept of the global standpoint in Chapter 2.  
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of principles that cannot be adopted or shared by all agents for whom 
they are supposed to hold.  
While I have no doubt that the thesis has much going for it as an 
overall meta-narrative underlying Kant’s critical project, my claim will 
be that it ends up being too sweeping and that it risks lumping together 
what are ultimately significantly distinct domains of rational activity. 
O’Neill goes too far in linking, in fact reducing, Kant’s discussions of 
politics to larger issues about the powers and limits of human reason, 
such that she ends up underestimating the implications of the fact that 
we need principles with interpersonal authority. Before we get there, 
however, I need to clarify what it is that O’Neill takes to unify the 
different realms of rational activity. 
The Predicament of Reason 
The crucial starting point in order to understand O’Neill’s continuity thesis 
is Kant’s rejection of foundationalism, that is the idea that in securing 
the unity of our experience and action we could rely on some external 
standard that does not itself require further vindication. As Kant 
famously argues in the first Critique, the reasoned principles that would 
guide and integrate all our rational activity can be neither ‘discovered’ 
by introspection (in a Cartesian manner) nor be ‘read off’ the world. As 
far as our speculative engagement with the world is concerned, the aim 
of Kant’s famous Copernican turn is to challenge the idea that our 
experience is somehow united by a real-existing unity that it mirrors. 
Analogously, in the practical domain it turns out that we are not the 
kinds of beings who have the terms of coexistence or coordination 
among us “instinctually programmed” as part of our native endowment 
(O'Neill 1989, pp.21/22), or can just receive them from an external 
authority such as God. 
However, giving up on reason, Kant thinks, is not a viable 
strategy either. Arbitrary thinking – indulging in what today goes under 
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“postmodern” (O’Neill 2015: 23) scepticism about reason –  will end in 
confusion and disaster. Again, the prospects of chaos and disorientation 
loom with regard to both our theoretical and practical engagement with 
the world. As Kant sets out to show in the first half of the Critique of Pure 
Reason’s Transcendental Dialectic, it is the “peculiar fate” (CPR A vii) 
of unconstrained theoretical reason constantly to fall into difficulty and 
contradiction on its proverbial flights of metaphysical enthusiasm. 
While we cannot but inquire into the ultimate grounds of our 
conditioned access to the world,14 our attempts to make sense of the 
world as a unified whole puts us at risk of slipping into superstition 
(O'Neill 1992, p.284). Analogously, the anarchical lack of order in 
moral and political life, itself a mere illusion of freedom, will not last for 
long but be replaced by a superior power that makes its subjects “bow 
under the yoke of laws given by another” and “wrench away” their 
rights (WOT 8:144/5).  
Given that we are not in a position to live without reason, 
processes of thought and action (lest they be tangled up) need to be 
disciplined in some way – a critique of reason, that is to say, cannot be 
merely destructive but must vindicate at least some standards or 
principles as authorities on which we may rely in our thinking and 
acting. Finite rational beings face the challenge of putting their trust in 
reason when it comes to guiding their thought and action without 
thereby relying either on its own (delusory) omnipotence or on external 
authorities that would provide a firm foundation or unequivocal 
guidance.  
I briefly hinted at the pertinence of this problem to theoretical 
and practical (including, for O’Neill, political) modes of reasoning alike. 
                                                
14 The problem is thus not just (as occasionally suggested by O’Neill) that giving up 
on reason would be dangerous, but that it is plainly impossible. Reason’s ‘interest’ in 
its own architectonic unity has it relentlessly seek the unconditioned conditions of 
our mediated access to the world and thus to unify our lower cognitive capacities of 
sensibility and understanding. Given that reasoning is thus something we 
unavoidably do, we’d rather do it appropriately. 
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In both domains of rational activity we require “maxims for a plurality-
without-pre-established-harmony“ (O'Neill 1992, p.300),15 principles 
through which finite reasoners that share a world can coordinate their 
thinking and acting respectively. Yet, those principles can neither be 
externally imposed nor dogmatically stipulated, for instance as 
emanating from a supposed divine plan or our own instinct. Given that 
human reason turns out to be at once indispensable and finite, the 
question is whether there are any principles that can have authority for 
beings of this kind. Can we vindicate standards of reason that do not 
themselves rest on any foundationalist grounds? 
O’Neill’s Constructivism 
We just saw that, according to Kant, human reason is a finite capacity 
rather than a God-given “inner light” that is “complete and entire in 
each one of us” (Descartes 1984, p.27) such that we could rely on it as 
a foundational guiding principle. However, if we give up on reason, 
things are bound to fall apart. Kant’s solution to this predicament, 
according to O’Neill (1989, p.13), lies in a turn to the reflexive nature 
of reason. Throughout the first Critique reason is characterised as an 
active capacity that not only generates problems but that is also able, in 
virtue of its reflexive structure, to resolve them – namely, by disciplining 
itself.16 The thought is that reflection upon the very nature of the 
problem can take us a long way towards solving it.  
Recall that we are looking for principles for a possible order 
among a plurality of uncoordinated agents. In this context, O’Neill 
speaks of “circumstances of reasoning” (O'Neill 2015, p.3) that arise 
                                                
15 Somewhat unconventionally and drawing on occasional usage Kant makes in the 
first (CPR A666/B694) and third Critiques (CJ 5: 182), O’Neill defines “maxims” 
(which are often associated exclusively with Kant’s ethics) very broadly as principles 
that organize and integrate our more specific cognitive capacities across all domains 
of rational activity (O'Neill 1989, p.19). 
16 The discipline of reason is defined by Kant as “the compulsion, by which the 
constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained and finally extirpated” (CPR 
A709/B737). 
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when a plurality of potential reasoners finds that their communication 
and interaction are not antecedently coordinated. Now, the most 
fundamental condition any set of such principles is to fulfil is that it be 
adoptable by each of those agents for whom it is supposed to hold. 
Reasoning thus turns out to be primarily a negative strategy: we can 
only overcome the limitations of ordinary human cognition by rejecting 
those candidate principles that the plurality of reasoners with whom we 
need to coordinate could not adopt or follow. 
O’Neill characterises norms of reason (and their authority) as 
something (to be) constructed:17 given that they can neither be found 
inside ourselves nor read off the world, the organization of our thinking 
and acting is a process rather than a product – one of ongoing “practices 
of connection and integration rather than as once and for all laying of 
foundations” (O'Neill 1989, p.8; O'Neill 1992, p.292). Ultimately, 
reason properly understood is “a term that we use for the necessary 
conditions of any coordination, however minimal, by those among the 
reasoning is to count” (O'Neill 1996, p.60). What we can specify in 
advance are certain minimal constraints on this process rather than its 
substantive outcomes: standards that need to be met such that we can 
accept, reject or revise what is being proposed as standards for sharing 
knowledge or recommending and coordinating actions. 
Importantly, Kant thus turns the presumptive shortcoming that 
consists in the finitude of human reason into a virtue: the insight that we 
lack a “supposed divine perspective“ (O'Neill 1992, p.302; see also 
O'Neill 1989, p.46) from which we could conclusively vindicate 
principles that unify our cognition and regulate our coexistence with 
other agents motivates the attempt to turn reason ‘upside down’. It is 
conceived of as an inter-subjective guide that allows a multitude of 
individuals to think together and coordinate politically rather than an 
external authority.  
                                                
17 On O’Neill’s Kantian constructivist method more generally, see for instance Barry 
(2013) and Hill (2013). 
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This idea comes across nicely in a passage at the beginning of 
the first Critique’s Doctrine of Method (CPR A 707/B735, see also 
O'Neill 1992; Ypi 2013, pp.775-778), where Kant likens the critical 
construction of reasoned norms to a building project.18 He starts off by 
characterising the predicament of vindicating reason as one in which a 
number of individuals must jointly construct a building. The first part 
of the book, the Doctrine of Elements, is supposed to have provided us 
with an inventory of the labour force and the building materials 
available. Our initial hope notwithstanding, these will not make for a 
tower that “reach[es] the heavens” but rather for a modest cottage “just 
roomy enough for our business on the place of experience and high 
enough to survey it” (CPR A707/B735). Yet, we still lack a “common 
plan of procedure” (CPR A707/B735) according to which to erect the 
building. We must come up with a plan that can be followed by a 
plurality of fellow workers. Each must be able to agree to and to adopt 
the common plan lest each of us “build his own according to his own 
design” such that we end up with an “arbitrary and blind project” (CPR 
A707/B735) that is doomed to collapse, such as the Tower of Babel. 
This metaphor is supposed to encapsulate the way in which, according 
to O’Neill, the vindication of reason is a constructive task for Kant. 
The Continuity Thesis 
Following O’Neill’s constructivist reading of Kant’s vindication of 
reason, what it is for reasoned principles to have authority is to be the 
outcome of a properly construed (that is, constrained) thought process. 
                                                
18 Kimberley Hutchings (1996) is much more sceptical than O’Neill about the merits 
of this metaphor and in general about Kant’s success in vindicating reason in the 
Doctrine of Method. On her view, in being premised both on the limitation of 
reason and the assumption of the capacity of reason to transcend that limitation in 
the process of critique, the Doctrine of Method sets itself a task which it cannot fulfil 
from the outset. “Caught up in in the tangles of its own incapacity” (Hutchings 1996, 
p.27), reason has to fall back on political solutions that, in shifting between 
authoritarian claims and dissolution of all authority, are no less “volatile and 
paradoxical" (Hutchings 1996, p.12). 
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In particular, we are to reason in ways that others can follow and adopt 
for themselves. Now, it is vital to add that, on Kant’s view, this thought 
is immediately connected to the idea of lawlikeness. For, what it is for a 
principle to be adoptable by a plurality of agents is for it to have a 
certain form: the perfectly general form of a law. The self-discipline of 
reason is thus described by Kant as its “own an indeed negative law-
giving” (A711/B739). The idea of lawful thinking (and acting) is 
contrasted with unconstrained or arbitrary rational activity and 
vindicated as the form of reasoning that is accessible to all. 
This explains why the categorical imperative plays a crucial role 
in O’Neill’s project of reason’s self-discipline. In its version known from 
the Groundwork, it asks us to only adopt maxims which we can at the 
same time will to become a universal law (Gr 4:421). On O’Neill’s view, 
this universalization demand can be taken to encapsulate a more 
general requirement to think and act, across all domains of rational 
activity, on principles that can be coherently adopted by all agents. The 
categorical imperative gives us a formal criterion for ruling out 
internally contradictory maxims, that is those which we cannot 
consistently think (perfect duties) or will (imperfect duties) to be 
universally adopted. In other words, we rule out those maxims that lack 
the required formal feature of being generalizable (O'Neill 1992, p.296). 
Hence, the categorical imperative is to be viewed as the supreme 
principle of reason that ties together Kant’s critical project as a whole.19 
Reason disciplines itself simply by asking whether the grounds of a 
proposed maxim or principle can be universalised (O'Neill 1989, p.59). 
What I want to highlight at this point is the idea that norms or 
standards are considered to be reasoned by virtue of having a certain 
form. And crucially, this is said to hold for standards that are supposed 
                                                
19 On this expansive notion of a categorical imperative as a kind of meta-norm 
governing all rational activity, see also Allison (2004, pp.53-54) and Mudd (2017). 
Markus Willaschek (2010, p.185) instead argues that “only pure practical reason 
issues categorical imperatives”. I return to this question in the context of my 
discussion of the regulative principle of theoretical reason in the next section below. 
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to guide our thinking as much as our willing and our interactions.20 At 
the core of what I want to call O’Neill’s continuity thesis is consequently 
the claim that, across all domains of rational activity, reasoned 
principles have authority in virtue of a certain formal property, namely 
their law-likeness. The thought is that not only the problem but also its 
solution is structurally similar across these different spheres: we require 
principles with a specific, generalizable form. This, of course, is an idea 
we are familiar with from our earlier discussion of O’Neill’s take on 
Kant’s politics as focused on the shareability of principles of justice. 
There is no doubt that the continuity thesis provides a deep insight 
into the architecture of Kant’s philosophical project as unified, at the 
most fundamental level, by a single guiding idea: that (critical) reason 
only answers to itself, rather than anything outside of it (see e.g. Ripstein 
2009, p.355). Following O’Neill’s constructivist specification of this 
idea, reasoned principles need to be shareable by all agents for whom 
they are to hold. What we need to do in order to obtain such principles 
is to follow a certain reasoning process. As O’Neill’s emphasis on the 
categorical imperative makes clear, what matters is that across all fields 
of theoretical and practical engagement with the world (and other 
individuals), we think lawfully. Hence, to say that a principle could be 
adopted among and thus shared by a number of reasoners is just to say 
that it has authority in virtue of its form. 
Let me also point out that O’Neill’s constructivist take on Kant 
further enforces the preliminary impression that her framework sits 
nicely with my own argument as developed in preceding chapters. Not 
only does she depart from a similar predicament – the need to regulate 
the coexistence of a plurality of agents that do not naturally or 
                                                
20 I am not denying that willing is a kind of acting for Kant, given that (unlike 
wishing or even merely deciding to do something) it is a kind of causality in the sense 
of involving an effort to realise what one wills (Gr 4:394). In contrast to wilful action 
alone, however, the domain of interaction has a specifically relational aspect that puts 
the focus on the consistency of one action with another (rather than the internal 
consistency of its underlying maxims). 
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harmoniously converge on shared principles. What is more, her attempt 
to overcome the unavailability of a “divine perspective“ (O'Neill 1992, 
p.302; see also O'Neill 1989, p.46) – a perspective from which we could 
conclusively vindicate principles that unify our cognition and regulate 
our coexistence with other agents – with a reflexive turn to the 
(appropriately constrained) first-person standpoint seems to provide a 
promising avenue for a possible solution. The need to constrain our own 
comportment in the cosmopolitan encounter also turned out to be a 
central aspect of what I developed, in preceding chapters, as Kant’s 
global standpoint.  
And yet, there is a worry – to be substantiated in the subsequent 
section – that the continuity thesis, in all its elegance and simplicity, is also 
too sweeping. There may very well be a sense in which the problems of 
cognitive, moral and political order arise in one and the same context 
for Kant. Yet, if we overemphasise this idea, we risk overlooking the 
way in which the problems we face in these various domains of rational 
activity are also distinct, so warrant different strategies of response. I 
hope to show that it is the peculiarities of the juridical realm in 
particular to which O’Neill pays insufficient attention. 
3. The Authority of Reasoned Principles  
In the preceding section, I introduced the continuity thesis in order to 
illustrate what it is that O’Neill takes to unify the challenges of consistent 
thinking, willing and interacting. The basic thought is that across all 
domains of rational activity, the kind of principles that have authority 
are those that are shareable in virtue of their universalizability. I now 
want to problematise this claim by examining more closely what 
distinguishes these realms in the pertinent regard. My primary focus will 
be on the contrast between Kant’s ethics and his political philosophy in 
order to show that O’Neill’s undifferentiated conception of practical 
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reasoning leads her to misconstrue the latter. I shall claim that where 
we need to regulate the interactions of a plurality of diverse agents, we 
require principles with interpersonal authority. A mere formality 
requirement will not do under such circumstances. 
Consistent Thinking  
As just mentioned, my focus in this section will be on the difference 
between Kant’s domains of ethics and right, specifically when it comes 
to the authority of the requisite principles. I will start, however, with a 
discussion of the authority of reason in the theoretical realm. My main 
intention in so doing is to underline that there is a lot to be said for the 
kind of continuity O’Neill invokes – as long as we retain an exclusive 
focus on the consistency of our thinking and willing respectively. It is 
only once we reflect on the possibility of consistent interactions among 
a plurality of agents that her claim turns out to be too sweeping. 
Moreover, the present subsection feeds in to another line of argument 
that I initiated in the conclusion of the preceding chapter and picked up 
in the present chapter: the difference between the single standpoint on 
the whole of interacting objects (that I drew upon in first developing the 
global standpoint in Chapter 2), and the multiple standpoints on the 
whole of embodied agents that coexist on the limited surface of the 
earth. 
It may seem unclear at first what it would even mean to talk 
about the authority of reason in the context of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy. In order to elucidate this question, let us have a closer look 
at the role Kant assigns to reason in this domain. What we are looking 
for are standards – principles of theoretical reason – on the basis of 
which subjects can organise and integrate their thinking. As we saw in 
the preceding section, whether there are any such (non-foundationalist) 
norms at all with the ability to regulate the cognitive activity of rational 
agents is anything but clear. Consequently, Kant does not take up this 
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question until the very end of the Critique of Pure Reason – only after the 
Aesthetic and the Analytic of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements 
have discussed the ‘lower faculties’ of cognition. In the Appendix to the 
Transcendental Dialectic, Kant then introduces the notion of the 
systematic unity of nature as reason’s fundamental principle (e.g. CPR 
A648/B676).21 The thought is that by providing the idea of the world 
as a well-ordered, systematic unity whereby all events can be subsumed 
under causal laws, reason plays a legitimate role for our activity as 
theoretical reasoners. 
What is clear from Kant’s discussion, and indeed central to his 
view, is that this principle (and thus reason as a whole) can only have 
regulative use (CPR A644/B672). We can employ the idea of systematic 
unity in order to guide our acquisition of knowledge.22 Yet, in contrast 
to the understanding, the unity that reason seeks to create – the unity of 
rules under principles (CPR A302/B359) – never applies to anything 
directly given in experience.23 While reason will thus never provide us 
with the systematic unity it strives towards, in its regulative function it 
can still enable us to actively organize our experience of the world 
instead of just passively responding to it. 
Now, by arguing that reason’s essential function is to guide our 
use of the understanding through the principle of systematic unity, I 
have not yet made good on my claim that we are warranted to speak of 
reason’s “authority” in the theoretical domain, at least  in the sense that 
it would bind us normatively.24 For, some interpreters have denied this 
                                                
21 To be more precise, in the Appendix Kant turns to the positive contribution of 
reason, after having spent the bulk of the Dialectic exposing the contradictions that 
result if we attempt the (dogmatic) proof that our thinking could be unified by some 
really existing unity. 
22 I take it that the more specific ideas of reason – most prominently the ideas of 
God, freedom and immortality, that the second Critique goes on to develop as the 
postulates of pure practical reason – are mere specifications of systematic unity as the 
quintessential idea of pure reason tout court (Mudd 2017, pp.94, see also CPR 
A695/B723). 
23 On the difference between constitutive and regulative uses of our faculties, see 
Friedman (1991). I return to this distinction in Chapter 6. 
24 My discussion in the present paragraph has benefitted immensely from Sasha 
Mudd’s (2017) lucid paper. 
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and argued that the principle of systematic unity binds in a way that is 
merely transcendental (e.g. McFarland 1970; Walker 1990). That is to say, 
it constitutes something like an a priori condition of the possibility of 
our cognition of objects such that we cannot but link bits of cognitive 
information in systematically unified ways. In presenting the attempt to 
seek systematic unity as something agents necessarily do whenever they 
apply empirical concepts or form empirical judgments (rather than 
something they ought to do), this reading makes talk of reason as having 
“authority” over our cognising activity effectively nonsensical. 
While I do not have the space here to refute this reading, I think 
that weighty textual and conceptual considerations speak against it. 
Textually speaking, there are numerous passages in the first Critique in 
which Kant explicitly uses normative language in order to characterise 
reasons’ regulative principle and the requirements deriving from it 
(CPR A671/B699; A509/B537; A750/B778; A548/B576; 
A570/B598; A646/B674). Conceptually speaking, moreover, the 
transcendental reading has the effect of blurring Kant’s sharp distinction 
between the constitutive role of (principles of) the understanding – 
which agents cannot but use in representing objects – and the merely 
regulative role of (principles) of reason, which are introduced as neither 
determining anything given in the world nor in our way of 
understanding it. In particular, Kant’s (implicit) claim in the 
Transcendental Analytic that the understanding can apply its concepts 
to experience without any ‘systematic unity’ constraint makes it difficult 
to conceive of reason’s principles as having transcendental status. 
Hence, I want to argue that it does make sense to speak of 
reason’s regulative principles as being authoritative, in this sense of 
providing a normative standard for (rather than causally determining 
or descriptively characterising) agents’ cognitive activity. Seeking 
systematic unity is not something we necessarily do but something we 
ought to do. Of course, this leaves open the (further) question of what 
kind this normativity is. Some interpreters suggest that the regulative 
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principle binds only hypothetically, under the condition that agents 
adopt a particular cognitive end like doing science (e.g. Guyer 1990; 
Kitcher 1994; Willaschek 2010). On their view, the command to seek 
unity is only required for those who decide to satisfy their speculative 
interest (by inquiring into nature), which is not valuable or obligatory in 
itself. It is a methodological device for extending and perfecting our 
understanding of nature. 
Others, in contrast, defend the view that the regulative principle 
is categorically binding (Mudd 2017; Allison 2004). Here, the thought is 
that cognitive unity is an objective end obligatory for every agent to 
pursue, due to its important role in the overarching (‘broadly 
practical’25) project of systematic unity that is the supreme aim of all 
rational activity (Mudd 2017, p.101; Kleingeld 1998a, p.314; Guyer 
2000, p.87). All of reason’s activities have unconditional worth in virtue 
of serving this telos. In its theoretical function, reason is supposed to 
guide our use of the understanding through the regulative principle of 
systematic unity. Given that this principle is consequently “inseparably 
bound up with the essence of our reason” (CPR A695/B723) rather 
than an agent’s contingent motives, it can be considered as issuing a 
kind of categorical imperative.  
The vindication (central to this second reading) of the idea of a 
categorical imperative as a kind of supreme meta-norm sits nicely with 
O’Neill’s framework as laid out so far. As we saw in the preceding 
section, on her view the categorical imperative encapsulates the general 
requirement – pertinent across all domains of rational activity – that 
reason discipline itself. Nevertheless, I want to abstain from taking a 
stance on the difficult exegetical question in which way reason’s 
regulative principle is normative. Rather, let me make a more general 
point about the principle of systematic unity: its authority is intrapersonal. 
                                                
25 On this view, the ‘narrow’ practical (i.e., moral) and the theoretical employment of 
reason are both in the service of the wider, ‘broadly’ practical aim of reason to satisfy 
its interest in systematic unity.   
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That is to say, we are each independently bound to organise our own 
cognitive activity rather than, for instance, the way we relate to others. 
Hence, the requisite principle is self-legislated.26 We each (ought to!) 
regulate our access to the world by submitting to reason’s own principle 
rather than that of spurious authorities. The supreme principle of 
theoretical reason is authoritative for each agent taken individually and 
is not contingent on other agents or their rational activity.27 
Consistent Willing  
Let us proceed to Kant’s ethical theory. The claim I want to defend in 
this context is that the structure of moral deliberation – while taking on 
board genuinely relational considerations on some level – is still 
intrapersonal in a way that is structurally analogous to the one just 
identified as pertinent to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Such a denial 
of the relational nature of Kant’s ethics seems somewhat 
counterintuitive and needs to be unpacked with care. Is morality, after 
all, not about what we owe to others?  
In order to answer this question, notice that Kant’s ethics is the 
domain of good willing or moral conscience. The supreme principle of 
practical reason guiding the will of rational beings is the categorical 
                                                
26 Kant himself talks about the way in which reason legislates the idea of systematic 
unity to itself (CPR A695/B723, A701/B729).  
27 Of course, there remains nevertheless an important sense in which the principle – 
as emanating from reason as a shared capacity – is itself shareable. For in virtue of 
constraining the relevant rational activity in the way required, we elevate our 
particular individual standpoint to a generalised, human standpoint. As Kant puts it 
in the Orientation essay, this recourse to a perspective that is simultaneously subjective 
and shared provides guidance on our “rational excursions into the field of 
supersensible objects” (WOT 8:142) even in the absence of external criteria. This 
idea resurfaces in the Appendix, where Kant calls the principle of systematic unity 
both a merely subjective maxim and one that is objectively valid (CPR A680/B708; 
A666/B694; A651/B679; A648/B676): while it is subjective in the sense of 
containing no truth-apt claims about its object (we have no warrant for knowing that 
nature constitutes a unified system), in virtue of emanating from reason itself the 
principle obtains a novel kind of objectivity such that it holds for all agents who 
share in this capacity. For this distinctively Kantian kind of objectivity characteristic 
for propositions arising from our rational nature, see Chignell (2007b, p.53).   
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imperative (Gr 4:412-21).28 By subjecting possible maxims to this 
intrapersonal test, we filter out those maxims that are internally 
incapable of being willed as universal law due to their defective internal 
structure. Again, the thought is that reasoned willing is a matter of self-
constraint: we need to will lawfully, i.e. adopt maxims of action that 
have the form of a possible practical law. In O’Neill’s vernacular, reason 
disciplines itself by picking what we judge to be shareable maxims (O'Neill 
1989, p.56). It is precisely this power to act in accordance with the 
representation of laws that, on Kant’s view (Gr 4:412), characterises the 
will of a rational being, as something distinct from the rest of nature.  
Importantly, however, the authority of such principles is 
intrapersonal, that is limited to the deliberating agent.29 For notice that 
the categorical imperative tests the permissibility – the moral quality or 
worth – of individual maxims for action. And, again, we self-legislate the 
requisite kind of principles: we each first-personally constrain our 
willing by asking ourselves whether we judge our own subjective maxim 
to be adoptable by others. Such an act of self-legislation (and subsequent 
self-subjection) is not contingent on what others will. Nor can it, 
crucially, prescribe to them what maxims they ought to adopt. To ask 
whether we can without contradiction will a maxim to hold as a 
universal law is not to want it to hold as such a law. In a nutshell, moral 
reasoning is intrapersonal in the sense that its supreme principle (the 
categorical imperative) is autonomously, that is, self-legislated.30 For, its 
authority is limited to the agent deliberating about what she ought to 
do.   
                                                
28 Given that humans are not simply rational, but finite rational beings, Kant argues 
in the second Critique that reason produces further ideas (the idea of the highest good 
as well as the ‘postulates’ of God and immortality), which I shall not discuss here. 
29 See Grenberg (2015) on Kant as a theorist of first-personal moral phenomenology. 
30 In an unpublished manuscript, Kleingeld and Willaschek (2017) argue that while 
Kant takes individual principles for action (what they call “Moral Laws”) to be “self-
legislated”, this cannot be said of the categorical imperative as the normative 
criterion guiding our adoption of maxims (the “Moral Law”). As it is not my main 
concern in the present context, I shall refrain from getting into this issue further. 
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This of course is not to deny that ethical reasoning includes an 
important relational dimension. For, while the categorical imperative 
requires us to give law to ourselves in the name of rational nature, this 
demand is grounded in the moral standing of other agents.31 Recall the 
Groundwork’s argument to this effect, which I briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 1: when we think ourselves under moral obligation, we 
necessarily regard ourselves in a certain way, namely “as belonging to 
the sensible world and yet to the intelligible world at the same time” (Gr 
4:453). In ascribing this status to ourselves, and expecting other human 
beings to act accordingly, we cannot consistently deny that they have 
equally good reasons to conceive of themselves in this way 
(Timmermann 2006, p.86). Consequently, we have to regard them as 
joint members of a possible intelligible order such that, as ends in 
themselves that deserve unconditional respect, they restrict our choices.  
However, to say that the command to legislate universal law on 
behalf of rational nature in general is grounded in the moral status of 
others is in turn not to say that, in doing so, we legislate to anyone but 
ourselves or that the relevant norms actually regulate our interactions 
with others. Kant’s moral point of view is that shared by all free and 
finite reasoners. Other agents figure in our moral deliberation as 
generalised and internalised others, constituting something like a ‘second 
person within’.32 What we do when we filter out candidate maxims with 
the help of the categorical imperative is to take up “the point of view 
[…] of every other rational being” (Gr 4:438), a point of view which is 
perfectly general yet intrapersonal. 
                                                
31 Christine Korsgaard, in contrast, famously argues that Kant derives the moral law 
from the bare idea of rational agency. The thought is that the reflective structure of 
self-consciousness makes us accountable both to ourselves and to others: to constrain 
my ends in accordance with my fellow agents is a demand purely of my own 
personal autonomy, properly understood (Korsgaard 1996a, pp.188-224).  
32 I borrow the term “second person within” from Korsgaard (2007), while diverging 
from the way she uses it. What I have in mind is closer to what Stephen Darwall 
describes as the “representative authority” of the abstract moral community as a 
whole (Darwall 2013, pp.34-49). Darwall associates this form of authority with what 
he calls moral obligation ‘period’, a non-relational kind of obligation that is 
contrasted with a bipolar kind of obligation (owed to a specific other).  
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Now, before we go on to highlight what distinguishes the 
domain of right or politics in this regard, it is important to notice that 
the problem with O’Neill’s account of practical reasoning – centring 
around the idea of principles shareable by a plurality of agents – already 
starts here. For, she is actually quite reluctant to acknowledge that it is 
consistent willing that is at stake in the Groundwork  (see e.g. O'Neill 1989, 
pp.81-104). As we saw in Section 1, O’Neill employs the categorical 
imperative as a procedure for the generation of reasonably acceptable 
principles of justice based on individual moral deliberation. In doing so, 
she follows John Rawls’s (2000, pp.143-328) attempt to turn the 
categorical imperative from a principle of self-legislation into one of 
other- or even public legislation – that is to say, a test through which an 
agent legislates an authoritative social order to others (Flikschuh 2012b, 
p.187). This semi-political reading of Kant’s ethics, however, leaves 
O’Neill unable to account for the fundamentally different kind of 
principles that we need in order to coordinate the interactions of a 
plurality of agents. 
Let me sum up the argument of the preceding two subsections. 
My discussion of the role of reasoned principles in Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy and his ethics is admittedly sketchy and incomplete. 
However, my aim was rather limited. I sought to point out a very 
specific structural similarity, concerning the authority of reason,  
between these two domains that are generally (and correctly) taken to 
encapsulate contrasting ways of relating to the world.33 In both realms, 
we require principles with intrapersonal authority, that is, principles that 
have authority over the agent who does the reasoning. Consequently, 
such principles can be self-legislated: every agent is rationally required to 
discipline their own rational activity by thinking and willing on the basis 
of shareable, that is universalizable maxims. In other words, what it is 
                                                
33 Kant himself of course argues that the highest division of philosophy is that 
organized by the concepts of nature and freedom (and the pertinent forms of 
causality), as corresponding to the division between theoretical and practical 
philosophy (DoR 6:217). 
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for a maxim to have this sort of authority is to have a certain logical 
property. This demand, to organize one’s rational activity in a way that 
can be considered generalizable, is directed at each agent respectively 
rather than the way in which they relate to one another. As I hope to 
go on to show now, this is precisely what distinguishes reasoned 
principles in the theoretical and ethical realms from principles of right. 
Consistent Interaction  
So far in this section, I have discussed the authority of reason in Kant’s 
theoretical and ethical domains, pointing to their structural similarity in 
this regard. I now want to turn to the domain of right or politics and the 
need for principles with interpersonal authority, which I take to be closely 
associated with the coordination requirement pertinent to this domain. 
The best way to introduce the normativity of right is through a contrast 
with Kant’s ethics. Recall, from the last section, that ethics pertains to 
the realm of inner morality, or moral conscience. The categorical 
imperative specifies an agent-internal compatibility test with regard to 
maxims: an agent asks herself whether a proposed maxim of action 
could have the form of a possible practical law. Good willing, or virtue, 
is a function of the maxim’s conformity with universal law. While the 
task that the categorical imperative confronts us with thus obviously 
requires us to treat others in a certain way (after all, we give laws in the 
name of humanity as such), it is a task set to each of us separately. 
Whether a maxim has the required form of generalizability is not 
contingent on what anyone else does.  
This is different in the realm of right, as a look at its very 
structure reveals. Right is an external morality concerned with the way 
the actions of embodied agents (as manifest in time and space) relate to 
one another. The kind of incompatibility relations we are concerned 
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with here are distinct from the ethical realm:34 they are not internal to 
a single agent’s willing, but pertain to the way the choices of multiple 
agents confront and relate to one other. This entails that the normativity 
of right is irreducibly relational. For, whether an action is rightful 
cannot be determined except through its relation to those of other 
agents. Recall, from Chapter 1’s discussion of the Introduction to the 
Doctrine of Right that, according to the universal law of right, “any action 
is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law” (DoR 6:230). We saw Kant illustrate this point by 
likening the coordinated actions of a plurality of externally free agents 
to the law-governed interaction of constitutive elements within a system 
of physical objects, held together by the Newtonian law of equality of 
action and reaction (DoR 6:232).  
From this we can draw an important conclusion concerning the 
kind of principles that will be required in the sphere of right: we need 
actionable principles that allow a plurality of agents to coexist and 
coordinate their interactions, norms that have the authority to equally 
bind all of them. In other words, we need principles with interpersonal 
(rather than intrapersonal) authority. Now, notice that such norms need 
to satisfy a stronger demand than maxims both in the speculative and 
ethical realms. In particular, mere generalizability is not a strong 
enough modal criterion. For, a number of action-patterns may each 
very well be shareable in the pertinent sense (and thus ethically 
permissible maxims for action) without in conjunction displaying the 
necessary compossibility. The universalizability test of the categorical 
imperative with its exclusive focus on maxim’s formal, internal (law-like) 
structure will not lead us far enough: it fatally underdetermines juridical 
principles. 
The implication is that principles with the required interpersonal 
kind of authority to coordinate the interactions of a plurality of agents 
                                                
34 On the domain of right as bringing in a new kind of incompatibility relation, see 
Ripstein (2009, pp.355-388). 
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cannot be self-legislated. For individual agents are simply constitutively 
unfit to come up with principles of the requisite kind. To say that 
individual agents lack unilateral juridical authority is to make a 
conceptual point that holds regardless of how generalizable or law-like 
their proposed principles may aspire to be. The bindingness of such 
principles is simply not a function of any internal formal property. In 
other words, what I presented, in Chapter 2, as a formal requirement 
to reflexively see one’s judgment from the standpoint of others – an 
imperative of mutual perspective-taking – will not do to identify 
principles on the basis of which a plurality of diverse agents with 
potentially incompatible sets of principles can coordinate their 
interactions. As I have mentioned at the end of the preceding chapter, 
in this context we need to think of the global standpoint’s reflexivity 
requirement in a way that honours the fact that it is constituted by an 
actual plurality of perspectives in a disjunctive relation. 
As far as O’Neill is concerned, this implies that her insistent 
emphasis on the need for principles that are shareable among a 
“plurality of potentially interacting and diverse agents” (O'Neill 2004, 
p.156) notwithstanding, she ultimately loses sight of the distinct kind of 
plurality pertinent to the domain of right. For in this domain, we are 
interested in the possibility of consistent interaction among a plurality of 
agents. Under these circumstances, it is not enough to account for 
‘generalised’ others by each constraining our reasoning (and hence 
comportment) accordingly. Instead, we need to account for the 
possibility of real diversity in agents, principles and political 
arrangements.  
With regard to the cosmopolitan encounter, which of course 
remains our main concern, this insight implies that while the regress to 
the global standpoint tells Western travellers to go no further than 
making communicative offers, they cannot also from this perspective 
identify norms on the basis of which both sides, with their potentially 
incompatible set of principles, could coordinate their interactions. 
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Wherever the requirement of constrained comportment is intended to 
leave us, it stops short of mutually binding principles.  
4. The Possibility of Interpersonal Authority   
My case against O’Neill so far was concerned with the kind of principles 
we require in the domain of right in order to coordinate a plurality of 
agents, rather than how we obtain them. In particular, I criticised her 
insufficient distinction between the ethical requirement to each 
constrain our own willing and the juridical requirement to interact 
consistently with a plurality of other agents. As such, this is not a 
particularly original insight, nor one that requires the notion of a global 
standpoint to be appreciated. The case for the distinctness of the 
morality of right from that of ethics – in particular, its externality – is 
defended by numerous interpreters and at the heart of a longstanding 
debate.35  
I mention this because its proponents usually take this line of 
argument to ground a case for the need to institutionally mediate rights 
relations. The familiar thought is that given that principles of right 
cannot be self-legislated, they need to be externally legislated: in order to 
have the requisite kind of interpersonal authority, principles need to be 
issued and enforced from a distinctly public standpoint. Only coercive 
political institutions have the pertinent kind of juridical authority that 
can unify an actual plurality of interacting agents under principles.36 
                                                
35 Versions of the claim that Kant’s domain of right is independent – in one way or 
other – from his ethics are defended by a wide range of interpreters including 
Flikschuh (2000), Horn (2014), Ripstein (2009), Willaschek (1997), Wood (2002a). 
36 In a sense, the “internal” (modal) reasoning constraint then simply devolves upon 
the coercively authoritative lawgiver. That is to say, it is the sovereign who has to 
reason from the perspective of all and judge whether a proposed norm (has the form 
such that it) could be self-imposed by those to whom it is meant to apply (that is, the 
subjects). This is precisely what Kant’s idea of the “original contract” (DoR 6:315) is 
supposed to get at: by providing a “touchstone of any public law's conformity with 
right”, it binds the lawmaker in their exercise of public authority. The sovereign 
instantiates a ‘general united will’ by legislating in the name of all of its citizens.  
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Under circumstances where what matters is not the mere internal form 
of the maxim underlying an action but the way it relates to a set of further 
actions, we need a distinctly public authority that links the actions of 
one agent reciprocally to those of the others and, in so doing, constitutes 
their rightness. In making public law, institutions are able to constitute 
a strict form of reciprocity between the constituent parties’ wills. In a 
nutshell, principles with interpersonal authority are principles of public 
right for Kant.  
I take this line of argument to be perfectly accurate as far as the 
domestic context is concerned, where individuals relate to one another 
through reciprocally raised property claims. Now, if the problem arises 
already on a more fundamental level – if the mere disjunctive relation 
of individual actions grounds the need for institutional mediation – we 
would expect the domain of cosmopolitan right to be publicly coercive 
in a similar way. Yet, for reasons I will get into in the subsequent 
chapter, Kant denies precisely that. Although it is positioned in the 
Doctrine of Right’s section on “public” (rather than “private”) right, he 
does not envision cosmopolitan relations to be subject to a shared 
political authority that could make and enforce laws in the name of all 
parties involved so as to ‘unify’ the entire cosmopolitan plurality.  
Of course, for someone like O’Neill this need not be hugely 
problematic. On her view, anyone who applies the requisite modal 
constraint appropriately can identify shareable (cum universally binding) 
principles of justice. Political institutions thus come in ‘after the fact’ 
anyway: they are required to enforce principles whose validity is a 
matter of their form and thus ascertainable prior to and independently 
of their institutional manifestation. Generally speaking, the specific 
modal criterion that generates principles of justice by testing their 
shareability can be applied by any agent. Recall that O’Neill defines 
principles of justice as prescribing or prohibiting specific acts towards 
identifiable others, such that they can be said to correlate with rights 
(O'Neill 1996, p.184). Given that duties of justice do not only have to 
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be enactable by all (i.e., have the required formal property) but also 
enforceable, “there must be agents or agencies to do the enforcing” 
(O'Neill 2016, p.123). 
O’Neill remarks that in today’s world the task of securing that 
everyone performs the pertinent set of duties is typically assigned to 
states (making them what she calls the primary agents of justice), simply 
because they tend to have the requisite powers and capabilities at their 
avail that allow them to fulfil that role (O'Neill 2011, p.183; see also, 
Caney 2013, p.138). If states are unwilling or unable (e.g. too weak or 
ineffective) to institutionalise and enforce justice within their borders, 
however, non-state agents (such as non-governmental organizations or 
transnational companies) need to step in and do the job for them 
(O'Neill 2011, p.185). Along these lines, even Westerns emissaries could 
(as a matter of principle) enforce norms regulating their interactions 
with non-state peoples, assuming they have constrained their reasoning 
accordingly.  
Yet, it is precisely this sort of unilateral affirmation of juridical 
authority that we have ruled out. This leaves us in a predicament. For 
cosmopolitan interactions are simply bound to lack the strict kind of 
reciprocity that only coercive institutions are in a position to constitute. 
I think this is a real problem for Kant, and one from which there is no 
easy way out. On the face of it, this makes it very difficult to understand 
why he would want to talk about cosmopolitan right as a form of public 
rights relation in the first place. What it does help us to understand, 
however, is why he falls back on an overly cautious stance according to 
which we have to limit ourselves to attempting interaction with those 
on whose shores we find ourselves. A neat solution is not available, given 
that neither of the parties has the authority to make the judgments that 
would allow them to come up with binding principles for coordinating 
their interactions, nor to force the other side into institutions with the 
capacity to make these judgments for them. 
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As we simply cannot predicate anything of our counterparts, all 
we are left with is to initiate what promises to be a long-winded and 
daunting process of finding shared norms for our coexistence. Kant 
merely specifies how we can get this process off the ground, namely by 
offering an actually dialogue that allows Western emissaries and non-
state peoples to get to know each other, gradually and over time.37 
Maybe we successfully learn to mutually understand each other such 
that we can ultimately find a shared basis for getting along, maybe not. 
Wherever this process leads, though, strict rights reciprocity simply 
cannot be had at the level of cosmopolitan right.  
Conclusion 
What motivated me to take my cue from O’Neill in this chapter was the 
observation that she starts from a predicament that is structurally 
similar to the one that we inherited from previous chapters: the need 
for “maxims for a plurality-without-pre-established-harmony“ (O'Neill 
1992, p.300). Her initially promising answer was that in order to find 
such principles, agents – who are constitutively tied to the first-personal 
perspective – must simply constrain their own reasoning. If their 
proposed principles are only abstract enough, such that they have the 
right form, they can be said to hold for all agents involved.  
My critique of O’Neill focused particularly on a crucial 
distinction within Kant’s practical philosophy, between consistency in 
willing (ethics) and consistency in interaction (right). O’Neill’s continuity 
thesis obfuscates the implication of the fact that the latter is characterised 
by a plurality of interacting agents, which entails that the requisite 
principles (in order to be interpersonally authoritative) cannot be self-
legislated. The upshot for the cosmopolitan encounter is that while the 
global standpoint binds Western emissaries to go no further than 
                                                
37 Here I follow Flikschuh (2017, pp.89-91). 
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inviting their stateless counterparts to interact on a non-coercive basis, 
they cannot also from this perspective identify norms that would allow 
both sides, with their potentially incompatible sets of principles and 
arrangements, to coordinate their interactions. 
At the same time, though, in the cosmopolitan context Kant also 
denies a simple shift to a public standpoint from which political 
institutions could mediate everyone’s reciprocal claims through 
coercive law. Given that cosmopolitan right – somewhat disconcertingly 
– thus lacks coercive or strict reciprocity, we are left with the cautious 
attempts to settle on shared terms through a gradual process in the 
course of which statist and non-state peoples get to know each other and 
their respective ways. The question we are then left with is to what 
extent we can then still intelligibly conceive of cosmopolitan right as a 
domain of “public” right in the first place. Given that public right is 
supposed to be a domain of distinctly institutional normativity, we need 
to ask what the institutional implications of cosmopolitan right (and 
hence the global standpoint) are. This question will, in the subsequent 
chapter, lead us back to the state. 
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The last chapter left us in a predicament: on the one hand, Western 
emissaries lack the juridical authority that would allow them to simply 
turn up at distant shores with universally binding principles in hand. 
On the other hand, Kant also denies that they can force their stateless 
counterparts into political institutions with them that would, from a 
public standpoint, make coercive law valid for all. I ended on the 
question how – given this lack of strict reciprocity – we can still conceive 
of cosmopolitan right as a domain of ‘public’ right. 
In this chapter, I shall return to the state in order to answer this 
question. My claim is that the obligation to interact with other earth 
dwellers from the global standpoint is not only predicated on states 
(recall my argument, in Chapter 3, that we obtain it via the property 
argument) but that the state is also its site of institutional 
implementation. Rather than a public global order, Kant’s mature 
cosmopolitanism is thus geared towards a world of radically reformed 
states that bind themselves and hence their citizens to rightful 
comportment towards other states and non-state peoples of their own 
accord. To take up the global standpoint from within states is to 
transform them into cosmopolitan agents. 
I will make this argument by developing a particular 
interpretation of Kant’s threefold system of public right that 
conceptualises distinct though interlocking forms of right at state, 
international, and cosmopolitan levels. Now, notice that the three levels 
are usually taken to depict something like a blueprint for a global 
institutional order (e.g. Höffe 2006; Lutz-Bachmann 1997). The 
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thought is that the conclusive establishment of public right requires a 
multi-level strategy ensuring that institutions are in place that regulate 
states’ relations to their citizens, to other states, and to non-state 
collectives respectively. The problem with this reading is that both 
domains of public right beyond the state – not only cosmopolitan but 
also international right –  are presented by Kant as non-coercive. As I will 
show in more detail in this chapter, it is the moral standing of states as 
juridical agents that rules out, on conceptual grounds, the option of a 
supranational public institution. 
Instead, I will read the two domains of rights relations beyond 
the domestic context as spelling out a set of juridical obligations that are 
predicated and incumbent on states (and their citizens) themselves. On 
this view, which is labelled by Peter Niesen as a “cosmopolitanism 
within one country”,1 the most important function of Kant’s tripartite 
system of public right, and its primary transformative potential, does 
not lie in its provision of a model of a global institutional order beyond 
the state. Rather, it consists in a cosmopolitically informed and, 
ultimately, transformed notion of statehood itself. Specifically, Kant 
provides a set of juridical constraints that states are to impose on 
themselves. In the absence of coercively institutionalised (i.e. truly 
public) rights relations that encompass the entire cosmopolitan 
plurality, juridically self-constrained comportment is the only way in 
which we can hope to find peaceable terms of mutual coexistence with 
other states and non-state actors. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I start, in Section 1, by 
returning to Kant’s concept of ‘commercium’. My aim is to gather some 
initial evidence that an important aspect of the notion of disjunctive 
community is to change our perspective on states. The remainder of the 
chapter develops a structural analogy (introduced in Section 2) between 
                                                
1 On Niesen’s (2012) view, this was a predominant (though subsequently largely 
forgotten) understanding of cosmopolitanism during the enlightenment period and 
can be reconstructed, for instance, in Bentham’s writings. Niesen hints at the 
presence of such a conception in Kant without developing it in much detail.  
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the two similarly non-coercive domains of public right beyond the state. 
I start, in Section 3, by focusing on international right. I read Kant’s 
retreat to a voluntary league of nations as a corollary of his view of states 
as moral agents with an artificial (sovereign) will, which rules out on 
conceptual grounds that they themselves be subject to a supremely 
coercive agent. Rather, states are duty-bound to enter a permanent 
congress of states and submit to its rulings of their own accord. Section 
4 goes on to show that, in a structurally analogous way, states are tasked 
to domestically implement cosmopolitan right by legislating provisions 
that constrain their citizens’ comportment towards distant strangers, as 
well as securing the rights of refugees who turn up on their own shores. 
Only if states coercively ensure that their citizens, when acting as 
traders, settlers or missionaries abroad, attempt to establish interactions 
with distant strangers on fair or equitable terms can we hope for the 
gradual emergence of a juridical meta-language that allows them to 
settle on shared terms. This confirms that Kant’s global standpoint is 
also a global standpoint on states. 
1. Communio and Commercium 
I would like to start by going back to Chapter 2, where I developed the 
global standpoint through a contrast between Kant’s notion of original 
common possession and that predominant in the natural law tradition 
as impersonated by Grotius (as well as his modern-day adherent Risse). 
One of my main observations was that Kant reverses the argumentative 
sequence familiar from the latter. Grotius starts with the idea of a 
common stock of resources and land (as a historically real state of affairs) 
that is subsequently divided up in accordance with the principle of need. 
The argument of the Doctrine of Right, by contrast, proceeds from 
unilateral acquisition of land to the idea of original possession in 
common. To think of the earth as possessed in common, that is to say, 
  162 
is a corollary of the unavoidable first acquisition due to one’s coming 
into the world as an embodied agent. Kant employs the idea of original 
common possession of the earth in order to visually express what it 
means to exist as an embodied agent, together with other such agents, 
within limited space. 
I also hinted at Kant’s underlying motivation for this inversion: 
his worry is that Grotius’s argumentative sequence, in aiming to 
overcome the condition of original common ownership, tends to 
obliterate the global standpoint. Kant suspects that this model essentially 
entrenches the separation between individuals and borders between 
communities rather than inviting and enabling them to find shared 
solutions for shared global problems. By contrast, in arising from the 
unavoidable conditions of our coexistence on earth, Kant’s global 
community takes precedence over contingent, man-made communities 
of rights-holders or co-owners. 
I now want to pick up and elaborate on this line of argument by 
reflecting further on the relation between existing political communities 
and the global community of possible physical interaction. I would like 
to do so by pointing to a conceptual distinction, between commercium and 
communio, to which Kant helps himself in the context of his argument 
from earth dwellership. In the section on cosmopolitan right in 
particular we are told that the members of the original community of 
land do not stand in a relation of “rightful community of possession 
(communio) and so of use of it, or of property in it; instead they stand in a 
community of possible physical interaction (commercium), that is, in a 
thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others […]” (DoR 6:352). 
Similarly, in the earlier passage on original acquisition of land Kant 
cautions that a “condition of community (communio) of what is mine and 
yours can never be thought to be original but must be acquired (by an 
act that establishes an external right), although possession of an external 
object can originally be only possession in common” (DoR 6:258). 
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In Chapter 2, I took Kant to be making this distinction in order 
to delineate his own conception of global community as commercium from 
the natural law conception of a “primitive community (communio 
primaeva), which is supposed to be instituted in the earliest time of 
relations of rights among human beings and cannot be based on 
principles but only on history” (DoR 6:258). As a “practical rational 
concept” (DoR 6:262), Kant’s own notion of original common 
ownership depicts a person-to-person relation (conditioned by the 
earth’s spherical surface) rather than a relation between persons and the 
external world. This is intended also to rule out a (semi-fictional) 
historical process, central to the natural law narrative, in the course of 
which resources are legitimately privatised and land legitimately 
enclosed (and consequently demarcated as territory). 
Notice, however, that in early modern political thought, the 
notion of communio was not confined to depicting a historically 
“primitive” state of community that precedes the establishment of 
human institutions (Wolin 2004, pp.86-95). Communio also had another 
meaning that goes back to its Latin origin as depicting a fortress or, 
more generally, a demarcated and bounded space. According to 
Howard Caygill, Kant was well aware of this exclusionary and 
determinate meaning of communio as “exclusive sharing of space 
protected from the outside“ (Caygill 1995, p.177; see also Milstein 2013, 
p.124) and used it across his political writings to characterise particular 
social and political communities or arrangements – delineated and 
demarcated from others of the same kind around them – that 
institutionalise relations of property, territory and sovereignty. 
It is this second meaning that I want to focus on in this section. 
For, given that we are interested in the institutional implications of the 
global standpoint, Kant’s reflections on the relation between the global 
community of original common possession and particular communities 
constituted by man-made institutions such as states are of immediate 
concern. That Kant actually has this relation in mind in contrasting 
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communio and commercium is confirmed by a brief look at a passage from 
the first Critique where the conceptual distinction is first introduced. In 
the third Analogy (CPR A 213-4/B260/1) Kant argues that we require 
the category of community in order to perceive a plurality of objects as 
co-existing simultaneously in one spatial whole. In this context, he also 
identifies an ambiguity in the word community as used in common 
language:  
The word “community” is ambiguous in our language, 
and can mean either communio or commercium. We 
use it here in the latter sense, as a dynamical community, 
without which even the local community (communio spatii) 
could never be empirically cognized [...] In our mind all 
appearances, as contained in a possible experience, must 
stand in a community (communio) of apperception, and 
insofar as the objects are to be represented as being 
connected by existing simultaneously, they must 
reciprocally determine their position in one time and 
thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective community 
is to rest on an objective ground, or is to be related to 
appearances as substances, then the perception of one, 
as ground, must make possible the perception of the 
other, and conversely, so that the succession that always 
exists in the perceptions, as apprehensions, will not be 
ascribed to the objects, but these can instead be 
represented as existing simultaneously. But this is a 
reciprocal influence, i.e., a real community (commercium) 
of substances, without which the empirical relation of 
simultaneity could not obtain in experience.  
Kant distinguishes between two meanings in order to resolve the 
ambiguity inherent in the term Gemeinschaft. “Communio” is a “local 
community” of objects, that is our perception of things as grouped 
together in some respect and thus delineated from other things. In the 
present context, we can read it as referring to a deemed “condition of 
commonality or shared existence, a more or less static condition of 
belonging together under some identifiable set of criteria that can 
demarcate that which belongs to the community from that which does 
not” (Milstein 2013, p.122). The notion of “commercium”, which, in 
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the above passage, Kant associates with the pertinent category or pure 
concept of the understanding, is said to depict a community 
characterised by mere interaction and reciprocal influence.  
What is particularly interesting for us at this point is that Kant 
does not merely distinguish between the two concepts, but that he also 
specifies their relation. The thought is that we can only mentally 
aggregate, individuate, or locate things with respect to one another by 
virtue of our ability to experience all the constituent parts as 
interconnected with one another in a unified horizon of possible 
experience. As the manifold of experience does not reach us already 
ordered into discrete types or groups of objects, we need an “objective 
ground” or starting point – the idea of a dynamical community of 
thoroughgoing interaction – from which we intuit the composition of 
the world and form judgments about it. Kant’s thought is that 
community as “communio” presupposes community as “commercium” 
(CPR A214/B261): without the dynamic reciprocal influence of 
substances in “commercium”, there could be no empirical relation of 
co-existence or “communio”.  
Let us take our lead from this passage. Let us, moreover, take 
seriously Kant’s return to the distinction between communio and 
commercium in the Doctrine of Right. We then get a picture that interestingly 
reverberates with the argument developed over preceding chapters. On 
the one hand, Kant suggests that his global community is in some way 
logically prior to or taking precedence over man-made communities of 
right-holders or co-owners, such as states. On the other hand, we only 
get to the idea of commercium through communio, namely by means of 
reflecting on the latter’s conditions of possibility. Only by virtue of our 
apprehension of communio, Kant argues in the above passage, do we 
realise that “this subjective community is to rest on an objective 
ground”. This lines in with Chapter 3’s argument that we get to the 
global standpoint via the property-based case for state entrance. 
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But how exactly should we think of this relation of priority? 
According to one possible interpretation, the global community of 
commercium is meant to overcome the community of communio. One way to 
understand this claim is to say that we are meant to dissolve particular 
human institutions into a single global community, possibly embracing 
an all-encompassing political institution or even world state.2 
Throughout preceding chapters, I have repeatedly pointed to Kant’s 
scepticism concerning these ideas. He is not inclined at all to suggest 
that we ought to dissolve or even redraw boundaries, redistribute land 
and territory, or – more broadly speaking – do away with all kinds of 
particular relations, commitments and institutions. 
Now, there is another way in which we could read commercium as 
overcoming community. This construal, recently suggested by Christoph 
Menke (2015, pp.350-4), is not predicated on an expansion of the scope 
of political community. Rather, Kant is taken to juxtapose two models of 
political community, that is to say, different ways of conceptualising 
relations among co-citizens. On Menke’s interpretation, the distinction 
between commercium and communio expresses two fundamentally different 
paradigms for conceiving of just relations. Commercium encapsulates the 
very form of modern rights that Menke ascribes to Kant and goes on to 
reject himself: the reciprocal relation between the two parties of any 
interaction that only together constitute a rights relation. On Menke’s 
view, this modern, individualistic notion of rights as concerned with the 
dynamic, reciprocal relation among persons asserting themselves as 
‘mere’ juridical subjects by making claims on each other to have their 
actions taken into account contrasts starkly with an alternative tradition 
of thinking about justice: that associated with communio understood as a 
                                                
2 Notice that, on a reading that likens Kant’s conception of original common 
possession to that of Grotius, the replacement relation would be exactly reversed: 
communio overcomes commercium. Along these lines, Byrd and Hruschka (2010, p.207) 
argue that “when the land is particularized, however, the disjunctively universal 
right to a place on this earth is made concrete, especially for a people. When it is, the 
right to be in a place other than the one an individual rightly occupies disappears, 
and with it the right to visit that other place”. 
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more comprehensive social praxis that for instance underlies 
communitarian ideals of the common good or the communist idea of 
true democracy. On this second view, individual actions are related not 
externally, thus reducing agents to a formal status of juridical 
subjectivity, but internally through an overarching conception of the 
good in which they all participate (Menke 2015, p.355). 
On Menke’s view, Kant plays an important role in the context 
of an (early modern) paradigm shift away from a ‘thick’ conception of 
political community as communio to a much ‘thinner’ one associated with 
commercium. At the conceptual heart of this transformation is the 
powerful notion of individual or subjective rights as validly assertable 
prior to the community itself. Now, while this is a familiar story about a 
central conceptual shift in early modern political thought from natural 
law to natural rights (Tierney 1997; Tuck 1990), I doubt that Kant 
actually plays the role Menke envisions for him. As we saw in Chapter 
1, Kant does not start with a foundational claim about subjective rights 
but with the general concept of right as a system of reciprocal relations of 
which individual claims are a constitutive component. Kant conceives 
of right in relational terms from the outset. 
I agree with Menke that, in so far as it depicts our coexistence 
on the earth’s spherical surface, Kant’s disjunctive community is not a 
community of shared ethnicity, culture or law – a community based on 
affinity or shared conceptions of the good. But that is not to say that we 
should only or exclusively understand ourselves as participants in 
commercium. It just means that our status as earth dwellers has logical and 
normative priority to any membership in positively instituted political 
communities. Rather than overcoming or replacing it, commercium gives 
us a different perspective on communio. 
In this, I follow Brian Milstein (2013), according to whom the 
idea of commercium is intended to provide us with something like a 
“critical perspective” on social, cultural and ultimately political 
boundaries. The thought is that “before [in a justificatory rather than 
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temporal sense, JH] we are nations, states, or even individual property-
owners, we are free beings, each with our own standpoint, who are not 
only capable of determining our own actions vis-à-vis one another but 
who are capable of negotiating publicly recognized principles for 
sharing our life on earth”. Thinking of ourselves as co-participants in a 
dynamic cosmopolitan community requires that we relate critically to 
existing practices and institutions. We do so by asking to what extent 
they affirm our ability to think of ourselves as joint makers of the world 
around us or whether they curtail this ability by delimiting possible 
interaction as well as entrenching and naturalising existing separations. 
Taking up the perspective of commercium is an “exercise in critical 
reflection on the terms of our relations of community with one another” 
(Milstein 2013, p.120.) From this standpoint, we are asked to reflect on 
our interdependence relations with others beyond our political 
community as well as collectively structure and transform the terms of 
interaction we find ourselves in rather than putting up with them. But 
that is not to say that we necessarily have to dissolve or do away with the 
latter. 
However, in arguing that we always “retain the reflexive 
capacities to build upon, critique, or revise the terms on which [we] 
coexist and interact with one another“ (Milstein 2013, p.127), Milstein 
makes it sound as though this exercise of critical reflection, i.e., taking 
up what I call the global standpoint, is somehow optional. On my view 
– and I think the passage from the first Critique in fact confirms this – 
has something even stronger in mind: the global standpoint is a 
condition of any possible communal standpoint. In other words, no 
local standpoint without a global standpoint. Textually speaking, we 
must regress further beyond the property argument and to original 
acquisition of land (and this implies that we can).  
What is more, the institutional implications of Milstein’s reading 
remain rather vague. His primary intention is to denaturalise the 
foundations and thus the boundaries of political community (Milstein 
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2013, p.127). For, the distinction between communio and commercium 
allows us to distinguish the unavoidable conditions of our concurrent 
coexistence on the one hand, from the contingent products of history 
(such as relations of property and sovereignty) on the other hand.3 
According to Milstein, this allows us to understand ourselves as makers 
of the practices and institutions we find ourselves in – to take ownership 
of them – and, ultimately, to critique, contest and revise them. Yet, how 
precisely what I have called the global standpoint reshapes our social 
and political world is still unclear. What is the practical (i.e., 
institutional) upshot of looking at relations of communio through the 
prism of commercium? This is the question I want to answer in the 
remainder of this chapter.  
2. Right as a System 
In the preceding section, I gathered some preliminary evidence for the 
idea that an important aspect of Kant’s global standpoint consists in its 
function as a global standpoint on existing states. I argued that his 
notion of global community or commercium should be thought of as 
transforming the way we look at particular political communities from 
within. I want to leave this specific issue behind for now and make good 
on the preliminary insight it has yielded on more systematic grounds. 
To that effect, I shall turn to Kant’s threefold system of right. My aim 
is to connect the above discussion of the relation between commercium 
and communio with the wider question that frames this chapter as a 
whole: how we can intelligibly think of cosmopolitan right as a domain 
of public right.     
                                                
3 Again, this is reflected in my regress, in Chapter 3, from the contingent practice of 
reciprocally raised property claims (and the ensuing duty of state entrance) to the 
non-contingent fact of entering the world as an earth dweller (and the ensuing 
obligation to think of the earth as possessed in common). 
  170 
Kant first introduces the idea that (what he calls) a 
“cosmopolitan constitution” (PP 8:358) should consist of public rights 
relations on three distinct (though interrelated) levels in the three 
‘Definitive Articles’ of Perpetual Peace (PP 8:349–357). While his focus 
there is very much on the significance of the tripartite structure for 
establishing the conditions of peace, the Doctrine of Right develops its 
formal grounds more systematically. The basic thought is that  
[...] under the general concept of public right we are led 
to think not only of the right of a state but also of a right 
of nations (ius gentium). Since the earth's surface is not 
unlimited but closed, the concepts of the right of a state 
and of a right of nations lead inevitably to the idea of a 
right for a state of nations (ius gentium) or cosmopolitan right (ius 
cosmopoliticum). So if the principle of outer freedom 
limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible 
forms of rightful condition, the framework of all the 
others is unavoidably undermined and must finally 
collapse. (DoR 6:311) 
Let me start by making two observations about this passage. First, Kant 
emphasises that the three forms of public right that constitute the 
pertinent system each derive from one and the same general concept of 
right. It lies in the very concept of right (conceived through its three 
forms), that is to say, that it be global in nature. Second, already in this 
passage Kant suggests that there is a sense in which international and 
cosmopolitan right are somehow predicated on states. “Since the earth’s 
surface is not unlimited but closed”, he argues, we cannot stop at the 
right of a state (or domestic right) but are “led” to the two further levels.  
Kant’s ensuing discussion in Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of 
Right then reflects this structure of exposition. He starts, respectively, 
with the domain of domestic right (or right of a state) as concerned with 
the institutional relations between individuals and their state. In 
Perpetual Peace, this domain is all about the nature of republican 
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government (PP 8:349-353).4 While the Doctrine of Right repeats the claim 
that a perfect republic – where the people act as a collective body rather 
than a loose collective – is the only kind of state that fully accords with 
its own internal standards, the focus as a whole shifts to the (prior) 
property argument as justifying a duty to enter the civil condition in the 
first place.  
From there, Kant goes on to claim that the concept of domestic 
right entails a requirement for right between states, which in turn 
“inevitably” (DoR 6:311) gives rise to cosmopolitan right as specifying 
just relations between states and non-citizen individuals as well as non-
state peoples. As far as international right is concerned, Kant advocates 
a voluntary federation of states that are said to have “outgrown” (PP 
8:355) the need to be under coercive law. Finally, cosmopolitan right – 
well-known to us at this stage –  is “limited” to hospitality, that is “the 
right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived 
on the land of another” (PP 8:357, see also DoR 6:352 ff.).  
While these three levels are distinct and functionally 
differentiated, Kant puts great emphasis on the way in which they are 
also constitutively intertwined and mutually implicating forms of public 
right. Only in conjunction do the three domains constitute a complex, 
self-sustaining system. “If the principle of outer freedom limited by law 
is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful condition”, 
Kant insists in the passage just quoted, “the framework of all the others 
is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse”. None of the 
three levels, that is to say, fully instantiates the idea of rightful relations 
such that it could persist on its own. Ultimately, securement even of 
                                                
4 In being defined by the three principles of political freedom and equality, 
separation of powers, and political representation of citizens, Kant’s republicanism 
describes more a way or mode of governing than a specific institutional setup (Niesen 
& Eberl 2011, pp.209-231). In the Contest of the Faculties (7:91), Kant famously claims 
that even a monarch can govern in a republican way by treating their people 
accordingly. 
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domestic right requires an institutional manifestation of international 
and cosmopolitan right. 
Earlier in this chapter, I indicated that the main purchase of 
Kant’s system of rights relations is the transformative effect it has on 
states. This may appear to be a puzzling claim. On the face of it, a focus 
on the three levels seems precisely to lead us away from the state and 
more towards trans- and supra-national contexts. For, a “cosmopolitan 
constitution” is usually taken to depict a global, multi-faceted 
institutional and legal order; not only by Kant-interpreters but also by 
contemporary proponents of what now goes under the label of a ‘global 
constitutionalism’ (Habermas 2006; Kumm 2009). 
I have already indicated that I diverge from this view. Instead, I 
hope to show that the domains of international and cosmopolitan right 
spell out two sets of obligations that are predicated and incumbent on 
states. In doing so, they provide us with a cosmopolitically transformed 
notion of statehood. It is the state rather than a global institutional order 
that constitutes the institutional heart of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. States 
must bind themselves (and hence their citizens) to the pertinent kind of 
comportment of their own accord. For in the absence of a global public 
constitution, transforming states into outward-looking, cosmopolitan 
agents is the most promising – in fact, the only viable – strategy for 
finding peaceful terms of engagement with other states and non-state 
peoples. 
3. Juridical Self-Constraint in the Right of Nations 
My primary aim in spelling out Kant’s conception of a 
‘cosmopolitanism within one country’ will be to further illuminate the 
cosmopolitan encounter. Before we get there, however, I shall discuss 
the domain of international right. In order to see why this promises to 
be an instructive comparison, notice that it shares with the domain of 
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cosmopolitan right the conceptual puzzle on which we started this 
chapter. On the one hand, both domains are located in the Doctrine of 
Right’s section on public (rather than private) right (DoR 6:343). This 
implies that they do not constitute pure state-of-nature contexts to start 
with. In this, they contrast with pre-political relations between private 
individuals who are coercively obliged to enter into the civil condition 
with one another.5 Rather, they are already located within the realm of 
a specifically institutional (as I hope to show, state-based) kind of 
normativity. At the same time though, both international and 
cosmopolitan right are also distinctly non-coercive kinds of public right – 
the pertinent kinds of interactions are, according to Kant’s exposition, 
not subject to coercion by a supreme authority.  
My claim is that we can make sense of the conceptual tension 
recurring on either of these levels by recognising the way in which they 
are equally tied to, and predicated on, juridical statehood. Obligations 
of international and cosmopolitical right are, in the first instance, 
immanent to existing states and their citizens. Rather than licensing 
states to force other (individual and collective) agents into state-like 
institutions with them, Kant advocates a cosmopolitan transformation 
of states themselves.  
The Non-Coerciveness of International Right 
Kant’s endorsement, in both Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right, of a 
distinctly voluntary, lose and non-coercive international federation has 
been subject to interpreters’ puzzlement ever since. Not only does it 
seem to be in tension with his claim, central specifically to the Doctrine of 
Right, from the intrinsically coercive nature of right (DoR 6:231); an idea 
that finds its most prominent manifestation in his vindication of a 
                                                
5 Kant does of course say that states are “in a state of nature [...] in external relation 
to one another” (DoR 6:347). However, as I shall show shortly, the fact that they are 
a rightful condition themselves fundamental changes what this amounts to. 
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coercive duty, incumbent upon private individuals in the state of nature, 
to enter the civil condition (such that an analogous move may be 
expected internationally). Almost more strikingly, Kant’s position 
constitutes a pointed departure from his earlier writings.  
Particularly the early Idea for a Universal History had been 
emphatic on the need for a strong, coercive kind of federal global 
authority “resembling a civil commonwealth that can preserve itself like 
an automaton” (IUH 8:25, cf. Kleingeld 2009, pp.177-179).6 At the 
heart of Kant’s argument there is a sustained analogy between the 
respective states of nature on the individual and international level, 
matching the requirement for persons to submit to a public authority 
with a corresponding obligation of states to join a coercive federation. 
Both Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right start with the very 
same analogy: the claim that “peoples, as states, can be judged as 
individual human beings who, when in the state of nature (i.e., when 
they are independent from external laws), already harm one another by 
being near one another” (PP 8:354; see also DoR 6:344). Yet, Kant 
surprisingly backs away from his earlier endorsement of a coercive form 
of world government. The “federation” (Bund) of states that he 
continues to argue for now depicts a much weaker kind of institution.7 
It is a merely voluntary association of states without coercive powers, 
one that “involves no sovereign authority (as in a civil constitution)” and 
“can be renounced at any time and so must be renewed from time to 
time” (DoR 6:344). This institution, whose sole purpose is to prevent 
war and conflict among its constituents, is neither established or 
maintained by force, nor are its decisions coercively enforced. 
Kant’s motivation for replacing his early model of an 
internationally coercive sovereign power with a relatively powerless 
federation remains highly contested among interpreters. A prominent 
                                                
6 Kant makes a very similar argument in the early Anthropology Lectures 
Friedländer (25:696) and Pillau (25:843). 
7 Kleingeld (2004, pp.322/3, fn.18) points out that the term federation itself is 
neutral as to whether or not the institution has the power to enforce its laws. 
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array of readers have accused him of merely giving in to the realities of 
power politics (call this the feasibility argument).8 Taking their cue from his 
(in)famous claim that states “do not at all want” (PP 8:357) to have their 
sovereignty curtailed in the way required for a coercive federation, they 
see him as simply acquiescing in states’ refusal to do what they ought to 
do, that is, submit under a supra-state coercive authority. This is a 
pointedly un-Kantian move. Since when does it matter to Kant whether 
or not you want to act on your duty? Nevertheless, it has been a major 
driving force behind interpreters’ attempt at making Kant ‘consistent’ 
with his own ideas by vindicating a world state solution even amidst his 
own explicit refusal to do so (e.g. Byrd & Hruschka 2008; Hodgson 
2012).  
There are, however, a number of textual resources on the basis 
of which more charitable and arguably more promising explanations 
for Kant’s refusal to stick to a coercive federation can be provided. First, 
the problem might be purely conceptual (calls this the contradiction in 
conception argument). In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that in the idea of 
a state of states “lie[s] a contradiction” (PP 8:354), for the very notion 
of international right is predicated on a plurality of states that their 
subjection to or even unification under a single coercive sovereign 
would do away with. Critics, however, have complained that – taken on 
its own – this is a mere semantic point without much purchase (e.g. 
Carson 1988; Guyer 2000, p.416): the idea of international right may 
very well presuppose a plurality of states such that it would cease to be 
applicable under a global political body. Yet, this does not go to refute 
the desirability of the latter ideal as such. For we may question the very 
assumption that a right of nations (rather than a ‘right of a state of 
states’) is of inherent significance. 
Instead, Kant may be read as rejecting a fusion of states on the 
straightforward normative basis that it would be either ineffective or 
                                                
8 Famously Habermas (1998), Höffe (2006, pp.198-201). 
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dangerous (the normative argument). On the one hand, the idea is that a 
global state would just be too big in size so as to effectively govern and 
protect its citizens (DoR 6:350, Kleingeld 2004, p.318). On the other 
hand, Kant famously worries that a hegemonic global empire in the 
form of a “universal monarchy” would be likely to turn into a “soulless 
despotism” (PP 8:367). Absorbing all subsidiary political units such that 
it is freed of any checks on its power, the peace such an institution 
creates would be that of a graveyard. While this is certainly an 
important part of Kant’s worry, the purchase of his attack on ‘universal 
monarchy’ is limited to highly centralised forms of global government 
that essentially amount to a world state. The normative argument cannot 
account, on similar grounds, for Kant’s scepticism concerning possible 
institutional arrangements that go beyond his voluntary federation, for 
instance in requiring partial sovereignty transfers, without dissolving all 
political communities into a single super-state (Byrd 1995; Kersting 
1996, pp.437-8).9 
A more promising take on Kant’s position starts from the 
observation that, in Perpetual Peace, he continues to argue that the 
“continual approximation” (PP 8:350) of the stronger, coercive kind of 
federation is possible and a duty prescribed by pure practical reason. 
Indeed, Kant does insist on the “positive idea of a world republic” 
before seemingly putting up with its “negative surrogate of a lasting and 
continually expanding league” (PP 8:357). Now, the idea is not (as on 
the feasibility argument) that the voluntary league of nations is ‘second best’ 
to a coercive federations of states in the sense of being all we can hope 
for amidst the realities of state interest and power politics. Rather, 
proponents of what I call the provisional argument (Ellis 2005; Kleingeld 
2004; Ypi 2014) suggest that it constitutes a necessary transitional or 
interim stage on the way to a coercive world government. 
                                                
9 In particular, we could conceive of arrangements in which states transfer only part 
of their sovereignty to the federal level. See e.g. Scheuermann (2014) and Ulas 
(2015) for recent alternatives to a global Leviathan. 
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The thought is that the lose federation goes some way in giving 
states at least some means to resolve their differences, thus paving the 
way for a deeper union in a stronger type of federation, which remains 
the ultimate ideal. Kleingeld (2004, p.315), for instance, suggests that 
“mediating institutions (even if voluntary) can prevent, postpone, or 
mitigate conflicts in a way that allows for internal improvement within 
states, and the gradual development toward a more peaceful world”. 
Once created, these institutional structures will, in the course of time, 
be consolidated such that states at some point willingly and 
autonomously enter a global institution that allows their relations to 
“eventually become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race 
ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution” (PP 8:358). The non-
coercive federation thus plays an important preparatory role for state’s 
voluntary submission to a coercive institution in the future. 
I find the way in which the provisional reading capitalises on a 
systematic ambiguity concerning the terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘coercive’ in 
this context peculiar. If coercion is the imposition of another’s will on 
yours, how can it ever be consistent with voluntariness? Relatedly, it is 
at least debatable whether states have the power at all to voluntarily give 
up their sovereignty and hence effectively their status as states – 
somewhat analogous to the question whether autonomous persons have 
the power voluntarily to give up their autonomy and hence effectively 
their status as persons, for instance by selling themselves into slavery.  
Yet, this shall not be my concern at this point. I take the main 
problem to be a different one. While the provisional reading makes a lot 
of sense within the confines of Perpetual Peace, in the Doctrine of Right Kant 
is much more reluctant to demand or affirm anything like the (eventual) 
curtailment of state power. The question does not seem to be a merely 
pragmatic one of how to institutionalise or bring about a coercive 
federation anymore. Rather, Kant has come to see the idea of a world 
government as in a more fundamental conflict with the juridical 
authority of states.  
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What accounts for this shift? The idea underlying what we may 
call the sovereignty argument is that by instantiating a public rightful 
condition among some individuals, states accrue a specific kind of moral 
status that renders them immune from being juridically compelled 
themselves (Flikschuh 2010b; Ripstein 2009, pp.225-230).10 This is not 
to deny that states (like individuals) are in a disjunctive relation such 
that, by remaining in the international state of nature, they do “wrong 
in the highest degree” (DoR 6:344). At the same time though, as 
supreme rights enforcers domestically, states cannot be compelled to 
leave this condition or consequently to submit to the norms issued by a 
coercive institution. Their juridical standing prohibits supranational 
compulsion such that we are left with a voluntary league. 
Notice that we do find traces of this view already in Perpetual 
Peace, where Kant argues that a coercive duty to leave the (international) 
lawless condition is not applicable to states “since, as states, they already 
have a rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the 
constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-governed 
constitution in accordance with their concepts of right” (PP 8:355).11 
But only in the Doctrine of Right does he seem to be fully aware in what 
way this is the case. For only there is Kant’s view of juridical statehood 
fully developed. By this, I mean the notion that the state’s essential 
function is to guarantee and enforce rights relations that could not exist 
otherwise and more importantly that, in so doing, it accrues a specific 
kind of moral status or personality. That is to say, in instantiating a 
general united or public will that imposes coercive laws on everyone 
(subject to it), the state acts as a distinctly public authority overriding 
                                                
10 Kleingeld (2004, p.311) effectively combines a provisional argument with a sovereignty 
argument, claiming that the need for a transitional stage is motivated “by a concern 
that a state of states that is established by coercing unwilling states into it runs 
counter to the political autonomy of the citizens of the member states”.  
11 As Kant puts it in the preparatory works to Perpetual Peace, states are allowed to 
resist the attempt by others to force them to join a state of states “because within 
them public law has already been established, whereas in the case of individuals in 
the state of nature nothing of the kind takes place” (23:168).  
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the plurality of conflicting private wills. And this status renders the state 
itself immune from juridical compulsion (Flikschuh 2010b, p.480). 
This allows us to see how far the analogy between lawless 
conditions among individuals and among states precisely goes: states, 
like individuals, have a will (while theirs is artificial) in virtue of which 
they have moral personality. Yet unlike individuals, their will is what we 
may call “juridically sovereign” (Flikschuh 2010b, p.480): the status of 
being the supreme enforcer of rights relations among some individuals 
is constitutive of their distinct kind of public will. Subjecting them to a 
superior coercive authority would effectively deprive them of their very 
personality and thus violate their moral status. Yet, while states’ 
entrance into a coercive institution would dissolve their moral 
personality, this is not the case with individuals. In contrast to states, the 
latter thus are indeed liable to being compelled into the civil condition. 
Against this background, Kant’s denial, in the Doctrine of Right, of a truly 
public (qua coercive) form of international right does not stems from a 
pragmatic but rather a conceptual difficulty. This kind of difficulty 
cannot be solved by simply hoping that, over time, states will turn into 
something else and come to a point where they want to do away with 
their own sovereign juridical standing. 
Sovereignty and Self-Enforcement 
I have just endorsed the sovereignty argument as the most plausible attempt 
to make sense of Kant’s refusal, particularly in the context of the Doctrine 
of Right, to uphold his earlier vindication of a coercive form of global 
government. I do not claim originality for this reading, nor do we 
necessarily need to invoke earth dwellership in order to appreciate it. 
Rather, my aim is to prepare the return to the global standpoint in the 
subsequent section by developing a more general reading of Kant’s 
tripartite system of rights relations as predicated on the existence of 
states and spelling out a set of obligations incumbent on them. 
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Notice, to that effect, that in virtue of their moral personality, 
states do not only have the requisite standing that protects them from 
being compelled into a coercive federation. They are also morally 
accountable and thus bearers of obligations.12 That is to say, states are 
bound to acknowledge their duty to join a voluntary federation and 
submit to its rulings as a corollary of their very claim to be free from 
compulsion. Their failure to do so would be a failure to treat themselves 
as moral agents.13 This obligation is predicated on states in the sense that 
it is incurred by virtue of their own claim to a certain (juridically 
sovereign) standing that accounts for their immunity from outside 
interference. And it is incumbent on states in the sense that it binds them 
internally. While states, like individuals, ought to leave the lawless 
condition vis-à-vis one another, unlike individuals they cannot be forced 
to do so. Juridically sovereign states must impose the requisite 
obligations on themselves and do so of their own accord. 
The observation that states ought to comply with their 
obligations under the law of nations but cannot be compelled to do so 
explains not only why Kant ends up with the loose institutional 
framework of a voluntary league of nations.14 It elucidates also why 
international right is presented as part of the juridical domain of public 
right despite being non-coercive. It is public in the sense that albeit 
states are in a lawless condition with one another, they each already have 
a lawful condition internally that binds them juridically to comport 
themselves in specified ways towards other states. At the same time, 
their moral personality means that they cannot be forced into (or more 
generally, be subject to) a coercive supranational arrangement. 
This, however, does not yet answer the questions what the point 
and purpose is of states’ juridical self-constraint. It would seem that if 
                                                
12 Possession of a will marks personhood and thus moral imputability for Kant (DoR 
6:223). As bearers of an artificial will, states are thus morally accountable. 
13 Analogously, in the ethical domain, anyone who lays claim to the capacity for 
autonomy thereby acknowledges their own status as obligation bearers.  
14 Flikschuh (2010b, p.417) calls this Kant’s “sovereignty dilemma”. 
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the problem is that states “wrong one another” (DoR 6:354) in an 
international lawless condition, self-enforcement should strictly 
speaking be juridically irrelevant: where others raise legitimate rights 
claims against you, it should not be left to your discretion whether you 
act accordingly or not. Yet, this seems to be precisely the situation we 
are left with, for the voluntary league patently lacks the requisite 
authority that would allow it to establish relations of strict reciprocity 
among states. If states refuse to join the permanent congress or simply 
withdraw when push comes to shove, they can be morally blamed but 
neither coerced to do otherwise nor punished, for instance through 
economic sanctions (Stilz 2013, p.552). Practically speaking, an 
institution’s normative power to adjudicate conflicts remains toothless 
without the power to coercively enforce its decisions. By joining such a 
non-coercive federation that is “dissoluble at any time” (DoR 6:351), 
states thus remain caught up, at least to some extent, in a situation in 
which each of them judges in accordance with what “seems right to it” 
(DoR 6:312), i.e., a lawless condition. So what guarantee do states have 
that joining a voluntary league will make any practical difference to their 
interaction with other states?   
The answer is that there can be no such guarantee. For whether 
one state’s subjection to a voluntary association makes any difference 
depends on whether other states do likewise. If, however, most or even 
some states continue to make use of their right to wage war in pursuit 
of whatever they judge to be self-defence, or refuse to accept the 
federation’s decision as binding, a single state’s acknowledgement of its 
obligation under the right of nations is bound to remain inefficacious. 
And yet, given that practical reason “pronounces” that “there is to be 
no war” (DoR 6:354), acting unilaterally in acknowledgement of their 
duty is all states can (and must) do. Absent a coercive global institution 
that would force states to abide by its objective standards, what Kant 
describes as a “permanent congress” of states is the only means to 
establish a procedure “for deciding their disputes in a civil way, as if by 
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a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), namely by 
war.” (DoR 6:351). Hence, the only option states are left with is to enter 
and comply with such an institution, hoping that others will follow their 
example such that their juridical self-constraint is not in vain but serves 
the “continual approximation to the highest political good, perpetual 
peace” (DoR 6:355). 
4. Juridical Self-Constraint in Cosmopolitan Right  
In the preceding section, I focused on the domain of international right 
in order to start outlining Kant’s conception of a ‘cosmopolitanism 
within one country’. On this view, the idea of a cosmopolitan 
constitution is foremost meant to depict a specific kind of domestic legal 
and institutional arrangement. My interest in this domain was sparked 
by a structural analogy I identified with cosmopolitan right. Both realms 
are deliberately placed by Kant in the section on public (rather than 
private) right as characterised by a specifically institutional kind of 
normativity. And both are presented as non-coercive kinds of rights 
relations, that is, they are not subject to publicly authoritative 
institutions. 
In the context of the right of nations, I claimed that we can make 
sense of this tension by understanding the pertinent requirements as 
immanent to states’ juridical standing. States incur obligations by virtue 
of their claim to (artificial) moral agency, which also renders them 
immune from compulsion. This is not to deny that the impossibility of 
a supra-state coercive authority with the power to regulate rights 
relations between states is not a real predicament for Kant, or to assert 
that there is a neat solution juridically speaking. Yet, in the absence of 
strict reciprocity on the international stage, voluntary entrance to a lose 
federation is the only way for sovereign powers to negotiate rights 
relations and hence to work towards a condition of peace.  
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I shall now go on to make a structurally analogous argument 
concerning the domain of cosmopolitan right. My claim is that the 
cosmopolitan context is similarly tied to juridical statehood. The 
pertinent obligations are incumbent upon states as well as those who 
claim to represent them, and institutionally implemented on the state 
level. That is to say, states are duty-bound to constrain themselves and, 
most importantly, their citizens to interact with outside individuals and 
non-state peoples on the basis of hospitality. In the absence of a global 
institution with coercive powers over the entire cosmopolitan plurality, 
juridical self-constraint is the only way in which states can initiate a 
gradual process in the course of which they may hope to learn to 
understand their stateless counterparts and ultimately find shared terms 
to get along. 
Before I go on to make good on this claim, let me briefly recall 
where Chapter 3 left us in this regard. There, I used the puzzle of non-
state peoples in order to make two claims. On the one hand, I restricted 
the scope of Kant’s duty of state entrance to those who raise property 
claims against one another. Non-state peoples lack the pertinent duty 
given that they ostensibly refrain from making such claims. On the 
other hand, state citizens’ recursive reflection on the (moral conditions 
of) possibility of unilaterally raised property claims not only yields a duty 
of state entrance towards their co-citizens, but also duties of 
cosmopolitan right against all others with whom they cannot but share 
the earth. Hence, they are duty-bound to constrain their comportment 
towards non-state peoples in acknowledgement of shared earth 
dwellership. Specifically, they must make good faith unilateral attempts 
to make contact with the other side. I shall now take up this line of 
argument and show that their rightful condition ‘back home’ not only 
accounts for Western emissaries’ cosmopolitan obligations to interact 
with distant strangers on the basis of cosmopolitan right but that it also 
constitutes the only site for implementing these obligations. 
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Contract and Coercion  
Recall, to start with, that Kant equates hospitality with a right to seek 
‘commerce’. This is supposed to be understood broadly, as a formal, 
communicative right that allows us  to “present ourselves” (DoR 6:352, 
see also Niesen & Eberl 2011, p.251) for a number of different modes 
of possible interaction including cultural, intellectual and political 
exchange (Muthu 2009, p.195). Kant is primarily interested in the 
general possibility of offering, accepting and rejecting any of these kinds 
of interaction. For present purposes, however, I want to focus on a 
narrower and in fact more traditional meaning of ‘commerce’ as 
referring specifically to economic or trade-related types of contact and 
exchange. Focusing on this aspect, which is an important though 
certainly not the only kind of cosmopolitan interaction Kant has in 
mind will allow me to make my point as clearly as possible.15  
In Chapter 3 we encountered Kant’s claim that commercial 
relations between Western settlers, traders or emissaries and non-state 
peoples ought to be of a contractual kind. On the one hand, this is no 
surprise given that Kant takes a just exchange of goods in general to 
take the form of a contract. In regulating both relocation (rightful 
residence) and fair transaction, contracts thus also regulate two essential 
aspects of global trade (Vanhaute 2014, p.136). On the other hand, 
though, it is not clear at all whether Kant is actually in a position to 
conceive of a contractual relation between Europeans and non-state 
peoples conceptually speaking. Before I go on to unpack this claim, it 
will be helpful to keep in mind Kant’s general account of contractual 
relations as laid out earlier in the Doctrine of Right: 
 
                                                
15 As Mary Gregor (DoR 6:352, remark ‘o’) observes, in the course of the section on 
cosmopolitan right Kant moves back and forth between the term Wechselwirkung, i.e., 
the abstract idea of interaction or intercourse in general (and, recall, the crucial 
concept to describe the relation of disjunctive community), and Verkehr, which he 
uses specifically in his discussion of contracts to signify exchange of property. I take 
this to confirm that cosmopolitan right should be understood to contain, but not be 
reduced to, economic forms of interaction. 
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Every contract consists in itself, that is, considered 
objectively, of two acts that establish a right, a promise and 
its acceptance. Acquisition through acceptance is not a 
part of a contract (unless the contract is a pactum re initum, 
which requires delivery) but the rightfully necessary result 
of it. – But considered subjectively - that is, as to whether 
this rationally necessary result (the acquisition that ought to 
occur) will actually result (be the natural result) - accepting 
the promise still gives me no guarantee that it will actually 
result. Since this guarantee belongs externally to the 
modality of a contract, namely certainty of acquisition by 
means of a contract, it is an additional factor serving to 
complete the means for achieving the acquisition that is 
the purpose of a contract. – For this, three persons are 
involved: a promisor, an acceptor, and a guarantor. The 
acceptor, indeed, gains nothing more with regard to the 
object by means of the guarantor and his separate 
contract with the promisor, but he still gains the means 
of coercion for obtaining what is his. (DoR 6:284) 
In Chapter 3, I drew on this passage to illustrate the sense in which, in 
the context of cosmopolitan right, reciprocal interaction is something 
we have to bring about, rather than something we simply have from the 
outset. For, as Kant explains in the passage at hand, a contractual 
interaction consists of two parts or moments (Vanhaute 2014, pp.136-
139): someone making an offer and someone else taking up or assenting 
to that offer. Only if both parties of a possible contract agree on the 
proposed exchange (of deeds or goods) are their wills ‘united’ in 
agreement. Analogously, while Western travellers are perfectly entitled 
to make offers to engage in commerce, whether the interaction actually 
comes about depends on whether the other side takes up that offer. 
Let me now investigate this idea a bit more systematically. In 
particular, let me point out that there are two perspectives from which 
we can conceive of Kant’s appeal to contractual vocabulary. On a 
general level, there is a sense in which a contract is simply a pure or 
bare form of a reciprocal interaction. For, like any rights relation (DoR 
6:230), a contractual relation is by definition one in which one party 
cannot bind the other to more than she is in turn bound by them. As 
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such, we can even think of a contract as a “prototype of rights relation” 
more generally (Flikschuh & Ajei 2014, p.232) – the form of a contract 
encapsulates a central formal feature of a rights relation, namely its 
reciprocity. 
On the other hand, though, contractual relations also have a 
more specific and technical meaning for Kant. Keep in mind that the 
passage at hand is located in the Doctrine of Right’s section on private right 
and serves to introduce the contract as one of three ‘instances’ of 
acquired right alongside property and status relations (DoR 6:260). 
Given that Kant likens a contract to a property exchange, it should  not 
come as a surprise that he takes non-state peoples – who, following my 
earlier argument, do not share in Western property practices – to be 
“ignoran[t]” (DoR 6:353) also of the kind of vocabulary that would 
allow them to enter contracts.16 How can Kant take himself to 
intelligibly conceptualise cosmopolitan interactions as contractual if 
only one side of that interaction is familiar with the relevant juridical 
concepts? 
While there is certainly a tension here, I believe we can make 
productive use of it. In particular, I think that it can be taken to confirm 
that the cosmopolitan encounter is conceived from the perspective of 
statist emissaries. From the global standpoint, they obtain the reflective 
insight that the idea of interacting on a contractual basis may be 
parochial. That is to say, it is wedded to their statist form of political 
arrangement, which is not shared by their hosts. At the same, though, 
they themselves have no other juridical categories at their avail. So all 
they are left with in order to find shared terms with non-state peoples is 
to make use of their own concepts, yet to do so with a certain epistemic 
humility. In other words, in the absence of something like a shared 
                                                
16 Kant’s requirement to interact with non-state peoples on a contractual basis was 
much ridiculed by critics of his time, who took it to offer “proof of Kant’s incapacity 
to judge of cultural-historical things”, since “primitive peoples”, according to one 
critic, “lack concepts of right, [and thus] treaties [with them] cannot be made, as 
Kant demands” (Medicus 1900; cited in Wood 1999, p.341 fn.8) 
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juridical meta-language, all they have to go on are their own terms of 
reciprocity. What they can do is to “comport themselves honourably 
towards the nomads in the only way they, the settlers, know, i.e., by offering 
to engage with the nomads on what are to settlers rightful terms“ 
(Flikschuh 2017, p.90).  
More specifically, amidst non-state peoples’ lack of 
acquaintance with the nature of contractual conventions, Europeans 
can very well tell the difference between honest attempts to propose fair 
terms of interaction, and “fraudulent” offers, for instance when it comes 
to purchasing nomadic land. This difference, I would like to suggest, is 
one between interacting with distant strangers from the global 
standpoint, and denying their earth dwellership by deceiving them 
through “specious” (DoR 6:353) appeal to contractual conventions. 
The reflexivity of the global standpoint plays a critical function here: it 
allows Western emissaries insight into the contingency of their own 
juridical concepts and leads them to reflect on their mode of 
comportment towards non-state peoples. Their offers must take a 
specific form and must remain just that: offers. 
Now, there is a third aspect of contractual relations that we 
should not lose sight of. Notice that, in the above passage, Kant argues 
that not two but actually three parties are required for a contractual 
relation: not only “promisor” and “acceptor”, but also “guarantor”. By 
ensuring that the former two deliver on what they have promised each 
other, the latter completes the contract and constitutes its juridical 
validity. We saw before that Kant takes the strictly reciprocal relation 
of individual wills (characteristic for rights relations) to be constituted by 
an omnilateral rights-pronouncing authority – no party can unilaterally 
claim juridical authority to bind the other’s will. As far as contractual 
agreements are concerned, the performance of any promised deed 
remains contingent on the respective party’s good will unless a public 
authority externally enforces the agreed terms. That is why, after all, 
Kant takes his reflections on contractual relations, together with the 
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other two instances of acquired right, to ground the need to enter the 
civil condition.  
The fact that the domain of cosmopolitan right lacks such a 
designated rights enforcing authority may be taken to cause further 
headache concerning Kant’s appeal to a contractual relation in the 
cosmopolitan encounter. After all, it seems to imply that European’s 
comportment is a matter purely of their good will. Yet, this is not the 
case: recall that while their relations with non-state peoples are bound 
to lack strict reciprocity, Western emissaries are themselves members of 
a public rightful condition. As such, they are not only juridically bound 
to interact with distant strangers from the global standpoint by 
proposing fair and equitable rather than exploitative terms when 
abroad. Their states ‘back home’ are also tasked to institutionalise these 
obligations. Hence, the sense in which Kant’s discussion of the 
cosmopolitan encounter is in fact accurately placed in the domain of 
public right is that states must implement and enforce the requisite 
obligations against their own citizens. Cosmopolitan right binds states 
to legislate the relevant provision of their own accord.  
My focus so far has been on the way in which these provisions 
are to constrain citizens’ comportment towards distant others; i.e., 
states’ obligation to enforce rightful conduct by merchants, settlers, or 
missionaries who claim to represent them. In the narrower economic 
sense, this means that they set “parameters on admissible behaviour in 
the global market” (Kleingeld 2011, p.146) and put an end to the 
“exploitative, profit-seeking practices of voyagers and the actions of the 
quasi-sovereign corporations like the imperial Indies companies” 
(Muthu 2009, p.195). More generally, states must prohibit all kinds of 
comportment of their citizens that coerces, deceives or takes advantage 
of another party abroad. They must stop them from engaging in 
“colonial adventures” of any kind (Niesen & Eberl 2011, p.266). 
That said, we should not forget that the rights and obligations of 
foreign newcomers are applicable not only to the cosmopolitan 
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encounters of state citizens abroad. Recall, from Chapter 2, that Kant 
also discusses states’ obligations towards foreign visitors on their own 
territory. In this context, he mentions the victims of a shipwreck washed 
ashore and sailors seeking refuge from a storm in a foreign harbour 
(Preparatory PP AA23:173). Both, he argues, can legitimately claim 
hospitality rights to remain on the host lands and cannot be returned to 
the sea or their homeland if this would in any way endanger them. This 
is not the kind of cosmopolitan encounter that I have been primarily 
concerned with over the preceding chapters. Nor is it the mode of cross-
community interaction that Kant himself was primarily worried about 
in formulating cosmopolitan right. Still, these cases can be taken to yield 
a second set of cosmopolitan obligations that states are bound to impose 
on themselves, towards what we would nowadays call asylum seekers 
(Benhabib 2004, pp.25-48). A cosmopolitically transformed state not 
only regulates the comportment of its citizens abroad, but also codifies 
the hospitality rights of a castaway who washes up on its shore pleading 
for food, shelter, and protection. Following the present chapter’s line of 
argument, in a world without a global public rights regime states are the 
only site for an effective legal implementation and realization of refugee 
law. 
From Free Trade to Fair Trade 
I have just argued that Kant’s domain of cosmopolitan right contains a 
set of juridical constraints that states must impose on themselves and 
their citizens with regard to their interactions with outside individuals 
and non-state peoples. That is to say, the state itself constitutes the 
institutional framework for realizing cosmopolitan right. This speaks to 
the reflexive function of the global standpoint, which is in an important 
respect a reflexive standpoint on states. 
In the last section I asked already what the point is, juridically 
speaking, of such self-constrained comportment. The idea was that a 
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loose institutional framework, albeit lacking enforcement powers, helps 
states to resolve conflicts and builds trust among them. In the absence 
of a coercive federation, their own submission to the objective standards 
set by a permanent congress is states’ only way to work towards a 
peaceful coexistence with other states. Analogously, we now need to 
answer the question what the purpose of juridical self-constraint is in 
the cosmopolitan domain. Why subjecting our own offers of commerce 
to the pertinent norms if the (possibly) ensuing interaction is bound to 
lack the strict reciprocity on which rights relations are modelled? In 
other words, what is the point of hospitality in the absence of truly public 
cosmopolitan right? 
In order to answer this question, it helps to reconstruct Kant’s 
change of mind, in the course of his political writings, away from what 
is initially an almost unbounded enthusiasm about free trade and cross-
community interaction more generally. In essays such as the Idea for a 
Universal History, Kant praises the spirit of commerce as driving human 
development. The thought is that commercial relations are a specific 
sort of social relation that naturally grows with the development of our 
natural predisposition’ to “unsocial sociability” (ungesellige Geselligkeit). In 
so doing, it cultivates moral predispositions that will progressively bring 
about the enlightenment of political institutions (IUH 8:27–8). 
Combining this narrative with a hierarchical account of human races 
and a stadial theory of human history that culminates in the supposedly 
superior age of commercial society (as laid out in the Conjectural 
Beginnings), the early Kant joins contemporaries such as Vitoria and 
Pufendorf in celebrating the civilizing effects of global commerce. 
The mature Kant, in contrast, is much more ambivalent about 
the merits of free trade and hesitant to unconditionally welcome it (e.g. 
Muthu 2009, pp.186-200). In the course of the 1790s, Kant started to 
recognise the negative effects of the unregulated commercial expansion 
of Western states that earlier essays had been silent on: trade relations 
between foreign merchants and indigenous peoples in particular might 
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very well be harmful and exploitative rather than fair and mutually 
advantageous (Vanhaute 2014, p.134). That is not to say that he does 
not continue to believe that commerce can play an important and 
productive role in establishing peace among all participants in the 
disjunctive global community. He simply does not take this to be the 
case automatically or unconditionally any more. Attempts to seek 
commerce with strangers can be productive under the condition that they 
take a specific form. In order to yield this effect trade requires regulation 
that prevents malpractice. Kant thus becomes interested in “fair trade” 
rather than “free trade” (Kleingeld 2011, p.137),17 i.e., the limits and 
norms of engaging in cross-community interaction with distant others. 
In a nutshell, trade and commerce have to proceed against the 
background of (cosmopolitan) right in order to have the intended 
productive effects. 
Of course, in the absence of a supra-national authority with the 
coercive powers to enforce commercial contracts – to act as their 
‘guarantor’ – there can be no assurance that cosmopolitan interactions 
proceed on equitable, that is reciprocal and mutually beneficial terms 
(Vanhaute 2014, p.134). That is not to say, however, that fair 
transactions may not very well take place. They are simply contingent 
on whether the parties involved offer (what they take to be) fair terms of 
cooperation. In the absence of international institutions administering 
cosmopolitan right, some transactions will be of mutual advantage, 
while others are likely to be unfair, abusive and exploitative. Against 
this background, the effects of commerce – whether it facilitates peace 
rather than conflict, repression and war – depends on states’ willingness 
to constrain their own citizens’ activities abroad. 
Kant’s hope is that, initially, successful instances of voluntary 
and mutually beneficial commerce increase the interdependence 
among participants and unites them in common interest. In the course 
                                                
17 Samuel Fleischacker (1996), in contrast, reads Kant basically as a free trade 
apologist. 
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of time it may even “yield some modicum of mutual understanding” 
(Muthu 2014, p.90). As he puts it in Perpetual Peace, it may bring strangers 
“into understanding, community, and peaceable relations with one 
another, even with the most distant” (PP: 8:368). Regular and peaceful 
contact changes the way people see each other, and leaves them more 
inclined to pursue peaceful negotiation (rather than war and aggression) 
where tensions emerge. Ultimately, there is no guarantee that we will 
arrive at a shared basis for interacting with non-state peoples. Yet, by 
proposing (what we take to be) fair or reciprocal terms we at least show 
our willingness to find them. 
If we look beyond the narrow domain of economic interaction 
and think of “commerce” as a broader communicative engagement, we 
can identify a similar dynamic. Niesen and Eberl (2011, pp.257/8; see 
also Bohman 1996) argue that cosmopolitan interaction can contribute 
to the emergence of something like a global public sphere in which 
violations of hospitality can be communicated and publicised. This 
creates a situation in which an injustice committed “on one place of the 
earth is felt in all (PP 8:360). For instance, the misdeeds and atrocities 
of colonisers abroad reach those ‘back home’ and create moral outrage. 
The thought is, again, that any form of mutual understanding among 
the plurality of participants in disjunctive community starts with 
communicative offers.  
Yet, the prospect of what may ultimately lead to something like 
a shared juridical vocabulary should not tempt us to look for an easy 
way out of the predicament that undeniably consists in the non-coercive 
nature of both domains of right beyond the state. In his discussion of 
cosmopolitan right, Kant warns that  
Someone may reply that such scruples about using force 
in the beginning, in order to establish a lawful condition, 
might well mean that the whole earth would still be in a 
lawless condition; but this consideration can no more 
annul that condition of right than can the pretext of 
revolutionaries within a state, that when constitutions 
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are bad it is up to the people to reshape them by force 
and to be unjust once and for all so that afterwards they 
can establish justice all the more securely and make it 
flourish. (DoR 6:353) 
In the domestic context, Kant seems to suggest here, the revolutionary 
looks for a quick fix: rather than going the painstaking way of gradually 
reforming the legal order in line with its own underlying principles,18 
she is after a violent shortcut. In doing so, Kant thinks, she destroys the 
prospect of a just order altogether. Similarly, colonizers on a “civilizing” 
mission hope for neat solutions where there are none to be had. On 
their view, the quickest way to establish rights relations with non-state 
peoples is to force them into the state or some other kind of shared 
coercive institution. Yet in so doing, they undermine the possibility of 
peaceful cosmopolitan interaction altogether. Finding terms on which 
such interaction can take place is a daunting process, one in the course 
of which statist and stateless peoples gradually learn from each other’s 
ways and slowly begin to communicate and interact on reciprocal 
terms. Our cautious, peaceful offers of interaction are only a first step 
intended to initiate such a process. Ideally, what they get off the ground 
is a dynamic in the course of which strangers who each acknowledge 
their ignorance of one another’s ways get to know and mutually 
understand each other. While this will never allow us to overcome the 
problem of ‘absent’ strict (cum coercive) reciprocity, it is the only way for 
us to acknowledge shared earth dwellership. 
Conclusion  
In developing a ‘cosmopolitanism within one country’ for a 
contemporary context, Niesen and Owen (2014) are motivated by their 
                                                
18 I look more closely at Kant’s reformist account of political progress in the 
subsequent chapter. 
  194 
impression that the current intellectual climate is too heavily focused on 
overarching supranational collectivities, constitutions and governments 
and thus on ways of transcending the modern state. This, they argue, 
has (lamentably) directed our attention away from proposals that 
emphasise transformative potentials that inhere it. Only once we stop 
restricting our theoretical horizon exclusively to models of a post-
national order will we be able to envision ways of transforming our 
world of states (and the pertinent ideals of membership and belonging) 
in a cosmopolitan direction. The same could be said of the interpretive 
orthodoxy concerning Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which is to read the 
tripartite system of rights relations as laying out an institutional 
framework for a global constitutional order. 
In the context of their own conception, Niesen and Owen 
understandably put much emphasis on opening up states to outside 
influence. Their specific proposals reach from policies that extend 
membership and participatory rights to foreigners, to far-reaching 
rights of migration and movement. The reason that these aspects (with 
the possible exception of a legally enshrined right to asylum) remain 
underexposed in Kant’s own account is that his worries concerning 
cross-community interaction are simply different to ours: for him, 
Western states surface mostly as would-be colonizers that travel the 
world with the intention of spreading their statist political 
arrangements, rather than being on the receiving end of migration 
flows. This explains why Kant is keen to formulate his hospitality right 
with extreme caution and with the primary intention of restricting the 
rightful claims of visitors.  
In reconstructing Kant’s own version of a ‘cosmopolitanism 
within one country’, my focus was similarly on the obligations of those 
arriving at the shores of distant strangers rather than their rightful 
entitlements. For my aim was to make headway on the encounter 
between European travellers and non-state peoples that has caused us 
so much headache over preceding chapters. Developing a structural 
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analogy to the right of nations, I argued that we should understand both 
domains of right beyond the state as laying out a set of norms that states 
are duty-bound to impose on themselves and their citizens in their 
interactions with other states and non-state groups. While juridically 
self-constrained comportment leaves us without the strict kind of 
reciprocity that only coercive institutions would be in a position to 
constitute, it is the only means by which states and those who claim to 
represent them can hope to find peaceable terms of interaction with 
other states and non-state peoples. 
In the larger context of this thesis, in the course of which I have 
attempted to lead us away from the state context (and for that matter, 
the property argument), this chapter’s argument implies a return to the 
state. But that is not to say that we are back to where we started. For, 
what I sketched was the idea of a cosmopolitically transformed state. Such 
a state acknowledges obligations of international and cosmopolitan 
right: it binds itself to interact with other states on peaceful terms and 
binds its citizens to do so with distant strangers. As I will go on to show 
in the subsequent chapter, this allows us to reconceive Kant’s notion of 
cosmopolitan progress as a process in the course of which states 
gradually approach to their own underlying cosmopolitan principles.
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Chapter 6 
Progress without Teleology   
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that the state is the primary site for 
institutionalising international and cosmopolitan right. Given that, in 
the Doctrine of Right, Kant takes the idea of a supranational coercive 
institution to be conceptually inconceivable, the obligation to interact 
with other earth dwellers from the global standpoint is not only 
predicated on but must also be legally implemented within existing 
states. Rather than a public global order, Kant’s mature 
cosmopolitanism is thus geared towards a world of radically reformed 
states that bind themselves to rightful comportment towards other states 
and non-state peoples of their own accord. To take up the global 
standpoint from within states is to transform them into cosmopolitan 
agents. 
The present chapter shows how this insight provides us with a 
novel perspective on Kant’s account of cosmopolitan progress, which is 
conceptualised (both in Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right) as 
progress toward ‘perpetual peace’. I shall argue that perpetual peace – 
a condition in which each of the three levels of rights relations is fully in 
line with its own regulative standard – functions as an idea of reason 
that arises as a corollary of our obligation to take up the global 
standpoint. Insofar as we act on our own duty to transform states in line 
with cosmopolitan principles, we are warranted to adopt a practical 
belief that other states will act likewise and that non-state peoples accept 
our offers for commerce, such that we can gradually approach a 
condition of peace. Our practical belief in the attainability of the “entire 
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final end of the doctrine of right” (DoR 6:355) serves to orientate our 
cosmopolitan activity from the global standpoint. 
At the heart of my defence of this proposed reading will be 
Kant’s structural analogy between the idea of perpetual peace – the 
“highest political good” (DoR 6:355) – and the notion of the highest 
good familiar from his ethics, that is happiness in proportion to virtue. 
In both cases, an obligation to set what appear to be unattainable ends 
threatens to undermine our moral agency. On the one hand, our pursuit 
of the highest ethical good – cultivation of moral disposition as well as 
its synthesis with happiness – thus requires a belief in our own 
immortality and God’s helping hand (the postulates of pure practical 
reason). On the other hand, the belief in the possibility of perpetual 
peace, which presupposes that other agents reciprocate our offers for 
peaceable interaction, allows us to work towards the transformation of 
our own domestic arrangements without a sense of moral despair. Just 
as the postulates provide a regulative basis for ethical progress, so does 
belief in the attainability of a justly ordered world provide a regulative 
basis for political action. 
The argument unfolds as follows: I start, in Section 1, by 
reconstructing Kant’s shift away from a teleological, process-oriented 
conception of cosmopolitan progress (in Perpetual Peace) to an agent-
oriented practical belief in the attainability of perpetual peace that is 
more akin to the doctrine of ‘postulates’ (in the Doctrine of Right). Section 
2 embeds this discussion in Kant’s wider account of political progress. 
To that effect, I introduce a distinction between constitutive and regulative 
levels of analysis in Kant’s politics. These levels concern, respectively, 
the very nature of a rightful condition – what constitutes it – and the 
regulative standard with which we must bring it into increasing 
conformity. This allows us to conceive of political progress as a process 
in which we reform an existing institution, such that it gradually 
approaches its own underlying norm. In Section 3, I return to the 
context of progress towards perpetual peace. While cosmopolitan 
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progress takes place primarily within the framework of established 
statehood, finite agents can only invest the requisite efforts if they have 
(practical) reasons to belief that those are not in vain. Our duty to 
transform states into cosmopolitan agents thus licenses us to reasonably 
hope that a condition of peace among the entire cosmopolitan plurality 
is attainable. However, the structural analogy between the two kinds of 
highest goods (and the respective practical attitudes they license) should 
not lead us to lose sight of their important differences. In particular, the 
pursuit of perpetual peace neither requires God’s assistance nor fully 
virtuous individuals with a ‘holy will’. 
1. Progress without Teleology  
In both Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right, Kant conceptualises 
cosmopolitan progress as progress towards a condition of ‘perpetual 
peace’. My focus in this chapter shall be specifically on the Doctrine of 
Right, where Kant drops the earlier teleological language in favour of an 
appeal to practical belief in the attainability of perpetual peace that is 
more akin to his ethical doctrine of the ‘postulates’. I will nevertheless 
start this section with a brief discussion of the much contested 
‘guarantee’ passage. This will allow us to see where Kant’s argument in 
the Doctrine of Right is continuous with the teleological framework of 
Perpetual Peace and where he departs from it.  
The Guarantee of Perpetual Peace   
The ‘guarantee’ of perpetual peace (PP 8:360) – i.e., the claim that 
nature “wills” perpetual peace to come about irrespective of human 
efforts – is generally considered to be the authoritative passage when it 
comes to Kant’s view on cosmopolitan progress; it contains what is 
arguably one of the most contested puzzles of his political philosophy as 
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a whole. Imitating the formal structure of a peace treaty, the essay’s 
main part consists of a number of “preliminary” and “definitive” 
articles outlining the institutional conditions necessary to bring about 
peace (PP 8:349-360). The prescribed institutional arrangement, on 
which I focused in the preceding chapter, in turn derives from a more 
fundamental duty, which “reason itself prescribes” (PP 8:310/11), to 
work towards the establishment of a condition that puts an end to war 
and discord – perpetual peace. Against this background, Kant’s claim, 
tucked away in the first of two “supplements” to the essay, comes as a 
bit of a surprise: 
What affords this guarantee (surety) is nothing less than the 
great artist nature […] from whose mechanical course 
purposiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise 
by means of the discord between human beings even 
against their will […]. (PP 8:360) 
Kant’s stunning claim, it seems, is that nature – the totality of 
observable events – guarantees that peace will come about, whether we 
will it or not. Nature has not only created the (empirical) circumstances 
that require a peaceful order in the first place – for instance, by causing 
individuals to disperse “even into the most inhospitable regions” (PP 
8:363) of the planet – it actually “affords the guarantee that what man 
ought to do in accordance with laws of freedom but does not do, it is 
assured that he will do, without prejudice to his freedom, even by a 
constraint of nature” (PP 8:365).  
Echoing the essay’s formal resemblance to a peace treaty, Kant 
argues that nature acts in analogy to a ‘guarantor’ power that enforces 
peace treaties should one of the parties fail to comply (Niesen & Eberl 
2011, p.267). Invoking strongly teleological language, he insists that 
“nature wills irresistibly that right should eventually gain supremacy” 
(PP 8:367) and specifies unequivocally that “when I say of nature, it wills 
that this or that happen, this does not mean, it lays upon us a duty to do 
it (for only practical reason, without coercion, can do that) but rather 
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that nature itself does it, whether we will it or not” (PP 8:365).  
How to reconcile this appeal to nature with the argument from 
duty has been the subject of sustained dispute among interpreters (e.g. 
Ludwig 1997; Kleingeld 1995, pp.62-67). Surely, if nature can and will 
achieve the pertinent task even against individuals’ wills, then whether 
or not agents acknowledge any duties on their part makes no difference. 
Conversely, if individuals do act on their obligations, what job is there 
left to do for nature? Traditionally, interpreters thus worried that Kant’s 
teleological account of human history threatens the normative 
dimension of his politics by precluding meaningful action. As just 
mentioned, speaking to this worry is not my primary aim in this chapter. 
For in the Doctrine of Right Kant drops the pertinent teleology altogether. 
Nevertheless, understanding what is going on in the ‘guarantee’ passage 
will help us to appreciate that the problem Kant’s conception of 
cosmopolitan progress is intended solve – and hence its point and 
purpose –  nevertheless remains continuous across the two works. 
A traditionally prominent interpretation of the ‘guarantee’ 
passage takes Kant to be engaged in a kind of proto-Hegelian 
reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason (most famously Yovel 
1980).1 Unsurprisingly, Kant’s supposed attempt to offer a narrative of 
freedom’s historical self-realisation is then diagnosed as a failure: he 
simply lacks the relevant metaphysical concepts required to tell the 
Hegelian tale. Of course, anyone familiar with Kant’s wider 
philosophical outlook – in particular, with the epistemological and 
metaphysical limits (self-)imposed by the framework of critical 
philosophy – should in any case be sceptical of such a reading: Kant’s 
systematic division between nature and freedom makes it impossible 
from the outset to get a moral argument out of nature. And indeed, 
immediately after introducing the guarantee, Kant goes on to argue: 
                                                
1 This interpretation also reverberates with a more general reading of Kant’s politics 
as a domain in which self-interest trumps morality (e.g. Höffe 1992). On this view, 
the political teleology confirms the unavailability of a genuinely moral justification of 
juridical obligation – nature does what humans cannot bring themselves to do. 
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nature, regarded as necessitation by a cause the laws of 
whose operation are unknown to us, is called fate, but if 
we consider its purposiveness in the course of the world 
as the profound wisdom of a higher cause directed to the 
objective final end of the human race and 
predetermining this course of the world, it is called 
providence which we do not, strictly speaking, cognize in 
these artifices of nature or even so much as infer from 
them but instead (as in all relations of the form of things 
to ends in general) only can and must add it in thought, in 
order to make for ourselves a concept of their possibility 
by analogy with actions of human art; but the 
representation of their relation to and harmony with the 
end that reason prescribes immediately to us (the moral 
end) is an idea, which is indeed transcendent for theoretical 
purposes but for practical purposes (e.g., with respect to 
the concept of the duty of perpetual peace and putting that 
mechanism of nature to use for it) is dogmatic and well 
founded as to its reality. (PP 8:361/2) 
Let me point out two interesting features of this passage, which indicate 
that Kant does not really intend to juxtapose the arguments from duty 
and nature, but instead suggests an intrinsic connection between the 
two. First, we get a distinction between “fate” and “providence” as two 
standpoints we can take on human nature and history. The former is 
equated with a deterministic and thus ultimately fatalistic perspective 
from which we observe cause-and-effect relations in the world, while 
remaining ignorant both of their ultimate cause and their final end. The 
providential perspective by contrast, which Kant vindicates with regard 
to the guarantee, evaluates history from its presumed purposiveness.2 
The idea of a higher cause, that is to say, is nothing we can observe. 
Rather, it is “add[ed] in thought”, i.e. employed for regulative (not 
constitutive) purposes. We judge nature as though it was purposive. 
Second, Kant argues that the guarantee is concerned with a 
specific practical purpose, namely “its relation to and harmony with the 
                                                
2 Kant emphasises that we should think of nature only, as it were, in analogy with 
providence, a term whose literal meaning should remain restricted to religious 
inquiry. Ultimately, he thus advocates that we stick to the term “nature” (PP 8:362). 
On the relation between nature and providence, see Kleingeld (2001). 
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end that reason prescribes immediately to us (the moral end)”. That 
which permits us to read nature as guaranteeing perpetual peace is our 
own moral duty to bring it about. Nature’s seemingly purposeful and 
unavoidable trajectory towards perpetual peace is nothing we “cognize” 
in the sense in which we observe law-like regularities in time and space, 
instead we “infer” it from a practical standpoint.3 This preliminary 
analysis of the pertinent passage is confirmed a little further on in the 
text, when Kant claims that nature guarantees perpetual peace “with 
an assurance that is admittedly not adequate for predicting its future 
(theoretically) but that is still enough for practical purposes and makes 
it a duty to work toward this (not merely chimerical) end” (PP 8:368). 
So the appeal to nature’s assistance does not actually constitute 
a dogmatic lapse into an eschatological philosophy of history. Rather, 
we need to understand the guarantee from the perspective of practical 
rather than theoretical reason – the standpoint of the moral agent, not 
that of the third-personal observer. This allows us to read it as 
complementing rather than subverting the agential strand of Kant’s 
political philosophy. Individual agents are not only indispensable 
contributors on the path to perpetual peace, the postulated progress 
indeed arises from their consciousness of the pertinent duty.  
I have mentioned that the Doctrine of Right gives up on any appeal 
to nature’s assistance. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the 
concern that motivates Kant to help himself, in the context of Perpetual 
Peace, to teleological language in the first place remains the same. The 
problem is that we do not know whether attaining the final 
cosmopolitan end – perpetual peace – is actually within finite human 
capacities. Hence, in order to be able to pursue and gradually 
                                                
3 The kind of cognition Kant precludes here is theoretical cognition (through 
representation of empirical objects), which does not rule out that the providential 
perspective provides us with a form of practical cognition of the course of nature. The 
difference between theoretical and practical cognition (or, relatedly, between 
cognition [Erkenntnis] and knowledge [Wissen]) has lately become subject to 
increasing scholarly debate, see e.g Kain (2010), Watkins and Willaschek (2017). 
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approximate it (thus fulfilling our duty), we are warranted to adopt a 
strong kind of practical attitude (here: belief in nature’s assistance). Yet, 
while the problem to which the teleology is meant to provide a solution 
remains, Kant changes his proposed solution to it and hence the way he 
conceptualises cosmopolitan progress. 
The Highest Political Good  
According to most interpreters, unlike Perpetual Peace the Doctrine of Right 
is notable precisely for its absence of teleological language and any talk 
about nature’s (or even divine) assistance (e.g. Flikschuh 2000; Ripstein 
2009; Byrd & Hruschka 2010). That is not to say, however, that the 
problem of cosmopolitan progress is not of concern to Kant. At the very 
end of the Doctrine of Right (DoR 6:354/5), in a “Conclusion [Beschluss]” 
attached to the final section on cosmopolitan right, we do get a set of 
claims that provide a reconceived take on a problem very similar to that 
which had led Kant, in Perpetual Peace, to evoke nature’s assistance. 
In the relevant passage, Kant effectively starts by repeating his 
argument for practical belief. The thought, familiar from the doctrine 
of ‘postulates’ in his ethics, is that a particularly strong kind of epistemic 
attitude can be warranted on purely practical grounds – that is, because 
of some end we have to set for ourselves – rather than objective evidence 
(DoR 6:354): 
If someone cannot prove that a thing is, he can try to 
prove that it is not. If (as often happens) he cannot 
succeed in either, he can still ask whether he has any 
interest in assuming one or the other (as a hypothesis), 
either from a theoretical or from a practical point of view 
[…] An assumption is adopted from a practical point of 
view in order to achieve a certain end […]. What is 
incumbent upon us as a duty is […] to act in conformity 
with the idea of that end, even if there is not the slightest 
theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its 
impossibility cannot be demonstrated either.  
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He then goes on to link this idea to the cosmopolitan context, 
characterising perpetual peace as an item of practical belief:  
So the question is no longer whether perpetual peace is 
something real or a fiction, and whether we are not 
deceiving ourselves in our theoretical judgment when we 
assume that it is real. Instead, we must act as if it is 
something real, though perhaps it is not; we must work 
toward establishing perpetual peace and the kind of 
constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (say, a 
republicanism of all states, together and separately) in 
order to bring about perpetual peace and put an end to 
the heinous waging of war […]. And even if the complete 
realization of this objective always remains a pious wish, 
still we are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting 
the maxim of working incessantly toward it. 
Finally, Kant invokes yet another concept familiar from his ethics, that 
of the highest good:  
It can be said that establishing universal and lasting 
peace constitutes not merely a part of the doctrine of 
right but rather the entire final end of the doctrine of 
right within the limits of mere reason; […] The attempt 
to realize this idea should not be made by way of 
revolution, by a leap, that is, by violent overthrow of an 
already existing defective constitution (for there would 
then be an intervening moment in which any rightful 
condition would be annihilated). But if it is attempted 
and carried out by gradual reform in accordance with 
firm principles, it can lead to continual approximation to 
the highest political good, perpetual peace.  
It is worth quoting these passages at length as they contain significant 
textual evidence that will turn out to be crucial as we go along. At least 
the problem Kant is concerned with appears to remain broadly 
continuous with Perpetual Peace: how the adoption of a certain practical 
attitude is rationally warranted (and necessary) for finite agents to fulfil 
their duty to gradually work towards an end (perpetual peace) the 
attainability of which they cannot be certain about.  
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That said, the way Kant conceptualises this practical attitude – 
and hence cosmopolitan progress – changes significantly. Notice the 
striking absence of any appeal to the will of nature in the pertinent 
passage. The teleological language that dominated the ‘guarantee’ 
passage has completely disappeared. By invoking the doctrine of 
postulates from his ethics, Kant replaces the assistance of nature or 
providence with a more general attitude of belief in the attainability of 
our ends. Of course, there is no actual mention of the ethical postulates 
– God’s existence and our own immortality – here. This should remind 
us that, as we go on to explore the analogy he invokes in this passage, 
we need to retain an acute awareness also of its limits. We must avoid 
losing sight of what it is that distinguishes the respective “highest goods” 
in ethics and politics as well as the requisite practical attitudes.  
But for now, let us focus on the shift in Kant’s conceptualization 
of cosmopolitan progress. I would like to suggest that we can think of it 
as one from a ‘process-focused’ to an ‘agent-focused’ practical attitude. 
The former asks how to get from A to B, the latter asks how we can do 
what we ought to do, that is, take up the global standpoint. While I do 
not have the space here to explore this idea further, it seems plausible 
to read this change as related to the preceding chapter’s shift from a 
transitional dynamic of overcoming sovereign statehood with the help 
of nature (in Perpetual Peace), towards our duty to transform states from 
within (in the Doctrine of Right). For, the practical belief in the attainability 
of perpetual peace does not commit us to read history as an end-
directed, purposive process but to the realisability of our ends. One 
important implication of this shift is a weakened assertability condition: 
while a teleology claims to find evidence of actually occurring progress 
in history,4 a practical belief claims not to need such evidence, given 
that ought implies can. We are licensed to assert the attainability of the 
                                                
4 Along these lines, Kant’s endorsement of the French revolution – which seems in 
tension with his prohibitive stance on any resistance against authority across other 
works –  is often interpreted as being supposed to be read in support of the 
assumption that mankind is actually on a route of “endless progress” (CF 7:85). 
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proposed end as long as its impossibility “cannot be demonstrated 
either” (DoR 6:354).5 We do not need to find signs of actual progress as 
long as its mere possibility cannot be ruled out. 
2. The Possibility of Political Progress 
What I have done so far is reconstruct a change in the way Kant 
conceptualises cosmopolitan progress. In the Doctrine of Right, he drops 
the earlier teleological language in favour of an argument for practical 
belief akin to the one he vindicates with regard to the ‘postulates’ we 
know from his ethics. This, of course, leaves open the question why 
Kant takes such an assent to be essential for our ability to gradually 
work towards perpetual peace in the first place. I take it that in order to 
answer this further question, we need to leave the cosmopolitan context 
behind for a moment and turn to the Doctrine of Right’s more general 
account of political progress. 
Notice that it is not only the systematic place of political progress 
in Kant’s philosophy of right that raises questions, but its very 
conceptual possibility. For, the very idea that the ‘final end’ of politics 
is something we must gradually work towards yet can at most 
approximate by degree is at least in tension with the importance Kant 
attaches to our entrance into a rightful condition. The latter is presented 
as a ‘binary’ matter: a rightful condition is something we do or do not 
have, rather than something that pertains to a greater or lesser extent. This 
idea sits uneasily with anything like a gradual, developmental process 
the final end of which can only be approached asymptotically (such that 
its pursuit would require practical assurance). 
Let me briefly introduce an example that brings this puzzle to 
the foreground in a particularly clear way. In her recent take on the 
                                                
5 Willaschek (2010) calls this a “theoretical undecidability” condition on a practical 
belief’s warrant. 
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Doctrine of Right, Elisabeth Ellis (2005) laments that in construing the 
relationship between state of nature and civil condition, Kant “makes 
two arguments simultaneously” that “do not fit together very well” (Ellis 
2005, p.126): on the one hand, there is “the requirement to exit the state 
of nature based solely on the need for a common judge of the right” 
(Ellis 2005, p.126). According to this strand of Kant’s argument, the 
only difference between the state of nature and the civil condition is that 
in the latter there is a central authority or judge “with the ability 
coercively to enforce common judgment” (Ellis 2005, p.126). On other 
hand, Ellis speaks of a requirement to transition “not merely to an 
orderly state but to republican governance” (Ellis 2005, p.126), focusing 
on the a priori elements of a just as opposed to simply a determinate 
exercise of juridical authority.  
Ellis considers the relation between these two arguments 
“obscure” and “confused” (Ellis 2005, p.126). Her own strategy is 
ultimately to collapse them into one by suggesting that Kant envisions 
a single, “extremely long” (Ellis 2005, p.114) gradual transition from the 
state of nature to the rule of law as instantiated only in the perfect 
republic. The notion of “provisional right” plays a central role within 
this narrative. It is said to be applicable both in the state of nature and 
within “faulty” (Ellis 2005, p.133) states that mirror their own 
normative principles imperfectly. Notice, furthermore, that her attempt 
to make Kant’s entire political project conform to a single normative 
logic of freely willed action eliminates the need for a practical assurance 
of the kind that we identified specifically in Kant’s account of 
cosmopolitan progress. On her view, the strong propositional attitudes 
invoked both in Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right constitute 
incoherent and implausible metaphysical baggage that Kant’s political 
philosophy should rather be “freed of” (Ellis 2005, p.42) for the sake of 
epistemic and normative coherence. 
My primary intention here is not to assess the merits of Ellis’s 
interpretive framework in particular. Rather, I would like to argue that 
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the confusion she diagnoses is due to a more general (and, in fact, 
widespread) misconstrual of Kant’s account of political progress. In 
particular, Ellis overlooks a crucial distinction between two distinct 
levels of analysis in Kant’s politics – constitutive and regulative – with 
distinct sets of norms that prescribe the creation and the perfection of a legal 
order respectively. My aim in this section is to show that Kant’s account 
of political progress is located on the second, regulative level and thus 
takes place within the constitutive framework of an established civil 
condition. This insight will provide us with a better grasp of the 
conceptual status of the practical belief in perpetual peace once we 
return to the cosmopolitan context.  
Constituting and Regulating Rational Activities  
Before I turn specifically to Kant’s political philosophy, notice that the 
contrast between constitutive and regulative principles, norms, or 
judgments plays an important role across different contexts in his 
philosophy (cf. Hanna 2016).6 The definition that I shall make use of 
operates on the most general level: it is one between norms or principles 
that constitute a rational activity, and norms internal to that activity that 
guide or regulate it. In Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the distinction I have 
in mind serves to separate the faculty of the understanding with its 
constitutive categories from the faculty of reason with its regulative 
(transcendental) ideas (CPR A642/B670ff., Friedman 1991; Buchdahl 
1992, pp.167-192). While the pure concepts of the understanding are 
constitutive of the objects and hence the possibility of experience, reason 
regulates it by giving us concepts of objects (representing the world as a 
“whole”) that, albeit without possible instantiation in experience, allow 
us to approach the final end of our empirical inquiry, the complete 
                                                
6 I do not have the space here to explore how this distinction relates to the 
apparently closely related (though not equivalent) contrast – first mentioned in the 
third Critique (CJ 20:211) – between determining and reflective judgments. 
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systematic unity of experience (see also CPR A180/B 223).7 Given that 
I have touched upon the underlying rationale for this argument in 
Chapter 4, I will not go into it any further at this point. 
In the present context, the ethical domain is of more immediate 
relevance to us. There, the contrast is one between the categorical 
imperative as constitutive of moral agency, and the highest good as the 
principle regulating our actions in accordance with the categorical 
imperative.8 This set of arguments is significant to us given that, as we 
have seen, Kant explicitly invokes some of the pertinent concepts in the 
relevant passage of the Doctrine of Right. It will be vital to explore the 
analogy he thus proposes as we go on to make sense of Kant’s notion of 
cosmopolitan progress. 
So let me briefly sketch the ethical argument, which is developed 
most systematically in the second Critique. It proceeds with the 
constitutive principle of moral agency, the categorical imperative, 
already in place. The problem is that, as finite agents, we are necessarily 
concerned with our happiness, i.e., the satisfaction of all our inclinations 
and desires (CrPrR 5:124). In other words, we cannot repudiate our 
hope for happiness even though morality seems often to demand that 
we do. The absolute end of practical reason (underlying all other ends) 
must hence not only include the object of pure practical reason – virtue 
(which Kant calls the “supreme end”) – but also that of empirical 
practical reason – happiness.  
                                                
7 Another way to make sense of this distinction in the first Critique (that I will not 
discuss here) is as one within the faculty of understanding, between the constitutive 
“mathematical” principles of pure understanding, and the regulative “dynamical” 
principles of pure understanding (CPR A178–181/B220–224, see also Banham 
2013). 
8 It is indicative that Korsgaard, who takes Kant’s ethics to be primarily concerned 
with agency (or willing) rather than moral agency (or pure willing), construes this 
distinction differently: on her view (2008b, pp.7-10) a proper understanding of what 
it means to act will give us the regulative norm (the categorical imperative) internal to 
it, that is how to act. A good will is one that is in full conformity with the standard 
appropriate to the assessment of a will. Characteristically, this pushes Kant’s 
practical metaphysics out of the picture. 
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Hence, we are led to the idea of the highest good – a world in 
which “happiness [is] distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the 
worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy)” (CrPrR 5:110-111) 
– because acting from duty seems often to come at the price of our 
happiness.9 If the wicked would always thrive while the virtuous bear 
misery, we would be left with a profound sense of practical absurdity 
and incoherence in the performance of our moral duties. In other 
words, if the highest good turned out to be a mere “phantom of the 
mind” (CrPrR 5:472 see also 5:114), the moral law itself would be in 
peril. Given that we cannot but hope for happiness in proportion to 
virtue, we cannot but adopt the highest good as an end. 
Now, Kant also thinks that, as a matter of practical consistency, 
we can only set something as an end if we take it to be in principle 
attainable. Humans can only strive for ends they deem genuinely 
possible – ought implies can (e.g. CPR A806/B834; CrPrR 5:125, 471). 
This is problematic, given that the highest good appears to be a plainly 
unattainable end for us: even if we could (per impossibile) become perfectly 
virtuous – acquire a ‘holy will’ –  within our lifetime and see to it that 
everyone else similarly always acts on the moral law, it still remains 
beyond our power to bring about the required harmony between virtue 
and happiness. Kant thus introduces God’s existence and our own 
immortality as the “postulates” of pure practical reason (CrPrR 5:107-
148, Wood 1970, pp.100-154; Guyer 2000, pp.333-371). On the one 
hand, our own immortality makes possible a continual progress toward 
complete conformity of our dispositions with the moral law, which 
begins in this life and extends into infinity (CrPrR 5:122). On the other 
hand, only a supreme “cause of all nature, distinct from nature” (CrPrR 
5:125) – God – is capable of synthesising virtue and happiness (the 
former being the ground of the latter), that is, ensuring the precise and 
                                                
9 While the concept of the highest good receives its most detailed and systematic 
treatment in the second Critique, there are already traces of it in the Canon and the 
Dialectic of the first Critique (as the concept of a “moral world”, e.g. A808/B836). 
For an elucidating recent discussion of the highest good in Kant, see Bader (2015). 
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necessary connection between these two qualitatively different 
elements.10  
Kant’s claim is not that God does exist or that our souls are 
immortal. Rather, we may employ these “ideas of reason” (to which no 
corresponding object can be given in sense experience) as aids for our 
practical cognition. The appropriate epistemic attitude towards the 
postulates is not one of knowledge but of “practical belief” (Stevenson 
2003; Chignell 2007a; Willaschek 2010) – a highly confident, 
“assertoric” (Logic 9:66) kind of holding-true, yet one that is not deemed 
to have a determinate relation to objects in the world. Our belief in the 
postulates has the distinctly practical ground of allowing us to promote 
the highest good as an end and thus ultimately to make sense of our 
vocation as agents under the demands of the moral law.11 While the 
postulates are mere ideas the “possibility of which no human 
understanding will ever fathom“ (CrPrR 5:132), acting on the basis of a 
belief that their objects exist allows us hope that our moral efforts may 
eventually be rewarded and hence to conceive of the highest good as a 
possible end of our will that we can actively approach. 
Much more could be said both about Kant’s notion of the 
highest (ethical) good and the postulates as items of practical belief 
allowing us to promote it by assuring us that our efforts will not be in 
vain. Here, I want to focus on the way in which the argument reflects 
the distinction between constitutive and regulative levels. The thought 
is that for finite rational beings like us the very idea of what constitutes 
moral agency – acting from maxims that accord with the categorical 
imperative –  leads to a regulative principle that guides it, the highest 
                                                
10 I bracket the third postulate of pure practical reason – the reality of our own 
(transcendental) freedom – given that it plays a special role for Kant that I cannot go 
into here. The causality of human reason is a basic presupposition of being bound by 
the moral law in the first place and thus of moral agency tout court, for without 
freedom we would be merely part of mechanistically ordered nature (CrPrR 5:29). 
11 On the wider notion of the primacy of practical reason (CrPrR 5:119-121) which 
underlies Kant’s affirmation of the practical as an independent source of validity for 
theoretical claims, see Gardner (2006) and Willaschek (2010). 
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good. What gives rise to the regulative level is a particular feature of the 
categorical imperative, namely its unconditional nature. It requires us 
to discount, in acting morally, that which as finite agents we cannot 
ultimately discount: our desire for happiness. The implication is that 
although the constitutive level is characterised by a binary logic (every 
particular act either accords with the categorical imperative, or it does 
not), it leads to the regulative idea of a gradual process towards a world 
in which all more specific ends are unified.  
Given that approaching such a world not only requires infinite 
time but also an almighty and benevolent God who ensures the 
synthetic connection between virtue and happiness, the regulative level 
requires a strong propositional attitude (practical belief in the postulates) 
that licenses us to assume the efficacy of our own efforts. Given that it 
is based on a belief in our own immortality and God’s assistance, it 
should thus not surprise us that the second Critique conceptualises the 
gradual dynamic of moral progress on the regulative level in pointedly 
a-historical, indeed a-temporal terms.12  
Regulative Politics  
Having sketched the role that the distinction between constitutive and 
regulative principles plays within Kant’s ethics, I now want to go on to 
suggest that it is also vital for an accurate understanding of his mature 
political philosophy. I do not want to claim that Kant himself clearly 
intended the distinction to play a critical role in the Doctrine of Right. In 
fact, it seems to be one of the respects in which the text is less devoid of 
                                                
12 In other works – particularly in some of the earlier essays on history and politics as 
well as the Religion – Kant attempts to conceptualise progress towards the highest 
good as occurring in historical time. However, his general construal of moral agency 
as noumenal and hence unknowable and timeless leaves it unclear how a notion of 
historically mediated moral progress is conceivable within the confines of his moral 
theory at all. Given the opacity (to ourselves and others) of moral disposition, how 
could we possibly detect whether moral progress is occurring? And given the 
timelessness of moral agency, how could we think of it as undergoing change in time 
(or even history) in the first place? See also Kleingeld (1999a, pp.70/71). 
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obscurities than we would hope. This is the case particularly when it 
comes to the regulative level and the somewhat confusing jumble of 
‘ideas of reason’ that rather proliferate in the course of Kant’s 
argument. Yet, I think that approaching some of the main concepts and 
claims of the Doctrine of Right with the constitutive-regulative distinction 
in mind is a useful interpretive effort. In particular, I hope to show that 
it allows us to make sense of Kant’s account of political progress.  
In a nutshell, the thought is that within the domain of right we 
need to keep apart two separate normative dimensions that concern, 
respectively, the very nature of a rightful condition – what constitutes it 
(and hence its juridical standing) – and regulative standards with which 
we are to bring a legal order into increasing conformity. In 
systematizing the distinction between the two dimensions, it is worth 
paying attention to two aspects in particular: their respective contexts 
of application (which inquiry is pertinent under which circumstances) 
as well as the kinds of duties they impose (and the agents to which they 
apply). 
Let me start with the constitutive level that, in specifying what a 
legal system is, allows us to distinguish it from other entities in the (legal) 
world (Weinrib 2016, pp.47-57). The thought is that a rightful condition 
exists wherever publicly authoritative institutions enable private persons 
to interact with one another rightfully by making and enforcing 
universally binding public laws. Of course, not every organised form of 
power constitutes a rightful condition. While Kant has surprisingly little 
to say with regard to what it is that distinguishes such a public agent from 
the pure exercise of power by a private agent who just happens to have 
a monopoly of force somewhere (cf. Ripstein 2009, p.337), at least 
certain formal features of the rule of law such as generality, publicity, 
prospectivity, clarity and consistency will need to be in place for the 
minimal threshold of genuinely public law-making to be fulfilled 
(Weinrib 2016, p.62).   
The norm pertinent to the constitutive level requires of private 
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persons who raise reciprocally valid property claims against one another 
to enter into the state.13 They must establish public institutions that 
enact, interpret, and enforce generally valid public laws over a specified 
territory, and submit to their rule. In other words, the norm calls for the 
creation of an agent that solves a ‘horizontal’ problem among private 
persons, namely their respective lack of unilateral moral authority over 
one another. In so doing, it enables them to interact on rightful terms. 
Keep in mind, though, that what Kant provides is (according to my 
preceding argument) not a Lockean account of state-formation as an 
historically actual ‘act of establishment’, but a recursive justification 
from within the existing state context. 
This requirement is satisfied once private persons are in a civil 
condition constituted by a public authority that makes law in the name 
of all. Its absence is described by Kant as a condition of “anarchy” (PP 
8:302, 346, 374) or – even worse, in the presence of a self-declared 
political power that conducts itself so egregiously that we are thrown 
back into a state of nature – “barbarism” (DoR 6:337,351, PP 8:354-5, 
357, 359, 376).14 In such a lawless state of affairs, individuals cannot 
interact with one another on terms that respect their reciprocally equal 
moral status; they are, rather, subject to the arbitrary powers of others. 
By remaining within the latter condition, persons commit a “wrong in 
the highest degree” (DoR 6:307/8). For unlike violations of private 
rights in the civil condition, which can be rectified, violations of the 
constitutive norm are at odds with the very possibility of public 
institutions and perpetuate the lawless interaction of the state of nature.  
Let us now turn to the regulative dimension on which, I hope to 
show, Kant’s theory of political progress is located. While the 
                                                
13 Somewhat confusingly in the context of the present chapter, this requirement is 
itself phrased as a “postulate of public right” (DoR 6:307). On the question what 
motivates Kant to use this concept in that context, see Guyer (2005, pp.198-242).  
14 In the Anthropology (7:330), Kant characterises a condition of barbarism as “force 
without freedom and law”. See also Ripstein (2009, pp.336-343), Weinrib (2016, 
pp.76-108), Ebbinghaus (1953). 
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constitutive level specifies what it means for a condition to be lawful 
(and hence legitimate), the regulative level is concerned with its 
adequacy or justice (PP 8:297, see also Weinrib 2016, pp.57-65). The 
thought is that the very rationale for bringing about political authority 
has moral standards for its exercise built into it. In the first place, the 
regulative principle of right requires the sovereign to bring the existing 
legal order into the closest possible conformity with an immanent 
standard of justice: a criterion for the just exercise of public authority is 
inherent to the rationale for its establishment.  
The normative standard central to a rightful condition – its 
regulative principle – is encapsulated in the idea of the original contract  
(DoR 6:315, see also Ripstein 2009, pp.198-204).15 Kant makes it clear 
that by introducing the original contract as the concept “on which alone 
a civil and hence thoroughly rightful constitution among human beings 
can be based“ (PP 8:297), he does not intend to suggest that we should 
think of the state (or anything it does) as based on an actual contract, a 
product of voluntary agreement between private wills.16 Instead, it 
pertains to the normative structure of the civil condition itself and the 
way it regulates interactions among citizens through institutions and 
laws. The original contract, Kant claims, is  
only an idea of reason, which, however, has its undoubted 
practical reality, namely to bind every legislator to give 
his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from 
the united will of a whole people and to regard each 
subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has 
joined in voting for such a will. (PP 8:297) 
                                                
15 I take it that the idea of a “general united will” (DoR 6:256) is located on the same 
normative level (fulfilling a similar function. It would warrant an independent 
discussion, which I cannot provide at this point. See Aichele (2008), Flikschuh 
(2012a).  
16 The failure to acknowledge this has mislead a number of interpreters (Kersting  
1984; Riley 1983; Rosen 1993) to read Kant as an actual social contract theorist. For 
a rejection, see also Flikschuh (2000, pp.147-152). 
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The function of the original contract is to provide a “touchstone of any 
public law’s conformity with right”. It binds the sovereign in their 
exercise of public authority, imposing a duty to design the institutional 
arrangement (and to make law) such that the people could impose it on 
themselves. The institutional structure that Kant takes to ideally fulfil 
this function is that of a “true republic” (DoR 6:341). In a fully 
republican system of government, the lawmaker speaks in the name of 
everyone through officials acting as genuinely public (rather than 
private) persons such that citizens can be thought of as collectively 
ruling over themselves. It is defined by a separation of powers between 
legislative, juridical and executive authorities that respectively specify, 
apply and enforce rules that respect each citizen as an equal. Through 
this threefold unity of sovereign competencies, the state reflects “the 
three relations of the united will of the people” (DoR 6:388).17  
Notice that the regulative level does not pertain to the 
(horizontal) relation between private individuals, but rather to the 
(vertical) relation between the sovereign and its citizens. Public 
institutions solve a particular problem regarding the former, yet in so 
doing create a new one regarding the latter. This opens up an additional 
normative dimension that simply lacks applicability prior to state 
entrance. For the relationship to which it pertains – that between 
sovereign and citizens – is not in existence. The state is the point of 
departure for considerations of justice to get off the ground in the first 
place.  
I have already indicated that the duty to rule and legislate in 
accordance with the norm internal to a juridical condition is incumbent 
upon the sovereign rather than each of the private persons. As the agent 
                                                
17 Kant argues that the legislative authority can be held by or entrusted to one, a few 
or many persons, such that the republican form of government is compatible with 
autocracy (monarchy), aristocracy and democracy as long as the three elements are 
institutionally distinct (DoR 6:338). He follows Montesquieu in defining despotism 
(the opposite of republicanism) through the combination of executive and legislative 
authority in one hand (PP 8:352; 324). 
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of authority, it is the sovereign – regardless of whether it is embodied 
and exercised by one, many, or all citizens – who is bound to 
continuously refine and perfect the legal order in line with its underlying 
idea, that of the original contract. This is not to deny that citizens have 
an important role to play in this process: in making use of their right to 
free expression, they can advise and petition the ruler, point out (in a 
cooperative spirit) existing injustices in “matters of taxation, recruiting 
and so forth” (DoR 6:319), and urge possible reforms and 
improvements of the law (cf. Niesen 2005, pp.129-202). In holding the 
sovereign accountable to the standards immanent to his claim to rule, 
individual citizens play their limited though indispensable part in 
bringing the legal order as a whole closer to justice. 
Notice that the “original contract”, together with other concepts 
located on the same level such as the “general united will” or the 
“perfect republic” are ideas of reason with merely regulative function 
and hence not equivalent to any set of empirical particulars. No actually 
existing institution, that is, could ever be fully congruent with them: any 
instantiation of a civil condition necessarily mirrors its own underlying 
principles imperfectly (Ripstein 2009, p.200). But to say that perfect 
justice is unattainable is not to say that there cannot be a duty to 
gradually bring a civil condition into the deepest possible conformity with 
its own internal standard, regardless of how defective it may seem.  
Strictly speaking, every existing legal order is “unjust” in the 
sense that, while the rule of law is formally in place, the way authority 
is exercised does not fully conform to its own internal standard. Yet 
unlike violations of the constitutive principle, these pathologies do not 
actually undermine the normative powers ascribed to a rightful legal 
order. While the former point to the absence of public authority, any 
defective version of the ideal republican system of government 
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presupposes it to be in place.18 So in Kant’s politics, constitutive and 
regulative levels issue two sets of norms that figure as distinct, while 
mutually implicating, stages in a conceptually sequenced argument. Let 
me emphasise, again, that this sequence is of a conceptual rather than 
a historical kind. The distinction between creating and perfecting a legal 
order should be seen as analytical, that is, as serving explicative 
purposes rather than describing a historical process. 
The contrast between the two normative dimensions and the 
ensuing conceptual bifurcation between (legitimate) authority and 
justice comes across in a particularly stark manner in Kant’s prohibition 
of resistance and revolution.19 He (infamously) argues that the authority 
of an existing rightful condition is “unconditional” (T&P 8:299): no 
citizen can refuse obedience to the law on the grounds that it deviates 
from its regulative standard. Even a legal order “afflicted with great 
defects and gross faults” such that it is in need of “important 
improvements” may not be resisted (DoR 6:372). As just mentioned, 
citizens do very well have the right to political speech as their “sole 
palladium” (T&P 8:304). However, when push comes to shove, “on the 
part of the people, there is nothing to be done about it but to obey” (PP 
8:297). That is to say, citizens’ right to be governed justly, as correlating 
with the sovereign’s duty to bring the existing legal order into 
conformity with the idea of the original contract, is non-coercive. 
The line of argument I have developed in the present section 
helps us to elucidate Kant’s rigid stance on this issue.20 The pre-civil 
condition is a lawless condition: not one of injustice, but devoid of 
justice. In undermining the very possibility of rights relations and hence 
                                                
18 In practice, it may be contested which pathology we face in a particular case. 
While Ripstein’s (2009, pp.336-343) preferred example of Nazi Germany may be a 
clear instance of barbarism, in other cases the lines will certainly be blurrier.  
19 On different accounts of Kant’s take on the (no-)right to revolution, see Korsgaard 
(2008a), Flikschuh (2008), Ripstein (2009, pp.325-355). 
20 Besides the rationale I focus on here, Kant also provides a number of other 
arguments against resistance and revolution, including from the necessarily non-
public character of acts of revolution (PP 8:381) and from the conceptual 
impossibility of a coercive right against the highest authority (DoR 6:320).  
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of progress towards just government, Kant thinks, revolutionaries 
threaten to throw us back into anarchy.21 Resistance to the public 
authority is prohibited because it “would take place in conformity with 
a maxim that, made universal, would annihilate any civil constitution 
and eradicate the condition in which alone people can be in possession 
of rights generally” (PP 8:229). This claim is not empirical – that 
widespread disobedience even against unjust laws would lead to chaos 
and anarchy – but conceptual: disobedience, resistance and revolution 
appeal to normative criteria that are not even applicable outside the 
existing legal order.  
The most important implication of the distinction between 
constitutive and regulative levels is that it allows us to reconceive 
political progress in Kant, namely as a gradual process within the 
constitutive framework of the civil condition, guided and framed by a 
number of regulative ideas. That is to say, Kant conceives of political 
progress as a process of gradual institutional perfection within 
established states. In each doing their part to bring an existing rightful 
condition in ever closer conformity with its own underlying standard, 
both the sovereign (who makes legal and institutional arrangements) 
and the citizens (who advise the sovereign and hold them to account) 
are guided by regulative ideas such as the ‘original contract’ and the 
‘perfect republic’. 
 It is precisely the distinction between these two levels of analysis 
that Ellis, whose interpretive framework we briefly touched upon, lacks. 
This leaves her confused in the face of Kant’s simultaneous argument 
for the need to enter the civil condition on the one hand, and to reform 
the pertinent institutions on the other hand. Ultimately, her recourse to 
“provisional politics” covers the tension – that I took to be a conceptual 
sequence – by conceiving of a single dynamic from the state of nature 
                                                
21 Of course we may question the underlying assumption that within every 
revolutionary overthrow (at the transition from old to new regime) there is 
necessarily an “intervening moment in which any rightful condition would be 
annihilated“ (DoR 6:355). 
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to perfect government, rather than making productive use of it. In so 
doing, she overlooks the way in which entrance into the civil condition 
fundamentally transforms the normative landscape. While we can 
ascertain, at any point in time, whether or not we are in a civil 
condition, we can simultaneously affirm the possibility of continuous 
political (that is, institutional) progress within that condition.  
3. Cosmopolitan Progress  
My presentation of Kant’s account of political progress largely focused 
on the domestic context. The core idea was that state entrance 
fundamentally transforms the normative landscape in that it yields a 
whole new set of rights and obligations that simply lack applicability in 
the absence of the pertinent relations. Political progress is thus 
conceived of as an institution’s gradual approximation of its own 
underlying norm. 
Now, recall my argument, in Chapter 3, that we get to the global 
standpoint through the (property-mediated) argument for state 
authority. Combined with the insight of the preceding section, this 
implies that there is a sense in which the creation of states gets global 
justice off the ground as much as considerations of domestic justice. For, 
state entrance comes with the obligation not only to bring the existing 
institution in line with its own standard domestically speaking. It also 
yields an obligation to take up the global standpoint and bring it 
gradually in line with (its own underlying) cosmopolitan principles.  
I would like to suggest that the role that the idea of perpetual 
peace plays in the context of cosmopolitan progress is thus analogous to 
the role of ideas such as the ‘perfect republic’ in the domestic context. 
In gradually transforming states into cosmopolitan agents, we are 
rationally licensed to adopt a belief that a condition of peace between 
all states and non-state peoples is attainable, such that our efforts 
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directed at this end are not in vain. The idea of perpetual peace provides 
orientation for our cosmopolitan activity within the state. 
Perpetual Peace as an Idea of Reason 
Let me start by returning to the passage in the Doctrine of Right’s 
‘Conclusion’ (DoR 6:354) that I referred to in the first section of this 
chapter. Recall that, in the first part of this passage, Kant presents 
perpetual peace as an idea of reason that we adopt as a practical belief 
in order to “work towards establishing” it. He then goes on to 
characterise it as the “entire final end of the doctrine of right” and calls 
it the “highest political good”. I take it that what Kant has in mind in 
referring to perpetual or “universal and lasting peace” is a condition in 
which each of the three levels of rights relations is fully in line with its 
own regulative standard.22 In such a world, all states are perfect 
republics, voluntarily join (and submit to the rulings of) a non-coercive 
federation that mediates, arbitrates and resolves conflicts, and interact 
with non-state peoples on mutually agreed terms.  
This is not a state of affairs that will ever be empirically 
instantiated, but a mere idea. Yet, given that “morally practical reason 
pronounces in us its irresistible veto: there is to be no war” (DoR 6:354), we 
must at least work towards it. In particular, in each our states, we must 
bring about “the kind of constitution that seems to us most conducive 
to it” (DoR 6:354). If our attempt to realise a condition of peace is 
                                                
22 I will proceed on the assumption that, in this passage, Kant refers to perpetual 
peace loosely, that is in the sense of “universal and lasting” or a general “condition 
of peace”. In virtue of a simple conceptual reason, a peace that is “perpetual” 
should, strictly speaking, be off the table at this point. For only a coercive institution 
has “the resources at its disposal to guarantee its own preservation” (Ripstein 2009: 
23), such that it can regard itself as existing in perpetuity. Yet, I have argued that a 
truly public cosmopolitan condition is something we cannot have. The only rightful 
forum beyond the state is voluntary and can be dissolved. This is not to say that it 
could not last for a long time or even forever. It cannot be thought to exist in 
perpetuity, however. If that is the case, and if the reason for this – as I have argued in 
the preceding chapter – is of a systematic kind, the idea of perpetual peace should, 
qua conceptual incoherence, not even be apt to function as an idea of reason. 
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“carried out by gradual reform in accordance with firm principles, it 
can lead to continual approximation to the highest political good, 
perpetual peace” (DoR 6:355). 
Notice, however, that even if we do our best to transform our 
own state in line with cosmopolitan principles, these efforts are in vain 
unless other agents reciprocate our efforts. Peace will only prevail in a 
condition in which all states act as cosmopolitan agents, and in which 
non-state peoples do not refuse to accept our offers of commerce. 
Hence, I would like to suggest that the idea of perpetual peace, as the 
“entire final end of the doctrine of right”, gives us confidence that our 
efforts to transform states from within will coincide with the requisite 
developments beyond our power that lead to a condition of peace. By 
asserting, “from a practical point of view” (DoR 6:354), that perpetual 
peace is attainable, we are able to coherently adopt it as an end and 
work towards it. We are thus licensed to think of perpetual peace “as if 
it is something real”, lest our duty to “work incessantly toward it” (DoR 
6:355) from the global standpoint be undermined by the unattainability 
of its end. This allows us to pursue a goal that would otherwise appear 
chimerical. 
Let me briefly explicate this thought with regard to each of the 
three levels. On the level of the right of a state, domestic and 
cosmopolitan progress overlap. For, the gradual reform of a state’s laws 
and institutions in line with republican principles not only entails that 
its exercise of authority vis-à-vis its own subjects is brought more closely 
in line with its own underlying rationale. Given that republics – where 
power is, by definition, exercised in the name of all – tend to be 
responsive to citizens’ own reluctance against warfare, they are also 
likely to comport themselves more peacefully towards other states (PP 
8:350, see also Höffe 2006). Of course, this will only lead to a peaceful 
world if other states invest similar efforts. A republic’s inclination to 
peace will hardly take effect if it is surrounded by warmongering 
dictatorships. And even a perfect republic can rightfully defend itself by 
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force if attacked by another state that refuses to mediate conflicts 
institutionally (DoR 6:364). 
As far as international relations are concerned, states are 
required to voluntarily join a non-coercive federation and respect the 
objective standards this institution issues in cases of disagreements and 
conflicts as binding for them. Again, their own willingness to do so 
remains entirely inefficacious if other states in turn retain their 
prerogative to unilaterally decide when to engage in war. Kant thus 
argues that “only in a universal association of states […] can a true 
condition of peace come about” (DoR 6:350). The alliance he has in 
mind –  one which aspires to be universal in the sense of ultimately 
encompassing all states – is precisely the permanent congress that the 
right of nations is said to be limited to. States can only consistently 
submit to such an institution if they can reasonably hope that other and 
ultimately all states follow their example.  
Finally, cosmopolitan right obliges states to legally enshrine 
refugee rights and coerce their citizens to comport themselves 
hospitably abroad. The final end of cosmopolitan right is described by 
Kant as the “possible union of all peoples [Völker] with a view to certain 
universal laws for their possible commerce” (DoR 6:352). I take it that 
such a condition is one in which states (and their representatives) find a 
moral meta-language for negotiating shared terms on the basis of which 
they can interact peacefully with non-state peoples. Now, this requires 
not only that states comport themselves accordingly. It also presupposes 
that non-state peoples accept their offers of commerce such that they 
can gradually get to know and ultimately understand each other. We 
are thus licensed to frame our own efforts to implement cosmopolitan 
right domestically by the “rational idea [Vernunftidee] of a peaceful, even 
if not friendly, thoroughgoing community of all peoples on the earth 
that can come into relations affecting one another” (DoR 6:352). 
To sum up, the idea of perpetual peace arises as a corollary of 
our duty to take up the global standpoint from within states. It is the 
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duty itself that warrants a practical belief that our efforts to transform 
states in line with cosmopolitan principles will not be in vain but that 
perpetual peace is actually attainable. State entrance commits us not 
only to promote the perfect republic, but also a cosmopolitically 
embedded state that acknowledges obligations beyond its borders. But 
we can only do our ‘homework’ (juridically speaking) if we have warrant 
to reasonably hope for external circumstances in which our attempts of 
peaceable interaction with other states and non-state peoples are 
reciprocated. 
In line with my earlier argument, Kant takes considerations of 
justice – both of the domestic and the global kind –  to get off the ground 
within the context of established states: cosmopolitan progress is closely 
tied to progress within the state context. In both contexts, our activity 
to bring about political progress is guided by ideas of reason: just as 
ideas such as the original contract serve to frame our effort to transform 
the state into a perfect republic, so does the idea of perpetual peace serve 
to frame our effort to transform it into a cosmopolitan agent. 
Progress without God or Virtue  
At the heart of my account of cosmopolitan progress so far was the 
analogy between the respective highest goods in ethics and politics. The 
two arguments are structurally alike in the sense that, in both cases, the 
looming sense of practical incoherence in the face of obligatory though 
seemingly unattainable ends licenses the adoption of a specific practical 
attitude. Just as the postulates provide a regulative basis for ethical 
progress, so does belief in the attainability of a peaceful world provide a 
regulative basis for political action from the global standpoint. Both the 
highest ethical good and perpetual peace as the highest political good 
are ideas of reason that regulate our activity as agents in the ethical and 
juridical domains respectively. In both cases, adopting the respective 
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practical attitude enables us to acknowledge our respective duty without 
sliding into moral despair. 
Now, as vital as this analogy is for the present chapter’s 
argument, it is important also to be clear about its limitations. To be 
more precise, we must avoid equating the two kinds of highest goods. A 
number of interpreters have suggested precisely this: that cosmopolitan 
progress should be conceived as part of or coinciding with mankind’s 
moral progress towards ethical perfection (e.g. Lindstedt 1999; Ypi 
2010; Taylor 2010; Goldman 2012; Rossi 2005, pp.87-113; Kleingeld 
2009).23 That is to say, we have to understand the ideal of a peaceful 
world as a component of the higher order goal of attaining a genuinely 
ethical community – the highest ethical good “contains perpetual 
peace” (Taylor 2010, p.12). 
In order to pre-empt such a misreading, recall that the highest 
ethical good is composed of two elements – complete virtue, as well as 
its synthesis with happiness. Kant introduces a postulate for each of 
these elements, such that the highest good as a whole can be a possible 
end: the postulate of immortality guarantees that we can be what we 
must be like, namely completely conform our dispositions with the 
moral law (i.e., acquire a ‘holy will’). The postulate of God’s existence, 
in turn, guarantees that the world is arranged such that happiness is 
distributed in accordance with virtue (Bader 2015, p.8). My aim in this 
section is to show that, despite the mentioned structural analogy, 
perpetual peace requires neither of the two substantive elements of the 
highest ethical good. As a consequence, the relevant practical belief 
does not contain any supersensible commitments. 
                                                
23 This claim reflects a wider interpretive position, defended by interpreters such as 
Wood (1999, pp.321-323), Riley (1983) and Guyer (2000), that reduces Kant’s 
political thought as a whole to its instrumental value to the domain of ethics. On this 
view, a law-governed social order is exclusively in the service of the higher goal of 
attaining a genuinely ethical community. Ultimately, the idea is that “if everyone 
had a completely efficacious good will, there would be no Kantian politics to study” 
(Riley 1983, p.17). 
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Let me start with the question of virtue. Some interpreters have 
suggested that institutional perfection requires ethical perfection: public 
institutions will improve alongside and as a consequence of progress at 
the level of virtuous dispositions.24 The thought is that only 
appropriately minded individuals will be able to ultimately bring about 
perfect institutions. What is required for a cosmopolitan political order 
are hence ethically transformed individuals. Perpetual peace will only 
be realised once “humanity’s moral disposition” (Ypi 2010, p.123) is 
fully developed and, as it were, as a by-product of the latter. 
Now, Kant is quite clear that perfecting the institutions that 
regulate our rightful interactions with others does not require that we 
perfect our own ethical dispositions (Ludwig 1997, p.224). As he puts it 
in Perpetual Peace, given that “it is not the case that a good state 
constitution is to be expected from inner morality”, being a good citizen 
does not require being “a morally good human being” (PP 8:366). This 
point is paradigmatically encapsulated in the “nation of devils” 
argument, around which much of the pertinent debate has crystalized 
(see also Höffe 1992). Kant famously argues that the problem of 
bringing existing institutions in line with their underlying regulative 
principle – turning a “more or less lawful condition” into a perfect 
republic – “is soluble even for a nation of devils (if only they have 
understanding)” (PP 8:366). Arguably, the thought is not that humans 
are essentially evil, but merely that they are not angels. That is to say, 
humans are finite rational beings capable of acknowledging the a priori 
demands of practical reason yet routinely fail to act on them. Hence, an 
                                                
24 In fact, the argument is usually that the interdependency between ethics and right 
goes two ways: not only do perfect political institutions require fully virtuous 
individuals, they are themselves instrumental to ethical perfection. Synchronically, 
politics contributes to the development of impartial dispositions in each agent by 
coercively guaranteeing compliance with public laws. Individuals will learn that they 
“cannot follow their inclinations with impunity, because if they violate the law they 
are subject to sanctions” (Kleingeld 2009, pp.172/3). And diachronically, institutions 
bolster the process of making mankind more virtuous across time by ‘knitting 
together’ the respective efforts of individual agents and consecutive generations, 
coordinating them over time and continuing them into the future (Ypi 2010, p.124). 
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improvement of rights relations in line with their underlying regulative 
standard does not require morally perfected, fully virtuous agents. 
In a classic exchange on the issue, Bernd Ludwig (1997) and 
Reinhard Brandt (1997) disagree about the meaning of Kant’s phrasing 
that the problem of republican constitutional design is solvable “for” 
non-virtuous citizens. While Ludwig takes it to imply that a moral 
politician needs to come onto the stage who arranges the established 
institutions for them in line with republican ideals, Brandt suggests a 
reading according to which it is citizens themselves who have the 
required ability. I shall abstain at this point from arbitrating this dispute, 
given that either of them agrees with my point that Kant decouples 
individual citizens’ route towards virtue from institutions’ route towards 
(domestic and global) justice. 
While the issue of virtue is concerned with the question what we 
must be like in order to be able to will the highest good, let us now turn 
to the question which external conditions need to be given. With regard 
to the highest ethical good, the answer was that the world must be such 
that there is a necessary connection between happiness and virtue. This, 
in turn, requires divine intervention: only God can make it so. We must 
now ask what the elements of perpetual peace are that are beyond our 
control though have to be met for it to be a possible end.  
In order to answer this question notice that, pace Guyer (2000), 
happiness plays no role in Kant’s politics. Drawing on a distinction 
Kant makes concerning two meanings of the highest good (CrPrR 
5:110), the highest political good is more similar, at least in this respect, 
to what he calls the “supreme good” (a good that is not subordinated to 
any other good – nothing is normatively more important) rather than 
the “complete good” (a good that encompasses all goods, including 
happiness). So the “entire final end of the doctrine of right” (DoR 6:355) 
only consists in a set of juridical relations, rather than two qualitatively 
different elements. The implication is that we do not need to postulate 
an all-powerful being with the power to synthesise (i.e., to necessarily 
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connect) these two elements. We can set perpetual peace as an end even 
without a practical belief in God or another kind of “naturalised deity” 
(Taylor 2010, p.10 fn.17; Williams 1983, pp.2/3).  
Yet, the fact that we do not require divine intervention is not to 
deny that there are indeed certain elements beyond our control that 
need to be given if our own efforts from the global standpoint are to 
successfully promote perpetual peace. As I have mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, unless other states also reform themselves in line with 
cosmopolitan principles, and unless non-state peoples accept our offers 
of “commerce” such that we can work to find shared terms of 
coexistence, our own efforts directed at a condition of peace will be in 
vain. So what we need – and what our practical belief affirms – is not 
the assistance of God but that of other earth dwellers; that is, their 
willingness of reciprocate our attempts to bring about peaceful relations. 
Much more could be said about these issues. My aim here was 
not to make a full-blown case against an ethicised reading of Kant’s 
juridical cosmopolitanism, but was more limited: that we should be 
wary not to collapse highest goods (or final ends) in ethics and right into 
one another. The highest political good – a cosmopolitan juridical order 
that brings about peace – does neither require fully virtuous agents, nor 
God’s assistance. First and foremost, this has implications for the 
practical attitudes that are required in each of the domains in order for 
us to work towards the respective final end (without a sense of moral 
incoherence). The postulates that the highest ethical good warrants 
include super-sensible features of commitment – God’s assistance and 
the immortality of our soul. These are metaphysically indemonstrable 
propositions which we are warranted in asserting on practical grounds.  
The practical belief in the possibility of perpetual peace, by contrast, 
does not include any such super-sensible (hence metaphysically 
problematic) elements – neither does it presuppose that we have infinite 
time to improve our worth nor does it presuppose a necessary 
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connection that could be brought about only by an all-powerful being.25 
The proposition that other agents will reciprocate our efforts is certainly 
not metaphysically undecidable in the same way in which God’s 
existence and our immortality are simply constitutively beyond the 
reach of possible knowledge. Yet, given that humans are not only finite 
but also free, we can never conclusively rule out that others will do their 
part in working towards a more peaceful world. This alone warrants 
our belief that perpetual peace is attainable and the future open to our 
continued effort. 
Conclusion 
At the heart of Kant’s account of political progress as reconstructed in 
this chapter lies the intriguing claim that the path from anarchy to 
justice goes through injustice: the move towards an ideal future 
proceeds through institutions that are initially unjust and gradually 
improve in line with their own underlying standard.26 This is certainly 
not an inaccurate description of how much political change has come 
about historically – as an institution concentrates power so as to 
effectively deliver certain goods, it is being challenged and held to 
account by its subjects who want their voices heard. For Kant, however, 
this is not a hypothesis deduced from real world politics, but inherent to 
the two-staged logic of political normativity. That is to say, the sense in 
which the creation of (imperfect) systems of positive law is a necessary 
first step towards the emergence of fully rightful relations within them 
                                                
25 One important implication of the fact the practical attitude pertinent to the 
political domain lacks commitment to metaphysically problematic elements is that 
the requisite progress towards perpetual peace can be conceptualised as occurring in 
historical time. Recall that the inclusion of supersensible elements requires Kant to 
conceive of ethical progress in (problematically) a-temporal, indeed a-historical 
terms. In contrast, cosmopolitan progress – the gradual extension of rightful (hence 
external) relations beyond the state – takes place plainly within space and time.  
26 For a contemporary (though not Kant-inspired) argument along these lines, see 
Nagel (2005). 
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is conceptual rather than speculative. Only once a condition of public 
right exists can respect for the more stringent requirements of the ideal 
civil constitution be claimed and brought to bear against the powers 
that be. Hence the much criticised reformist (i.e. anti-revolutionary) 
flavour of Kant’s politics: we honour our obligation to help bring about 
a more just institutional order not by undermining the current one, but 
by holding the sovereign accountable to the standards internal to their 
exercise of authority.  
In this chapter, I employed this framework in order to 
specifically think about Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan progress – 
progress towards perpetual peace. Emphatically – and in contrast to the 
domestic level – cosmopolitan progress does not require that we force 
others into transnational institutions with us. Rather, we take up the 
global standpoint from within existing states by transforming them in 
line with their own underlying cosmopolitan principles. Our final end 
in doing so is a condition of perpetual peace, that is one in which all 
states interact with other states and non-state peoples on the basis of 
mutually agreed terms. For such a condition to come about, however, 
our own efforts to transform states into cosmopolitan agents need to 
coincide with other states’ similar efforts, as well as non-state peoples’ 
willingness to accept our offers of commerce. The notion of perpetual 
peace thus serves as a regulative idea that guides our efforts from within 
the state. Insofar as we take up the global standpoint and acknowledge 
our obligations of international and cosmopolitan right, we may assert 
on practical grounds that a condition of peace is attainable. 




I began this thesis by reviewing some of the ways in which Kant is 
currently read, both by interpreters and normative political 
philosophers. I identified two dominant interpretive trends that have 
shaped the reception of his political thought in recent years: on the one 
hand, a focus on his cosmopolitanism as providing a particular 
institutional model of global order, citizenship, and democracy; on the 
other hand, the turn to Kant as a theorist of a distinctly state-based 
political morality, based on the much debated property argument.  
My claim was that these interpretive trends have sidetracked us 
from a particularly fascinating (though little-noticed) strand of 
argument in the Doctrine of Right that constitutes Kant’s most systematic 
and sustained attempt to theorise the juridical implications of global 
connectedness. Based on the notion of a global standpoint, I identified 
and highlighted a specific domain of moral investigation concerned 
with the coexistence of a plurality of embodied agents on the spherical 
surface of the earth. A cosmopolitanism that starts from this idea is not 
primarily intended to push a particular normative agenda, but aims 
instead to provide agents with a reflexive standpoint from which they 
must interact with distant strangers. While the pertinent obligations 
concern our interactions beyond borders, they are predicated on states 
and the discharge of these obligations is incumbent on states’ citizens. 
Kant thus employs the global standpoint in order to fold the 
cosmopolitan commitments that permeate his political writings from 
the outset into a theory of juridical statehood that emerges alongside his 
attempt to systematically develop the domain of right.  
In concluding this thesis, I will first briefly recapitulate some of 
the core claims made in the course of my argument (1.), before bringing 
together what I take to be the most important ways in which the 
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emerging vision contrasts with current normative global justice 
theorising. This will finally lead me to point to some potential avenues 
for further research. 
1. The Argument of this Thesis  
I started my argument with a move beyond the property argument that 
has become the focal point of state-focused interpretations of the Doctrine 
of Right. The cosmopolitan vision I set out to develop starts from the idea 
of original acquisition of land and goes on to sketch a ‘place-related’ 
domain of moral reflection concerned with spelling out the normative 
implications of corporeal agency under spatial constraints. The basic 
idea is that the mere fact that they can affect and constrain each other 
through their choices by virtue of their concurrent coexistence on the 
earth’s circumference unites what I called earth dwellers in a 
community of ‘original common possession’. 
Yet, this global community is not intended to function as an 
objective criterion for adjudicating individual entitlements. Instead, it 
constitutes a reflexive insight that constrains our comportment beyond 
the state. What I called the global standpoint is a distinctly first-person 
standpoint from which individuals must acknowledge their 
interdependence with others in a world of limited space. It is the 
standpoint from which we acknowledge our ability to locate ourselves 
vis-à-vis everyone else, and from which we act and interact with distant 
strangers with the aim of finding mutually agreed terms of coexistence. 
What we share with other earth dwellers is the capacity to come to terms 
with the fact of our concurrent coexistence as juridical equals. 
Ultimately, however, it turned out that the state remains central 
to Kant’s cosmopolitanism thus conceived. For one thing, we only get 
to the global standpoint through the property-based argument for state 
entrance, such that we must limit ourselves to making cautious attempts 
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to establish contact when interacting with those who do not share our 
own statist political arrangements. Moreover, the inconceivability of a 
global institutional order with coercive powers means that the state is 
also the site for implementing the pertinent requirements. Hence, at the 
heart of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is the idea of a world of radically reformed 
states that bind themselves (and their citizens) to rightful comportment 
towards other states and non-state peoples of their own accord. Insofar 
as we act on our own duty to take up the global standpoint and 
transform states in line with cosmopolitan principles, we can reasonably 
hope that other states will act likewise and that non-state peoples accept 
our offers for commerce, such that we can gradually approach a 
condition of peace. 
2. Theorising Globally  
I mentioned at the outset that, despite its largely interpretive nature, I 
intend this thesis to be of contemporary interest and relevance. In the 
methodological remarks of my Introduction, I suggested that serious 
and thorough engagement with a historical text can often prove helpful 
when it comes to orientation with regard to our very own philosophical 
whereabouts. In particular, at various points throughout the thesis, I 
came across interesting ways in which specific aspects of my argument 
seemed to me to contrast with ways of thinking that predominate in 
more recent disputes about global justice. I would here like to pick up 
on some of those themes in order to point out how the conceptual 
framework I have developed does not only contrast with predominant 
interpretations of Kant but with much of the contemporary normative 
global justice literature.  
A core feature of the global standpoint is its reflexivity: it is not a 
pre-established view from nowhere, but a reflexive, first-person 
standpoint through which we are duty-bound to interact with others 
  234 
with the aim of negotiating mutually justifiable terms of coexistence. 
Particularly in Chapter 2 I hinted at the way in which this vision 
contrasts not only with the natural law tradition but also its modern day 
adherents. By virtue of its tendency to reduce questions of global justice 
to questions of legitimate distribution, I argued that this theoretical 
framework has left us with an impoverished and overly limited vision of 
global relations. The problem, familiar by now from the domestic 
justice literature (e.g. Anderson 1999; Scheffler 2003) but less so in the 
global context,1 is not only that in prioritising the recipient-oriented 
question of ‘who gets what’ over a concern with intersubjective relations 
and structures, it overlooks important ways in which we relate to each 
other independently of each our respective holdings. Another worry is 
that in viewing individuals as passive recipients of goods rather than 
agents with the authority to raise claims and the capacity to create 
mutually justifiable relations, we lose sight of the power relations 
underlying particular allocations of goods.  
In exploring the most fundamental way in which individuals 
relate to one another globally (rather than how to divide up the world’s 
material resources), the framework I developed in this thesis thus 
reverberates with recent efforts to re-politicise the concept of justice by 
refocusing it on social relations rather than individual holdings (e.g. 
Schuppert et al. 2015). Kant’s global standpoint is intended to provide 
a non-parochial perspective that actually enables us to find shared 
solutions for shared problems. 
A second point relates to the highly systematic nature of Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism.2 An idea that we encountered time and again 
                                                
1 Notable exceptions are Forst (2013), Young (2006), Ypi (2012, pp.88/89). 
2 Kant’s at times obsessive tendency for systematic architectonic thinking – the 
labyrinth of more or less related (preferably threefold) divisions and subdivisions 
within and across his writings – has frequently been belittled as getting in the way of 
argumentative substance (Bennett 1966; Strawson 1966). Other interpreters, in 
contrast, have associated Kant’s systematizing tendency with his rejection of 
(particular Cartesian kinds of) foundationalism (Ameriks 2003, pp.37-80; O'Neill 
1989, pp.11-28; Flikschuh 2011, pp.138/9): absent indubitable first premises, the 
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throughout the thesis was that Kant takes the very concept of right – an 
account of the “formal external relation between the power of choice of 
one person to that of another” (DoR 6:230) – to raise cosmopolitan 
questions. Starting from the idea of right as an external morality that 
places rights claimants in a determinate and systematic relation in 
space, the thought (laid out in Chapter 1) is that the earth’s 
circumference constitutes the relevant spatial constraint once the a 
priori construction of juridical relations is mapped onto empirical space.  
In this regard, Kant’s framework contrasts interestingly with the 
motivating concerns of contemporary theorists. The latter tend to 
derive the need to theorise globally from certain empirical 
developments, for instance the fact that we are increasingly 
interconnected in a globalised economy, while at the same time 
confronting more and more problems that “concern our way of dealing 
with the earth as a whole” (Risse 2015, p.84). The heavily practice-
driven nature of these debates (see also Beitz 2009; James 2012) is in 
striking contrast with Kant’s suggestion that it lies in the very concept 
of right that it be global. His famous claim, for instance, that “a violation 
of right on one place of the earth is felt in all” (PP 8:260) should thus 
not be taken to express a normative concern emanating from certain 
empirical developments or diagnosed global ills. Rather, it speaks to 
Kant’s attempt to conceive of a thoroughgoing system of juridical 
relations that spans the earth’s entire surface. 
Finally, let us focus on the institutional implications of global 
theorising. On the one hand, there is a sense in which Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism as conceived from the global standpoint pushes back 
precisely against the tendency, predominant in global justice debates, to 
rush to substantive principles of global reach and the requisite 
institutional arrangements. Kant urges us to be wary of philosophical 
impatience despite the urgency of eliminating perceived injustices and 
                                                
only way to orient oneself in thinking – and hence to place philosophical thinking on 
the “secure footing of a science” (CPR B vii) – is to systematise thinking itself. 
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instead to systematically reflect on the question how individuals relate 
to one another globally. Partly, this is driven by his scepticism 
concerning the possibility of globally extending the very idea of 
statehood, or (more generally) to transfer and implement principles 
developed within and for the nation-state context to the world at large.3 
The global standpoint thus focuses on the quality of interaction rather 
than its matter, prescribing a form or mode of engagement through 
which earth dwellers can settle the terms of coexistence. 
This also implies that rather than providing an institutional 
blueprint for a global order, the main function of the global standpoint 
is to give us a different and critical perspective on our own existing 
institutions. I have discussed in detail the sense in which the global 
standpoint is also a global standpoint on states. In contrast, current 
global justice debates usually approach the state from either of two 
perspectives. First generation cosmopolitans thought of state 
sovereignty effectively as an obstacle to the realisation of global justice, 
which they conceived of as demanding just relations between 
individuals globally. Recent internationalists, in contrast, returned to 
the morality of statehood. Their main idea – which, somewhat 
ironically, is often taken to be Kant-inspired – is that states are to be 
respected as sovereign agents by virtue of the moral coordination 
function they play in relation to their own subjects. 
Kant rejects this dichotomy between statism and 
cosmopolitanism. His cosmopolitanism is one of distinctly outward-
looking states. The point of reflecting, from within, on the contingency 
of the institutions of property, territory or sovereignty that we have 
inherited allows us to take ownership of them – to see ourselves as earth 
dwellers with the capacity to collectively structure and transform our 
shared social world rather than putting up with the terms of interaction 
that we find ourselves in. Within states we institutionalise normative 
                                                
3 For a methodological critique of precisely this tendency in contemporary global 
justice disputes, see Bottici (2003). 
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requirements that go beyond it. In doing so, we bring them in line with 
their own underlying cosmopolitan principles. 
3. Directions of Inquiry  
Having highlighted some ways in which the interpretive framework 
developed in this thesis contrasts with a prominent debate in 
contemporary political theory, I want to end on a more constructive 
note. In pointing to potential directions of inquiry, I shall highlight two 
clusters of themes and questions that my interpretation has raised and 
which I take to be worth exploring further. 
The first direction of inquiry pertains to the questions of politics 
and space that were at the very heart of this thesis. I read Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism as emanating from a set of “place-related” reflections 
on the nature of politics under conditions of limited space: starting from 
the insight that human agents need to be somewhere in order to act, I 
showed how Kant develops a distinct domain of political normativity – 
built around considerations from the concurrent existence of a plurality 
of corporeal agents on the limited surface of the earth – that can neither 
be reduced to rights that we have in virtue of our humanity (in an 
abstract noumenal sense), nor particular rights of citizenship. 
The underlying thesis that the foundations of political 
community are place-related reverberates with an emerging discussion 
in the political philosophy literature about the morality of space, place 
and territory. A number of theorists have started to consider ways in 
which the spatial nature of human agency and political association co-
determine what we owe to each other. The thought that a given 
configuration of people at a particular geographic location has moral 
and political ramification has proven to provide original insights 
particularly in debates about authority, citizenship and migration, 
where philosophers are struggling to get to grips theoretically with the 
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increasing loss of the traditional congruence between membership in a 
political community and territorial presence. Authors have for instance 
discussed the possibility that mere physical presence in a territory may 
ground a right to stay (Ochoa Espejo 2016) or wider rights to citizenship 
and democratic enfranchisement (Bauböck 2015). 
It should not come as a surprise that Kantian perspectives are 
largely absent from these debates, given that Kant’s universalism is 
usually known precisely for abstracting from all particularities. Prima 
facie, it would seem that such an account is doomed to remain silent on 
the “locatedness” of agents and political communities, leaving it 
profoundly inapt to theorise place-related considerations of any kind. 
While this thesis should have gone some way in debunking this myth, it 
remains to be seen whether the mere idea that Kant’s cosmopolitanism 
can be said to be place-related on the most general level can also frame 
more specific attempts to theorise the moral and political significance of 
the relations between individuals, communities and the particular 
places where they dwell. 
The second issue I want to raise concerns the topic of progress in 
politics. It is fair to say that the very notion of progress has fallen out of 
fashion in political philosophy. Politically, progressive narratives are 
associated with the atrocities of the 19th and 20th centuries that were 
justified with regard to the grand utopian visions they were supposed to 
bring about (Geuss 2008), as much as with the devastation caused by 
Western imperialism and empire in past and present (Berman 1998). 
Philosophically, they are linked to the dogmatic and eschatological 
philosophies of history that are nowadays disdained as excesses of 
reason leading to metaphysical megalomania (e.g. Allen 2016). For 
Kant, however, the assumption that progress is possible has a regulative 
status: it is a first-personal stance of practical belief that our political 
efforts are not in vein as the future is (in principle) open to our 
intervention. As such, it does precisely not make voluntary action 
meaningless (as much metaphysics of history is suspected to) but 
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constitutes a subjective presupposition for it by orienting political action 
towards its projected goals. 
This practical reading raises a host of interesting and under-
theorised questions about the significance of progressive aspiration in 
politics, and the reciprocal or even mutually constitutive relation it 
stands with what is practically possible (Goldman 2012). From the 
perspective of the agent, distant ideals often frame, motivate and enable 
concrete political efforts. And in so doing, the ideals that we bring to 
bear on action co-determine the limits of what we can achieve: by 
orienting our action towards distant political ideals, we can bring reality 
itself closer to the desired goal. A Kantian framework thus 
problematizes the antagonism (striking in many a methodological 
debate in political theory specifically) between distant ideals and 
concrete contexts of agency. In other words, it invites us to thematise 
more explicitly the bridge between subjective aspiration and (the limits 
of) objective possibility in politics rather than construing them as in stark 
opposition. 
Of course, in taking up these themes and relating them to 
ongoing debates in political philosophy, we are bound to strike a 
balance between taking seriously the distinctiveness of Kant’s 
perspective (which is always tied up with his wider philosophical 
commitments) and the prospects of making his insights fruitful for 
contemporary contexts and audiences that often start from a deep 
scepticism about his framework. Yet, this should only encourage us to 
aim at a better understanding of the originality of Kant’s philosophical 
outlook, without ever ceasing to reflect on the question what we can 
take and what leave behind while sti
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